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ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes moments in which presidents interact with transnational
audiences, identifying and explaining their rhetorical strategies for developing a global
imaginary. Specifically, I first consider how George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev
negotiate geo-political and spatial metaphors leading up to their joint press conference,
symbolically ending the Cold War. Second, I discuss how Bill Clinton and George W. Bush
universalize the trope of “democracy” in their speeches before the United Nations General
Assembly. Third, I explain how Barack Obama figures transnational citizens and himself as a
global leader in his transnational town hall meetings. Together, these case studies show the ways

contemporary presidents call forth particular understandings of “the global” through speech.
Politically, this study is significant because it broadens our understanding of the institution of the
presidency from the framework of a national institution to that of a global one. Rhetorically, this
study illuminates the relationship between presidential speech, transnational audiences, and the
rhetorical imaginary of the global sphere.
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1

INTRODUCTION

On March 5, 1917, amidst the events of World War I, Woodrow Wilson stated in his
second inaugural address: “We are provincials no longer. The tragic events of the thirty months
of vital turmoil through which we have just passed have made us citizens of the world. There can
be no turning back. Our own fortunes as a nation are involved whether we would have it so or
not.”1 In this declaration, Wilson constituted the American people in a new way; because of the
interconnectedness of the world, he argued, the American people must act as “citizens of the
world.”2 Wilson’s speech indicates the ability of global contexts to press upon national identity,
and that presidents respond by refiguring “the people,” to some degree, as extra-national entities.
Still, even while constituting the people as “citizens of the world,” Wilson reminded his audience
of its national “consciousness of standing in some sort of apart, intent upon an interest that
transcended the immediate issues of the war itself.”3 In other words, Wilson asked the people to
understand themselves as national citizens who were set “apart,” but because of external
circumstances were thrust into the realm of world citizenship.
John F. Kennedy also addressed the complicated relationship between national
citizenship and world citizenship in his January 20, 1961, inaugural addresses.4 In this speech,
which occurred during the Cold War, Kennedy addressed “citizens of America” and “citizens of
the world” separately. The most famous line in this speech called for “citizens of America” to

1

Woodrow Wilson, “Inaugural Address,” March 5, 1917, in The American Presidency Project, eds. Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25832.
2
Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Deeds Done in Words: Presidential Rhetoric and the Genres
of Governance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 34.
3
Wilson, “Inaugural Address,” March 5, 1917; for a discussion on national identity in relation to this speech, see
Vanessa Beasley, You the People (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press), 53-55.
4
John F. Kennedy, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1961, in The American Presidency Project, eds. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8032.
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“ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country.” It is the
relationship between this call to action for U.S. citizens and the following sentence, though, that
is especially interesting. In the next line, Kennedy asked “fellow citizens of the world” to “ask
not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man.”5 Here,
Kennedy acknowledged world citizens and provided instructions for them alongside his
instructions to American citizens. Kennedy continued, “Finally, whether you are citizens of
America or citizens of the world, ask of us here the same high standards of strength and sacrifice
which we ask of you.”6 In this line, Kennedy used “whether… or” to set a distinctive boundary
between the two types of citizens, ending a speech steeped in Cold War-isms characterized by
stark ideological division.7 For Kennedy, “citizens of America” were to defend “freedom,” and,
by serving their country, labor alongside the president to “lead the land we love.” “Citizens of
the world” were instructed to work together with “citizens of America” to achieve this
“freedom.” 8 It is clear that one could not be both a citizen of the world and a citizen of America.
This speech suggests that presidents in the Cold War era understood themselves as the leaders of
the free world, a world cleanly and clearly divided between “us” and “them.”
This dissertation begins several years later during George H.W. Bush’s presidential term,
at a moment when global power structures were shifting and the global market was expanding.
The nearly four-decade long narrative of a world pitted East against West fell apart. With the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the U.S. was no longer under a threat of Soviet attack, and there
was no global hegemonic ideology to be protected or contained. It would follow that the

5

Kennedy, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1961.
Kennedy, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1961.
7
See also Sara Ann Mehltretter, “John F. Kennedy, ‘Inaugural Address’ (20 January 1961),” Voices of Democracy 4
(2009): 41-59; Sam Meyer, “The John F. Kennedy Inauguration Speech: Function and Importance of Its ‘Address
System,’” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 12 (1982): 239-250.
8
Kennedy, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1961.
6
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president then would no longer need to “lead the free world,” which had been a guiding
metaphor in U.S. political discourse since the Truman administration.9 Still, Bush positioned
himself rhetorically as the “leader of the free world” to defend international intervention like the
Cold War presidents who came before him.
In an early 1990 speech, Bush characterized U.S. involvement in the Cold War as “three
generations” of people who have “stood steadfast in a hostile and tumultuous world” because of
their “belief in America’s destiny as the leader of the free world.” This free world, according to
Bush, was “growing bigger all the time” after the “watershed events of 1989.” He continued his
speech by offering the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama as evidence of the good work the U.S. was
doing as “leader of the free world.”10 Bush made two interesting rhetorical moves here. First, he
helped his audience envision a larger, more interconnected “free world.” Second, he placed the
U.S., and himself, as the leader of this world. Robert Litwak notes that Bush’s invasion into
Panama was the first U.S. intervention since 1945 that was not explicitly connected to the Cold
War.11 Still, the U.S. president continued to position himself (and the U.S.) as the leader of the
world and acted as such. While the phrase “leader of the free world” fell out of favor after the
George H.W. Bush presidency, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama used
rhetorical strategies to continue inhabiting an extra-national leadership role—instead of leading
the “free world,” they figured themselves as global leaders. That is, their rhetoric suggests that
the scope of the presidency expanded from leader of the allied powers (“free world”) to world
leader after the Cold War.

9

John Fousek, To Lead the free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War (Chapel Hill,
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 146.
10
George Bush, “Remarks to the Chamber of Commerce in Cincinnati, Ohio,” January 12, 1990. In The American
Presidency Project, eds. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18027.
11
Robert Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War (Woodrow Wilson Center
Press, 2000), 31.
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This dissertation focuses on how post-Cold War presidents shaped this particular global
imaginary. I evaluate how presidents create transnational and global identities among citizens,
how they position themselves as global leaders, and how they interact with other global leaders
and within supranational organizations. In doing so, I provide a way of understanding the role of
the contemporary presidency and the rhetoric that shapes and upholds that role. This dissertation
asks, “How do U.S. presidents position the U.S. within the rest of the world?” and “What is the
president’s place in this world?” These questions stem from the notion that the U.S. president is
an influential actor on the global stage. Few would argue that U.S. politics cease influence at the
border of the nation-state. From U.S. participation and leadership in intergovernmental
organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the World Bank, and the United Nations (UN) to their role in
international interventions, including a “global war on terror,” it is clear the that U.S. actions can
have a tremendous effect on other parts of the world. And while all branches of government are
responsible for national and extra-national influence, the office of the president, as the “focal
point for foreign policy,” holds the most immediate and impactful control over U.S. engagement
in inter- and trans-national affairs.12
Thus, the primary focus of this dissertation is the role that the U.S. president plays within
the world, and specifically, the rhetoric that shapes this role. I understand rhetoric as public
discourse that is both instrumental and constitutive. Presidents use rhetoric as an instrument by
making specific discursive choices for the purpose of changing people’s minds about policy.
Presidential rhetoric is also constitutive. Ronald Greene notes that a constitutive model of

12

Dana D. Nelson, Bad for Democracy: How the Presidency Undermines the Power of the People (Minneapolis,
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 3.
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rhetoric “focuses on the role of public discourse in the process of world disclosure.” 13 This
project focuses on the ability of rhetoric to shape “subjects, personas, situations, and problems”14
as presidents construct an imaginary in which they are global leaders and representatives. As
James Jasinski notes on constitutive rhetoric, these texts “enable and constrain subsequent
practice,” as they exhibit “constitutive force through the cultural circulation and discursive
articulation of their textual forms.”15 That is, rhetors draw upon rhetorical texts and practices to
construct and alter reality. This dissertation shows that presidents do so through the construct of
the global imaginary. This rhetorical construct includes speeches as well as other discursive
forms, such as images and embodiment. It also includes speech contexts, such as the forums in
which these speeches take place.
While presidential rhetoric is usually understood within the context of the executive
office of a national institution, I argue that the contemporary presidency is better understood
within an expanded model of the rhetorical presidency. This dissertation develops and applies a
theoretical framework for understanding the rhetorical presidency that is grounded in the claim
that presidents construct and negotiate global imaginaries for audiences. These global
imaginaries are themselves a force of globalization. This framework offers a heuristic for
presidential rhetoric as it attends to how the meaning of rhetoric changes as it crosses national
borders, how presidents collaborate with other world leaders to restructure and define political
realities, and how political and cultural representation occurs through the physical circulation of

13

Ronald Walter Greene, “The Aesthetic Turn and the Rhetorical Perspective on Argumentation,” Argumentation
and Advocacy 35 (1998): 19.
14
Greene, “The Aesthetic Turn and the Rhetorical Perspective on Argumentation,” 19; Darrel Wanzer-Serrano, The
New York Young Lords and the Struggle for Liberation (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2015), 18.
15
James Jasinski, “A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography: Toward an Understanding of the
Discursive (Re)constitution of “Constitution” in The Federalist Papers, in Doing Rhetorical History: Concepts
and Cases, Kathleen J. Turner, ed. (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1998), 74.
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the president as well as his discourse. An underlying thread of this dissertation is that while there
are globalizing material realities—such as increased trade, a growing presence of international
governing institutions, and widespread communication infrastructure—the concept of
“globalization” is itself a construction. Instead of taking “globalization” as a neutral, objective
concept that describes the world as it is, I understand globalization to be an imaginary—an
imaginary that U.S. presidents help shape through speech.
In this introduction, I first discuss the rhetorical presidency model, explaining how it
helps us understand presidential rhetoric as well as the ways in which it falls short. Then I
discuss literature on globalization, showing that it is both an objective process and a subjective
construct in which the president may intervene and shape. Third, I explain my use of the “global
imaginary” as a rhetorical lens for analyzing contemporary presidential discourse. Finally, I
discuss the case studies for this dissertation. My first case study examines George H.W. Bush’s
interactions with Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of the Cold War. The second case study analyzes
Bill Clinton and George W. Bush’s speeches before the UN. The third case study examines
Barack Obama’s transnational town hall meetings. The concluding chapter discusses the
implications of this study. This dissertation provides a deeper understanding of the role of the
contemporary president and how he uses rhetoric to construct that role. Specifically, it shows
how presidents rely on a global imaginary to relate to different transnational audiences, define
global political realities, and extend U.S. interests abroad. Moreover, by focuses each chapter on
a president’s interaction with a different transnational audience, this dissertation deepens our
understanding of the relationship between rhetor and audience in transnational speech situations.
1.1

The Rhetorical Presidency
Scholars use the model of the “rhetorical presidency” for understanding how the

7

institution of the presidency shapes, creates, and restrains presidential rhetoric. The model stems
from the work of political scientists James Ceaser, Glen Thurow, Jeffrey Tulis, and Joseph
Bessette, who argue that twentieth century presidents, unlike the presidents before them, relied
on popular rhetoric as “one of their principal tools in attempting to govern the nation,” which is a
result of a “modern doctrine of presidential leadership, the modern mass media, and the modern
presidential campaign,” effectively changing the way the constitution works. 16 In relying on
rhetoric, Ceaser et al. argue, presidential leadership is oriented to the people. Presidents
increasingly “go public,” to use Samuel Kernell’s phrase, in order to bypass or put pressure on,
Congress.17 Tulis argues that the reliance on going public marks a “profound development” in
American politics in which “the promise of popular leadership [by the president] is the core of
dominant interpretations of our whole political order.”18 In other words, this model of the
presidency places rhetoric in the center of the relationship between the president and the people.
Because it argues that a rhetorical presidency bypasses Congress, it also places rhetoric in the
center of the relationship between the people and their government.
Using the rhetorical presidency as a model of presidential leadership, scholars have
developed insights into the tradition of presidential speech. They note that presidents consistently
rely on particular rhetorical tropes, figures, and myths in their speeches, and argue that the U.S.
public responds to these generic prompts in consistent ways.19 Patterns arise in which
comparable situations of rhetorical form, context, and content occur, with presidents responding

16

James W. Ceaser, Glen E. Thurow, Jeffrey Tulis, and Joseph M. Bessette, “The Rise of the Rhetorical
Presidency,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 11 (1981): 161; See also, Jeffrey Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987); Mary E. Stuckey and Frederick J. Antczak, “The Rhetorical
Presidency: Deepening Vision, Widening Exchange,” Annals of the International Communication
Association 21(1998): 405-442.
17
Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential leadership (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006).
18
Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency, 4.
19
See Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Presidents Creating the Presidency: Deeds Done in
Words (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).
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in similar ways to similar situations. Presidential rhetoric is, thus, both enabled and constrained
by the office of the presidency. As Mary Stuckey argues, the rhetorical presidency itself is an
argument of the “requirements, limitations, and opportunities provided by the executive as an
institution.”20 Rhetorical scholars consider how presidents shape and define crises (national and
international), how they define the national identity of Americans, how they persuade or “go
over the heads” of Congress, how their success in leadership depends on prudence, and so on.21
Importantly to this dissertation, all of these studies consider the presidency and presidential
rhetoric inherently within the bounds of the U.S. as a nation-state, focusing on the presidency as
a national institution. The world and its actors, however, are not so cleanly separated. Whether
the presidency actually developed its rhetorical elements in the late twentieth century or
deepened elements that had always been present, the model of the rhetorical presidency usefully
described the presidency and its relationship to the national polity at that moment in time.22 But it
is increasingly clear that we need a new model, one that is more appropriate for this time. Such a
model must combine the continuing elements of institutional practice with the contemporary
context.
Several scholars have critiqued and advanced the rhetorical presidency model. First there

20

Mary E. Stuckey, “Rethinking the Rhetorical Presidency and Presidential Rhetoric,” The Review of
Communication 10 (2010): 39.
21
For example, for foreign crisis rhetoric, see Denise Bostdorff, The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994). On the president’s power to define and shape situations,
see David Zarefsky, “Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34
(2004): 607-619. On the president’s ability to use rhetoric to define national identity, see Mary Stuckey, Defining
Americans: The Presidency and National Identity (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004). On the president
and rhetorical leadership, see Leroy Dorsey, ed., The Presidency and Rhetorical Leadership (College Station, TX:
Texas A&M University Press, 2002).
22
For arguments on how more speech from the president and other political leaders is harmful to democracy, see
Roderick Hart, The Sound of Leadership: Presidential Communication in the Modern Age (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1987) and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Eloquence in an Electronic Age: The Transformation of
Political Speechmaking (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). For an argument on whether a rhetorical
presidency has always been rhetorical and an examination of when the rhetorical presidency began, see Melvin
Laracey, Presidents and the People: The Partisan Story of Going Public (College Station: Texas A&M University
Press, 2002).
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are those who argue that the rhetorical presidency has spiraled into something more dangerous
than what Tulis originally described. For instance, John Dilulio argues that since the mid-1980s,
presidential leadership would be better characterized as demagogic than deliberative” naming
this the age of a “hyper-rhetorical presidency.” 23 While the rhetorical presidency, according to
Tulis, provided the president “an increased ability to assess public opinion and to manipulate it,”
the hyper-rhetorical presidency is aided by electronic mass communications media such that the
presidency can manipulate public opinion “in its sleep,” as well as “routinely and reflexively
defend presidential assertions regarding presidential powers.”24 That is, in a hyper-rhetorical
presidency, the president extends his executive power through constant mass mediated
communication. Often this communication lacks reflexivity and “real legislative analysis.”25
This, according to DiIulio, is an intensified and dangerous extension of Tulis’s rhetorical
presidency because the role of the president is more concerned with speech and image than with
policy. Stephen Hartnett and Jennifer Mercieca make a similar argument, but go a step further to
describe this new age as a “post-rhetorical presidency.” 26 For them, George W. Bush, instead of
defining the bounds of political discourse through traditional means of “eloquence, logic, pathos,
or narrative storytelling,” which describes a rhetorical presidency, marshaled “ubiquitous public
chatter, waves of disinformation, and cascades of confusion causing misdirection.”27 According
to Hartnett and Mercieca, George W. Bush used new means (constant communication through
mass media instead of traditional speeches) to misinform and confuse, rather than teach, the

23

John J. DiIulio Jr., “The Hyper-Rhetorical Presidency,” Critical Review 19 (2007): 316-317.
DiIulio, “The Hyper-Rhetorical Presidency,” 323; Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency, 185.
25
DiIulio, “The Hyper-Rhetorical Presidency,” 323; Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency, 322.
26
Stephen John Hartnett and Jennifer Rose Mercieca, “‘A Discovered Dissembler Can Achieve Nothing Great’; Or,
Four Theses on the Death of Presidential Rhetoric in an Age of Empire,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 37
(2007): 599-621.
27
Hartnett and Mercieca, “‘A Discovered Dissembler Can Achieve Nothing Great’; Or, Four Theses on the Death of
Presidential Rhetoric in an Age of Empire,” 600.
24
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public. That is, they argue that both the method and the content of communication changed.
Both the “post-rhetorical” presidency theory and the “hyper-rhetorical” presidency theory
are concerned with the relationship between increased unilateral power of the president and
reliance on constant mass-mediated messages. Hartnett, Mercieca, and DiIulio’s assessments
align in their evidence that the president’s communication strategy is more concerned with
defending presidential action than with defining reality and encouraging public deliberation.
Whether this means we have entered a “post-rhetorical” age or that the rhetorical presidency has
spun into a “hyper-rhetorical presidency” depends on one’s definition of rhetoric. Hartnett and
Mercieca argue that deceptive speech moves from the realm of rhetoric to that of demagoguery.
If presidential speech is meant to confuse the public, it is no longer rhetorical but is instead
demagogic (what DiIulio calls “hyper-rhetorical”). Presidential abuse of power through speech,
of course, was a central concern in the rhetorical presidency model. Tulis argued explicitly that
the balance of powers is disrupted when presidents take their agenda directly to the people.28
Roderick Hart and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, likewise, separately argued that a rhetorical
presidency is bad for democracy.29 While the merits of the rhetorical presidency have often been
questioned, with scholars focusing on how presidential speech might manipulate the people the
other branches of government, these recent studies show that presidential rhetoric has expanded
beyond the scope of the rhetorical presidency paradigm; whether the presidency is now “hyperrhetorical” or “post-rhetorical,” these studies make it clear that presidents now face the challenge
of transcending over the noise of mass media and speaking to disjointed publics.
A study by Susan Herbst and another by Joshua Scacco and Kevin Coe address the
problem of disjointed audiences and messages suggested in previous studies. In doing so, these
28
29

Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency.
Hart, The Sound of Leadership; Jamieson, Eloquence in an Electronic Age.
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scholars also argue that the rhetorical presidency, as defined by Tulis, is dead.30 For Herbst, the
paradigm is no longer helpful for understanding the presidency because of the changing
relationship between the presidency to the other branches of government and between the
presidency and the public. She comes to this conclusion through observations that mass media
makes presidential texts incoherent; that presidential proxies speak for the president, revising, reinterpreting, and re-making presidential speeches; that audiences are divided and elusive, making
it impossible for presidents to address them; that audience-based media technologies such as
YouTube create a situation in which statements on behalf of the president can be hacked up and
revised; and, finally, that the president cannot adapt to the “intimate nature of contemporary
media.”31 Thus, for Herbst, presidential rhetoric cannot achieve what it once could. The content
of messages is incoherent, fragmented, and recycled. What remains from the rhetorical
presidency model is the form of presidential speech. The president symbolically embodies the
nation; thus the president’s voice still matters, even if the content is lost.32
Joshua Scacco and Kevin Coe agree that the rhetorical presidency “struggles to
adequately contextualize the notable changes the presidency is undergoing.”33 They argue that a
more helpful paradigm would acknowledge that presidents cultivate a highly visible and nearly
constant presence in both political and nonpolitical arenas of American life via engagement in a
fragmented media environment. So, like Herbst, Scacco and Coe agree that not only the content,
but also the form of presidential rhetoric is important—that is, the ways in which the president
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interacts with the people and with other branches of government. They argue that the
contemporary presidency is ubiquitous—communication between the president and the people
no longer exist as “texts.” Rather they are “intertextual,” being “promoted, challenged, and
redefined by individuals.”34 This is because presidents, as “strategic communication actor[s],”
seek ways to identify with “an increasingly diverse segmented, and disinterested set of
audience.”35 The rise of mass media has changed audiences to the extent that the rhetorical
presidency model is no longer sufficient. Presidents interact with the people in new ways, and
the people themselves are organized differently.
All of these studies that critique the rhetorical presidency model recognize the rise of
mass media has altered presidential speech in content and form, as well as the relationship
between the president and the people. This is where my work begins. Accepting the premise that
the relationship between the president and audiences has shifted, this dissertation takes up this
question of the people. While scholars note ways in which the U.S. audience has changed,
diversified, fragmented, and become more pluralistic, I contend that another important aspect of
a contemporary presidency (be it hyper-rhetorical, post-rhetorical, or ubiquitous), is the
relationship between the president and transnational audiences. Scacco and Coe note that
presidential ubiquity “does not stop at the U.S. borders,” evidenced by the fact that other nations
pay considerable attention the U.S. president,” which heightens “the stakes for how presidents
talk with, and about, the international community.”36 That is, the contemporary president plays a

34

Scacco and Coe, “The Ubiquitous Presidency,” 2015.
Scacco and Coe, “The Ubiquitous Presidency,” 2015.
36
Scacco and Coe, “The Ubiquitous Presidency,” 2015; See also, Stephen J. Farnsworth, S. Robert Lichter, and
Roland Schatz, The Global President: International Media and the US Government (Rowman & Littlefield,
2013).
35

13

role not only in U.S. politics and culture, but also throughout the world. Understanding the role
of the president, through transnational speech situations, is the project of this dissertation.
Scholars of presidential rhetoric have done some work on the president as an international
actor. Political scientist Michael J. Smith, for example, distinguishes between “going public” to
the nation and “going public” internationally, and Robert Denton notes that globalization is a
challenge for modern presidents because globalization complicates the notion of audience as the
U.S.’s problems are intertwined with those throughout the rest of the world.37 These studies
conceive of the presidency and the rhetoric that flows from it as it is empirically—a national
institution. 38 I propose the study of presidential rhetoric that expands the focus of presidential
rhetoric to locate it within a network of global forces, orienting rhetorical analysis toward the
movement of texts across national borders and directed toward global audiences. Politically, this
project is helpful in understanding the presidency because it further contextualizes the
contemporary president’s role, which extends past the nation-state. Rhetorically, this project
helps us understand how a speaker—one who is the embodiment of the nation-state—
communicates with transnational audiences. Further, this dissertation shows how some aspects of
globalization are defined and created through speech.
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1.2

Globalization and Democratization
Scholars define globalization in various ways, meaning anything from the collapse of the

nation-state, to global free market capitalism, to a hope and aim for the building of mutuality and
eventual cosmopolitan citizenship.39 Rhetoricians are most interested in globalization as an
“ideology of worldwide communication”40 and in how social relationships “become defined by
specifically global contexts.”41 That is, globalization both affects, and is an effect of, discourses
and identify formation. Globalization scholars argue that that globalization is bound with the
idea, on the one hand, of organic relationships and flows between global units and, on the other
hand, of Western imperialism.42 This tension is important in this study as I understand the
rhetorical presidency as a global, rather than a purely national, institution.
One view of globalization is that it occurs at the systems level, affecting both the global
political system and the identity of geo-political units, which is precisely the process we see in
the creation of supranational institutions that declare universal laws and rights. 43 Anthony
Giddens also argues, though, that globalization is a “complex set of processes, not a single
one.”44 During the process of globalization, he writes, not only is there a “pulling away of power
or influence from nations into the global arena,” although this is one of its consequences, but
globalization itself also pushes down onto geo-political units, “creating new pressures for local
39
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autonomy.” 45 Additionally, globalization pushes sideways, creating “new economic and cultural
zones within and across nations.”46 That is, globalization de-centers the nation-state as the
“primary locus of cultural meaning,” because national politics are “increasingly rendered in
relation to transnational networks.”47 Nation-states are not rendered obsolete or even lacking in
power in this process.
Martin Shaw, similarly to Giddens, argues that globalization is a complex set of “distinct
but related processes—economic, cultural, social, and also political and military—through which
social relations have developed towards a global scale and with global reach, over a long historic
period.”48 Globalization, for Shaw, reflects a restructuring of power and governance that takes
into account the superpowers that arose from the World Wars, but not to the point of dissolution
of the state. In fact, he argues that the state plays a critical role in governance during
globalization, ever-changing though this role may be. The “global dominant contemporary form
of the state” is the Western conglomerate in the post-Cold War world. 49 This conglomerate, for
Shaw, represents a new global state in which certain Western nation-states possess “global reach
and legitimacy, and which function as a state in regulating economy, society and politics on a
global scale.”50 This new global state’s powers “crystallize as both imperialist and
humanitarian,” as well as in other forms.51 Global states are no longer “nation-states” in the
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classic sense; instead, they are “postmodern” states, which are articulated in transnational
western and global networks.52 For Shaw, the organization and power-relationships of states are
in the process of changing from nation-state to global states, but globalization still rests on
statehood, not statelessness, and agency is found within these global states.
Nations and national problems are intertwined and mutually influencing, which is
apparent, as rhetorical scholars Kendall Phillips and Mitch Reyes note, in supranational
institutions such as the United Nations, European Union, Organization of American States,
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and North American Free Trade Agreement.53 What
is less apparent is how presidents, whose power is grounded in the nation-state, deal with
political issues of both national and global concern. While supranational institutions were created
for this interaction, the role of the presidency is traditionally bound to the nation-state. Yet,
because the world is interconnected, presidents make decisions that affect other parts of the
world, for good or for ill. As this dissertation shows, they also regularly interact with, collaborate
with, and seek to persuade transnational audiences. Presidents have notably interacted with
audiences outside of the U.S. as part of the democratization process.
As Armand Mattelart argues, “National systems, whether technological, economic,
cultural, socio-political, civilian or military, are all permeated by a logic that transcends and
reconfigures them.”54 That is, the global presses upon the national. One of these global forces is
the project of democratization. When understood in the context of Shaw’s description of the
global state, which is currently dominated by post-Cold War superpowers, it follows that
powerful nations would rely on the appeal of democracy. The end of World War II brought about
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the construction of concepts “intended to announce, if not explain, that humanity had reached the
threshold of a new information age and, hence, of a new universalism.”55 Mattelart argues that
with this universalism came the global democratic marketplace, the freedom of commercial
speech, and the search for the “global standard,” among other traits.56 The language used to
promote mass media, in this age, was connected to the idea of liberal democracy. Mattelart notes
that words to describe the emerging power of the Internet included “decentralizing,”
“harmonizing,” and “empowering.”57 Increased communication, and thus, the right to
communication and the right to a free flow of information, reinforced—and at times became
synonymous with—the concept of globalization. Communication development is, of course, only
one aspect of global democratization. I offer it here as an example of how globalization can be,
and has been, constructed and propelled by Western forces, particularly the U.S.
U.S. concern for global standards became salient during the World Wars and the
following Cold War.58 Modernization theory promised that democracy promotion—and
communism fighting—would lead poor countries to economic growth, produce antiRevolutionary spirits, and convert nations to Western democracy.59 U.S. presidents were key
actors in promoting Western liberal democracy. For instance, the Kennedy administration
created the United States Agency for International Development and the Peace Corps.60 In 1982,
Ronald Reagan delivered a speech to the British Parliament in which he proposed an initiative
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that aimed to “foster the infrastructure of democracy” and “assist in democratic development.”61
Then he created the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to fight communism and
promote the U.S. interpretation of democracy during the Cold War.
For the U.S., because of the close association of the free flow of information in the liberal
conception of democracy, democracy promotion is linked to communication development. Karin
Wilkins and Bella Mody define communication development as “strategic intervention toward
social change initiated by institutions and communities.”62 That is, in practice, U.S.-led
democratic development involves building infrastructures for communication (such as radio
towers and cable lines) overseas and training communication experts. In addition to, alongside,
and through the establishment of the United Nations, the American press and the U.S.
government “launched their great international free-press crusade.”63 Margaret Blanchard argues
that this crusade began with the same ideology that encouraged the creation of the League of
Nations and the United Nation—to prevent future bloodshed. American journalists, specifically,
believed that their right to a free press “had prevented government leaders from propagandizing
the country into war as Hitler and other WWII leaders had done in their prospective countries.”64
Thus, if U.S. journalists could export this free-press system, the world could avoid another war.
This free speech campaign drew upon rhetoric of human rights and the promotion of democracy.
The crusaders were eventually granted Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), which states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
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this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”65 As I show in this
dissertation, U.S. presidents were instrumental in forming the United Nations and guiding
projects like the UDHR. This example shows one way in which the U.S. helped create universal
standards, which is a globalizing force upon other nations.
The promotion of liberal democratic principles is found not only in the form of journalists
advocating for universal press freedom, but also in the discourse of U.S. political representatives.
The way to peace, so Woodrow Wilson told Americans and the world, and as presidents after
him agreed, was to “make the world safe for democracies.”66 President George W. Bush echoed
Wilson when he stated the following in a 2006 speech to war veterans:
The war we fight today is more than a military conflict; it is the decisive ideological
struggle of the twenty-first century. On one side are those who believe in the values of
freedom and moderation—the right of all people to speak, and worship, and live in
liberty. On the other side are those driven by the values of tyranny and extremists—the
right of a self-appointed few to impose their fanatical views on the all the rest. As
veterans, you have seen this kind of enemy before. They’re successors to fascists, to
Nazis, to Communists, and other totalitarians of the twentieth century.67
Bush argued that the current war Americans must fight is against any ideology that constrains
individual freedom. In this case, Bush used the liberal conception of the freedom of speech to
justify military action in the “War on Terror.” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also employed
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post-Cold War rhetoric of liberal democracy promotion in her 2010 speech on internet freedom.
In this speech, Clinton argued that the U.S. must commit itself to the development of Internet
freedom around the world—members of the “global community” have the right to the freedom of
information and from government censorship and surveillance.68 Clinton made clear that the
principle of free speech and the access to information is a universal right that the U.S. must
actively support.
In each of these examples—the United Nation’s discourse and speeches by a U.S.
President and a U.S. Secretary of State—liberal democratic principles, such as autonomy of
thought and freedoms of speech (both the freedom to speak and the freedom to access
speech/information), are treated as universal. Liberal democratic rights are declared for all,
though the supranational institutions are not legitimated to enforce these declarations. That is,
neither political elites in the U.S. nor the United Nations have binding extra-national
constitutional authority.
Political theorist John Keane argues that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) promoted a change from representative democracy to “monitory democracy,” further
strengthening the conceptual bond between democracy and globalization. By making universal
claims for humanity, the UDHR sidesteps who “the people” are. Defining “the people” is vital to
representative democracy, and it is not at all vital to the emerging global democracy in which
leaders do not represent their people, but instead, their universal values of rights.69 These
democracy promotion projects, which seek to “prevent social conflict, as an agent of political
transparency and accountability,”70 attempt to globalize democracy—potentially altering
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democracy for the U.S. as much as it does for the rest of the world. This dissertation seeks to
locate the “people” in a global society—at least in instances in which they address the U.S.
president or the U.S. president addresses them.
Thus far, I have provided a description of globalization as both an objective process and a
subjective one. Globalization is an “amalgam” of irreversible technological forces break “down
barriers of time, space, and nation, … fashioning the planet into a coherent global community.”71
But globalization is also subjective and rhetorically constructed. Ulrich Beck calls this aspect of
globalization a “stage managed” political campaign for globalization, noting globalization’s
malleable features.72 The latter process is, according to Janine Brodie, “a contestable political
posture that promotes a transnational worldview, philosophy of governance and institutional
structures.”73 The two processes are interrelated, as political “postures” may stimulate the
material process of globalization. This dissertation focuses on the rhetorical aspects of
globalization within the context of its potential effects. I use Manfred Steger’s concept of
“global imaginary” as a theoretical tool for analyzing this rhetoric. 74
1.3

Global Imaginary as Rhetorical Lens
One productive way to understand contemporary presidential rhetoric is to consider the

ways in which presidents construct a global imaginary through rhetorical practice. This
imaginary varies from audience to audience and have diverse material ends. The concept of
global imaginaries used in this dissertation stems from Benedict Anderson’s “imagined
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communities,”75 Charles Taylor’s “social imaginary,”76 and, finally, Manfred Steger’s “global
imaginary.”77 Together, these concepts form a rhetorical lens for understanding the relationship
between U.S. presidents and globalization.
Benedict Anderson’s much-cited theory posits that nations are imagined. Though every
person in a nation imagines their communion with fellow members, these citizens will never
know or meet most of their fellow citizens.78 As Anderson notes, theorists of nationalism
recognize the paradoxes that historians understand nationhood to be a modern, objective
phenomenon while nationalists see themselves as having always been a subject of their nation;
that the modern formal universality of nationality assumed that everyone has a nationality—that
it is concrete; and that nationhood has political power despite “philosophical poverty and even
incoherence.”79 In positioning nationhood in the realm of a shared imaginary among a group of
people, Anderson is able to account for these paradoxes. Nations, in addition to being communal,
are also imagined to be limited and sovereign.80 Thus, citizens both create nations and are
defined by nations—citizens uphold a structure that both limits them and enables them access to
other imagined nations. Since the nineteenth century, this idea of the “nation,” Mignolo notes,
and the social role of “national citizen” has been the principal organizing structure for building
new communities.81 Thus, it is important to understand how nations are created and perpetuated.
The social, discursive aspect of nationalism is vital to its propagation.
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Charles Taylor builds on Anderson’s work when he writes about the “social imaginary.”
The social imaginary, according to Taylor, refers to “the ways in which people imagine their
social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their
fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images
that underlie these expectations.”82 That is, the social imaginary is an understanding people have
of who they are in relation with others and also how they ought to be in relation to others. Social
imaginaries appear in stories, legends, and images, providing basis and legitimacy for common
practices and institutions as well as for their transformation.83 For example, Taylor explains that
the Parliament’s place beside the king “was one of the most widespread premodern concepts of
order.” This concept transformed into a foundation popular sovereignty among colonists,
providing the basis for the Declaration of Independence and later the shifting of institutional
powers “the people,” newly realized, enacted in the Constitution.84 The social imaginary consists
of the “background” social knowledge that informs action, values, and identity of communities.
This background knowledge guides actions among citizens, which sometimes extends past their
nationality.
Manfred Steger brings Taylor’s conception of the social imaginary into a global context.
He argues that the end of World War II ruptured public consciousness. With technologies that
increased and accelerated the circulation of “images, people, and materials” across national
boundaries, a global imaginary was born. This global imaginary undermined the “normality” of
the nation-state—especially its notions of community tied to sovereign, homogenous populations
and the ideologies of those populations.85 For instance, British Liberalism, French conservatism,
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and German socialism of the nineteenth century were replaced by totalitarianisms of the
twentieth century—these totalitarian states ushered in World War and the global imaginary.
Steger argues that the rise of the global imaginary occurred through such events as national
interests being tied to events in distant locations during World War II, the importance of
transnational alliances for military success, the defeat of Axis powers and thus their political
belief system, the Allied war conferences in Teheran, Bretton Woods, and Yalta that “divided the
planet into expansive spheres of influence” across national borders, and technological
innovations such as jet airplanes, the atomic bomb, and communication infrastructure such as the
Internet.86
Thus, globalization is, on the one hand, a set of objective events. On the other hand,
globalization is also subjective—invented and codified by intellectual and political elites.87
Walter Mignolo notes that the “geopolitical imaginary nourished by the term and processes of
globalization lays claim to the homogeneity… from above.”88 That is, powerful figures and
structures use “globalization”—as both a rhetorical and material force—to make universal
claims. Globalization is, according to Mignolo, “a set of designs to manage the world.”89 The
president is one of those designers. I use the “global imaginary” as a theoretical tool for
explaining how the president designs global political realities through rhetoric. I contribute to
Steger’s concept of the global imaginary by showing that this imaginary is, in part, a rhetorical
production.
I develop an understanding of the rhetorical presidency under conditions of globalization
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by studying how presidential rhetoric functions transnationally as presidents use rhetoric to
constitute particular understandings of how the world works, and who has political authority to
make global decisions. Because of the “intensification of worldwide relations” that characterizes
the process of globalization, the president’s concerns and influence center on both the nationstate and transnational entities and problems.90 The interconnectedness of nation-states brings a
crisis of authority—it is unclear which entities have the power to act, and to what extent.91 Heads
of state, as this title reflects, have the authority to act on behalf of the country they lead.
However, when nation-states are interconnected through both problems that are transnational or
global in nature—such as immigration, world war, and environmental crises—and supranational
governing institutions, a head of state’s authority changes. It expands when given the opportunity
to impose unilateral action and it contracts when it must bend to the will of other nation-states in
order to protect its own national interests.
Moreover, as rhetorical scholar Rebecca Dingo argues, the political, cultural, and
economic interconnectedness of nation-states affects the way “texts are produced, circulated, and
used.”92 Understanding presidential rhetoric within the context of globalization requires attention
to the ways in which texts are created and how they move across national borders. That
movement occurs through presidents themselves and through the circulation of the discourse by
different forms of media. It also requires attending to the ways in which presidents use rhetoric
to position themselves within interconnected global political systems, which sometimes reinforce
national boundaries, and sometimes blur them. Presidents, who have some influence over
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interpretation and definition of political national realities, also possess some rhetorical power to
interpret and define global political realities.93 They do so, largely, through what I call
transnational presidential rhetoric.
I define transnational presidential rhetoric as rhetoric by the president that crosses
national borders. This means that a speech is either circulated beyond the U.S. through
presidential travel or through media technologies such as television, radio, or the internet. Or,
taking a symbolic view of the presidency—wherein the president performs his representative role
—transnational presidential rhetoric exists between the U.S. president and a leader or citizen of
another nation despite the location or circulation of that particular speech event. That is, a speech
may cross national borders even if the speech takes place within the U.S., because the president,
as a “focal point” of U.S. values, policy, ideals, and the U.S. public, crosses borders in
interacting with a representative of another nation.94 In these cases, the president is engaged in
transnational speech events.
This dissertation explores how U.S. presidents also shape and are shaped by a global
imaginary. I delineate three audiences with which the global president engages: other national
leaders, intergovernmental organizations, and transnational citizens. In each of these cases,
presidents use “democracy” to shape the global imaginary and to strengthen their role within it. I
begin my study with the fall of the Berlin Wall, which, as historian Timothy Garton Ash argues,
“has become a kind of master metaphor” to represent and predict the “forward march to
freedom.”95 Presidents mention the fall of the Wall in their public address as a symbol for unity,
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the promise of democracy, and global progress.96 Mikhail Gorbachev, Manfred Stegar argues,
was the first major political leader who “connected the necessity for a new political thinking to
globalization,” and Thomas Friedman named this moment the “birthday” of the globalization
system.97 Globalization has arguably always been happening—with every new transportation and
telecommunication system, with world religions, and trade markets wider than one’s own
community. This moment of unification, though, symbolizes, in both Mikhail Gorbachev’s and
George H.W. Bush’s words, a “new world order.”98 And thus, it is with the moments just before
the fall of the wall and its actual fall that my dissertation begins. I draw upon moments/events
within the presidencies of George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama
to understand presidential rhetoric under conditions of globalization.
1.4

Project Details
This project is organized both topically and chronologically. It consists of three analytical

chapters, each chapter attending to the presidents in the order that they held office and each
chapter focusing on the president’s engagement with a different transnational audience. First, I
examine the joint press conference between Bush and Gorbachev at Malta, as well as the
meetings that led up to it. Second, I examine Clinton and George W. Bush’s speeches before the
UN. Third, I analyze Obama’s transnational town hall meetings. By shifting audiences in each
case study, this study reveals different facets of the president’s relationship to the rest of the
world, and the rhetoric that creates and sustains it.
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Audience is important for understanding the president’s global role, and his construction
of global imaginaries, because, as John Murphy notes, the linguistic potentiality of rhetoric “can
only be actualized in a collaborative performance of speaker and audience.”99 In other words,
audiences shape rhetoric; the interaction between the speaker and the audience is a necessary
component for rhetorical effect. As Aristotle wrote, “For of the three elements in speechmaking—speaker, subject, and person addressed—it is the last one, the hearer, that determines
the speech’s end and object.”100 Audiences, then, determine the object of speeches differently
from one another. Moreover, rhetors shape speeches for particular audiences, potentially
revealing both the rhetor’s motive and the audience’s character.101 By shifting from one audience
to another, these studies reveal three important aspects of the role of the global role of the
president. First, this study shows how presidents interact with, not only speak to, other powerful
world leaders capable of shaping global imaginaries. While most studies of presidential rhetoric
focus on a president’s speech text, I also analyze how presidents negotiate and collaborate in
deliberative speech situations with other world leaders. Second, it deepens our understanding of
how presidents relate to extra-national institutions and citizens, thus revealing how presidents
help create transnational and global identity formations. Third, it reveals similarities and
differences of presidential speech across different audiences and over time. Thus, it tells us
something about the presidency as an institution.
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1.4.1 Presidents and Foreign Leaders
The first speaker-audience relationship I study is the that between the president and
another world leader—in this case, George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. Restructuring
global politics marked George H. W. Bush’s presidency, partially because he was president at
the end of the Cold War, and partially because of how he chose to engage with supranational
institutions and international political leaders—notably, Mikhail Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping.
This project only focuses on the collaboration between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, because it
was the heads of the U.S. and the Soviet Union who met together in Malta, created a narrative of
the nations’ pasts, and constructed the idea of a new world order, rhetorically ending the Cold
War.
Mikhail Gorbachev was one of the primary leaders of “globalization.” Steger argues that
Gorbachev tied globalization with a new political thinking—in his words, a “New World Order.”
Gorbachev spoke and wrote about the “objective process” of globalization that made our
“complex and diverse world more and more interrelated and interdependent.”102 In other words,
Gorbachev treated “globalization” as an external material force that explained social change. In
treating globalization as empirical fact, Gorbachev promoted the material trend and its
ideological counterpart. The two are co-constitutive. As the world becomes more interconnected,
so does the “subjective recognition of a shrinking world.103 This “recognition” by political and
intellectual leaders in turn spurs on globalization; for example, leaders enact neo-liberal trade
agreements, create transnational governing bodies, and engage in “global” wars. Each of these
promotes “globalization” while figuring the ideological underpinning of what it means for the
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world to be “global.” Gorbachev’s role in promoting a globalization makes him a particularly
compelling subject to study alongside Bush—his discourse about globalization reveals
intentional construction of a global imaginary.
This chapter examines George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev’s rhetoric leading up to their
joint press conference, which symbolically ended the Cold War. I argue that the two leaders were
able to end the Cold War in part through their negotiation geopolitical and spatial metaphors.
Gorbachev and Bush teased out the international identity of their nations, breaking down the
division between “Eastern” and “Western” values. In doing so, they came to terms with certain
“universal” values, such as self-determination and pluralism, which then guided their unifying
decision-making. Still, there were differences between the global imaginaries of the two
leaders—namely, Gorbachev imagined a multi-lateral world driven by these universal values,
while Bush imagined one led by the U.S.
1.4.2 Presidents and Transnational Governments
Bill Clinton’s presidency was also marked by the restructuring of global politics—in part
because his presidency followed Bush’s and in part because of his own insistence on “democratic
expansion.”104 For Clinton, expansion was directly connected to the international spread of
democracy, which is exhibited in his work with the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). George W. Bush’s presidency also sought
the international spread of democracy, as he used the trope of democracy to defend both the Iraq
War and the War on Terror. This chapter focuses on how Clinton and Bush constructed
“democracy” as a universal—a rhetorical process that relies upon the transformative process of
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national institutions interacting with global forces. While political leaders in the United States
have arguably been constructing democracy as a universal since the Declaration of
Independence, understanding how they do so in the contemporary context is especially important
when interrogating how presidential rhetoric functions in a globalized world. The methods for
constructing a universal, and the global impact of this construction, has undoubtedly changed
since the Founders drafted the Declaration. The purview of the rhetorical and political audience
has widened since the Americans first began invoking “democracy,” as a universal, thus
demanding a new method for understanding this rhetoric. Because of the expansive nature of the
war on terror, the ever-increasing use of communication technology, and the rhetorical and
political collaborations between nations as explicated in speeches for the United Nations, Bush’s
rhetoric circulated throughout the globe.
In this chapter, I argue that U.S. presidents use the U.N. to inform the global imaginary
through a universalization of the trope of “democracy.” Presidents Clinton and Bush
universalized “democracy” in at least two ways. First, they did so through the symbolic work of
their speech setting at the UN, which was most often before the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA). The rhetorical act of speaking before the UNGA, specifically, illustrated
democratic action, aligning the ideologies of the U.S. and the UN through collective political
approval. Second, the speech texts universalized “democracy” by conflating “democracy” with
“global market” and “human rights.” In their speeches before the UN, presidents drew upon a
particularly American understanding of these terms that benefitted the U.S. and its allies.
1.4.3 Presidents and Foreign Citizens
Finally, while Obama’s discourse was circulated in many of the same ways as Bush’s,
Obama also created situations, such as transnational town hall meetings, in which he enacted
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global representation. He participated in rhetorical circulation as he traveled to foreign countries,
there appropriating a forum for discourse that has historically been used in the process of direct
democracy to speak with non-U.S. citizens about transnational issues. This chapter focuses on
these hall meetings, arguing that the circulation of this U.S. democratic practice along with the
president’s presence provided an opportunity for the president to define the transnational identity
of foreign citizens while presenting himself as their leader, thus contributing to a global
imaginary. This study reveals, first, that Obama used American exceptionalist rhetoric and
practices to position himself as a global leader, teacher, and representative. And second, that he
paradoxically dropped this exceptionalism as he called forth a transnational and global identity
among these citizens. These two aspects of Obama’s rhetoric display the complicated dynamic of
representation and citizenship under conditions of globalization.
1.4.4 Backlash to Globalization
In the final chapter, I discuss the rhetorical and political context at the end of, and just
after, Obama’s presidency. This dissertation shows how post-Cold War presidents contributed to
globalization through their construction of global imaginaries defined by the trope of democracy.
In doing so, they garnered their role as global figures and, to some extent, intensified U.S.
engagement in the rest of the world. Recent years have ushered in a backlash against
globalization, and against specific acts of global engagement by U.S. presidents. This chapter,
along with reviewing the through lines of the dissertation, delves into the political and rhetorical
implications of the bourgeoning global role of the presidency. Specifically, I consider antiglobalization discourses around the world as the relate to the U.S. presidency alongside the antiglobalization discourses of Donald Trump.
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2

PRESIDENTS AND FOREIGN LEADERS: BUSH AND GORBACHEV END THE
COLD WAR

On December 3, 1989, U.S. President George Bush and Soviet Chairman Mikhail
Gorbachev, aboard a Soviet passenger liner in Malta, held a joint press conference—the
symbolic importance of which was not lost on the two leaders. “Ladies and gentlemen,
comrades,” announced Gorbachev at the beginning of the press conference, “there are many
symbolic things about this meeting, and one of them—it has never been in the history that the
leaders of our two countries hold a joint press conference.”105 This joint press conference was
important because the leaders of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, for the first time, were ready to
make a united appearance before the press.
This chapter examines how these two leaders arrived at that point, and, particularly, how
their rhetoric reveals global imaginaries of the two nations. I argue that this meeting is
representative of the discourse that ended the Cold War, and that this rhetoric reflects two
distinct global imaginaries. George Bush constructed a post-Cold War global imaginary led by
the West, and specifically the U.S. Mikhail Gorbachev’s global imaginary consisted of
multilateral leadership in an increasingly interconnected world. This chapter shows that their
negotiation of the “East-West” discursive and conceptual frame reveals and constructs these
imaginaries. The global imaginary, as Manfred Steger conceives it, is the “shared sense of a
thickening world community, bound together by processes of globalization that are daily
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shrinking our planet.”106 It is articulated in part, in the “ideological claims of political leaders and
business elites who reside in privileged spaces around the world.”107 The end of the Cold War
was brought on by a change in understanding of how nations are connected. The “new thinking”
in the USSR, specifically, presented a shift in ideology. Two of the mouthpieces for reconciling
this “New World Order” were Bush and Gorbachev.
Bush and Gorbachev were leaders struggling to not only end the Cold War, but to do so
in a way that fit into their polarized national narratives and geopolitical frameworks that
characterized Cold War discourse. By the time the two met in Malta, the Berlin Wall had fallen
and the Soviet Union had removed troupes from Afghanistan. The ideological discourses had
also shifted on both American and Soviet sides. German Chancellor Helmet Kohl had given his
10-point address, and Gorbachev had made a speech at the UN pledging significant arms cuts
and endorsing the “common interests of mankind” rather than the class struggle.108 These events
and accompanying discourses provided a context for the Malta meetings and the end of the Cold
War. In this chapter, I show that Bush and Gorbachev’s rhetoric at the end of the Cold War was
characterized, though not always consistently, by a push toward pluralistic political identity and
away from bilateral enemyship.109 In other words, the two nations came to terms with one
another as adversaries who were able to cooperate with one another, though they did so for
different ideological reasons with different political processes. As the two world leaders
envisioned the political path of the world, discussing Central and South America, the Middle
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East, Eastern and Western Europe, and the Middle East, they sometimes had dissimilar ideas of
how to proceed—it should come as no surprise, then, that Bush and Gorbachev figured diverse
global imaginaries through their discourse. While Gorbachev’s rhetoric evinced a global society
in which nations had the right to self-determine its political process, Bush advocated a vision of
market democratic enlargement. In other words, Gorbachev’s “global” vision was multipolar,
whereas Bush’s vision was that of a world led by the U.S. and was cohered by “Western values.”
This shows one aspect of the global role of the presidency—negotiating different imaginaries
with foreign leaders.
I begin with a contextual overview of Cold War rhetoric, highlighting key characteristics
of foreign policy on both the U.S. and Soviet sides, and paying particular attention to the rhetoric
that upheld these foreign policy decisions and ensured that that each side understood the other as
enemy rather than adversary. Second, I discuss the historical and rhetorical context of the Malta
summit, explaining the importance of both the bilateral meetings between Gorbachev and Bush
as well as their joint press conference. Third, I examine the shift in Cold War ideology and
discourse that occurred in 1989–1990 through an analysis of Bush and Gorbachev’s discussions
and speeches, leading up to, during, and just after the Malta conference. In this analysis, I
specifically focus on the ideological and foreign policy shifts that ended the Cold War discursive
framework, which I argue was through a management of the pervasive “East-West” frame. In
these speeches and discussions, Bush and Gorbachev both presented and negotiated their ideas of
global leadership and the characteristics of the amalgam “international community.” Stated
simply, Bush shifted from a foreign policy of containment to imagine the international
community led by the U.S. through NATO. Gorbachev rejected the Brezhnev Doctrine, arguing
for self-determination and multilateral leadership of the international community. By analyzing
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their conversations and joint press conference through the lens of the “East-West” frame, I show
how spatial and geopolitical metaphors undergirded conceptual differences of the world and,
because of their abstraction, also provided a way for the two visions to cohere. I conclude with
the implications of how global imaginaries shape foreign policy. While Bush and Gorbachev
held different views of the global, they were both concerned with world peace and some level of
self-determination among nations, allowing the two to make a showing of solidarity in a joint
press conference that symbolically ended the Cold War. This shows one way presidents navigate
their role in an inter-connected world.
2.1

Cold War Global Imaginary
The U.S. and Soviet Union were both nations founded on ideas. According historian Odd

Arne Westad, the U.S. was founded on the idea of liberty which manifested in democracy while
the Soviet Union was founded on the idea of justice which it found in communism.110 These two
sometimes-opposing ideologies became the foundation of the Cold War. Ideological polarization
of the world into “Eastern” and “Western” Blocs and the tension between the two characterized
the Cold War. The conceptual division of two distinct global spheres created and sustained an
Other with distinct values, traditions, and identity. This rhetorical distinction of the two sides
generated incompatible global imaginaries during the Cold War. This incompatibility was bound
to the rhetoric that sustained it.111
The naming of this state of relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union as the “Cold
War” exemplifies the centrality of rhetoric for this era. “Cold War” is a metaphor that, as Robert
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Scott explains, positioned the Soviet Union as an enemy of war, on the one hand; on the other, it
encouraged state actors to keep confrontations nonviolent.112 Moreover, it was a choice to
exclude combat that influenced, and resulted from, the state of affairs between the two nations as
a legitimate part of the war.113 Soviets, in fact, refused to use the term “Cold War” in an official
capacity until Gorbachev’s era, during which the war ended. The U.S. used the phrase “Cold
War,” and in doing so framed the Soviet threat and the U.S.’s mission to contain this threat; the
Soviet’s disregard for the word was just as rhetorically significant, as doing so implied that their
country was “peaceful” unlike U.S. imperialists.114 The name “Cold War” thus presents a
microcosm of the rhetorical difficulty of the “East” and the “West” to form a compatible global
imaginary.
Rhetoric was, as Martin Medhurst aptly notes, “the issue” of the Cold War. It was, in
Medhurt’s phrase, a “war of words.”115 Thus, rhetorical scholars have developed methodologies
for understanding Cold War rhetoric. We know that U.S. public discourse upheld tension
between the two states and shaped and justified U.S. foreign policy decisions. Scholars have
used close-text analysis to understand Cold War metaphors and they have traced discourses to
myths of national identity.116 Soviet public address, of course, also reveals national ideology.
This ideology, characterized by a commitment to social justice, compelled Soviet leaders to
protect communist nations, just as the commitment to liberty and democracy compelled U.S.
presidents to create foreign policy to protect democratic nations. Extending previous studies of
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Cold War discourse, I analyze Gorbachev’s rhetoric in addition to, and in comparison with,
Bush’s speech. The rhetorical choices of state actors in the U.S. and the USSR, such as in the
anecdotal “Cold War” metaphor or the “East-West” frame that guides my analysis, help explain
the events of the Cold War as they reveal the motives of the agents of the Cold War and tie their
discourses to deep cultural and national identity.
In this section, I provide the rhetorical and historical context in which Bush and
Gorbachev’s Malta meetings took place. I use the lens of U.S. and Soviet ideologies—liberty
through democracy and justice through communism, respectively—to examine Cold War foreign
policy discourses before these discourses shifted, and ended, the Cold War.
2.1.1

U.S. Liberty and Soviet Justice: Containing/Expanding Communism
Both the U.S. and Soviet Russia were nations founded on universal ideals—the U.S.,

liberty, and the Soviet Union, justice117—which informed their foreign policy during the Cold
War. The Soviet’s Brezhnev Doctrine was established to uphold the Soviet ideal, justice, by
expanding communism. The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, on the other hand, which
Truman described as “two halves of the same walnut,” were established as agents of liberty in an
effort to protect the world from communism.118 To do so, the U.S. would “contain” communism.
“Containment” became a master metaphor of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War.
Metaphors are inherent in language, so they are inescapable. They are also linguistic choices, so
they can reveal motive.119 Metaphorical choices both exaggerate and literalize, thus enabling and
constraining how we imagine the political situation and shaping foreign policy.
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“Containment” derives from the container metaphor, which Paul Chilton argues is the
main source domain “for the metaphorical conception of international relations.”120 In other
words, the container schema is a descriptor for a cluster of metaphors commonly used in
international political discourse. As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson note, we conceive through
metaphors, and “we act according to the way we conceive of things.”121 The container schema
provided a way to understand international relations and a way for presidents to enact
international policy during the Cold War. Truman sought to contain communism with the
Marshall Plan by providing monetary support for Europe, arguing that “the seeds of totalitarian
regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and
strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died..”122 Here,
Truman used the container metaphor (in combination with a plant metaphor) to illustrate the
need for financial assistance—when people are poor, the evil of communism “spreads” and
“grows.” This quotation also exemplifies how the conceptualization of the body contains
metaphors also within the container schema. When hope “has died,” communism can grow.
Here, the “disease” metaphor is clustered with the “body” metaphor. These metaphors worked
within the container schema to justify foreign policy.
U.S. politicians also used metaphor to create an enemy Other; it, too, was bound to the
container schema. Several rhetorical scholars note that presidents use the “disease metaphor” in
relation to international politics, enemies, and the “spread” of communism, specifically.123 In
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these instances, a disease is a foreign Other—either in the form of an ideology, a nation, or an
enemy people—and it infiltrates and spreads through the “body politic.”124 These examples Other
the Soviets by describing them, and their ideologies, as infectious diseases that could “spread”
through the rest of the world (a container). Thus, the container schema helped figure both the
enemy and the solution to the enemy. Robert Ivie provides more examples of how U.S. discourse
constructed an enemy Other. For instance, Cold War rhetors shaped perceptions of Soviets when
they treated “Soviet” and “savage” as identical terms instead of as distinct terms. Other
metaphors that structured the understanding of the Cold War include Soviets as a “germ infecting
the body politic, a plague upon the liberty of human kind, and a barbarian intent upon destroying
civilization.”125 Each of these metaphors contributed to the need and justification for war, and
each of them are part of the “containment” schema. Whether Soviets were framed as savages
bent on destroying the American way of life or germs that could poison the rest of the world, this
discourse provided a reason to “contain” them.
While “containment” characterized the foreign policy of all Cold War presidents, each
president after Truman differed in the ways they went about “containing” the Soviet threat. For
instance, Truman intervened with the Marshall Plan, which provided financial assistance for
rebuilding European economies after World War II; Eisenhower increased nuclear weapons; and
Johnson focused on blocking communism from Latin America (specifically the Dominican
Republic).126 These presidents presented justifications for their actions by using the metaphor of
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preventing communism from “spreading” throughout the globe. Moreover, their rhetoric hinged
on an understanding of the “West” as democratic, free, and civilized and the “East” as savage.
U.S. discourse, specifically, was based in the ideology of liberty and democracy as superior
ideologies to communism, warranting “containment” of communism, which sometimes required
intervention.
U.S. foreign policy was concerned with more than the Soviet Bloc. The unaligned,
formerly colonized Third World became an ideological and territorial battleground between the
Soviet “East” and the U.S. “West.” Truman explicated the U.S. position in what became known
as the Truman Doctrine, saying, “One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the U.S.
is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life
free from coercion.” 127 That is, Truman believed that the role of the U.S. was to protect other
nations from non-democratic government. One justification for this foreign policy objective,
which demanded U.S. intervention and global leadership, was the most ubiquitous Cold War
phrase, according to Robert McMahon—its “defense of peace and freedom abroad.”128 Presidents
tied this defense of democratic expansion and protection directly to domestic security. Truman
said, for example, “The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had
totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. This imposed aggression undermines the
foundations of international peace and the security of the United States.”129 In other words,
communism abroad directly affected international security and peace as well as domestic
security and peace. Communism, for U.S. presidents, was the ideological threat that warranted
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international intervention for the sake of global and domestic peace, an urge present in U.S.
rhetorical history since manifest destiny.130
U.S. Cold War foreign policy discourse created an enemy Other through metaphor. This
discourse also used metaphor to solve the problem of this enemy Other as the U.S. sought to
“contain” Soviet communism. These metaphors constructed and reflected the U.S. Cold War
global imaginary that was pervasive when Bush and Gorbachev met in Malta—that the world
was divided into an objective “East” and “West,” and that the “West” was superior to the “East.”
2.1.2

“New Thinking” Under Gorbachev
By the end of 1989 when Gorbachev and Bush met in Malta, Soviets had begun to shift

their global imaginary away from the “East-West” paradigm. Before Soviet intellectuals’ “new
thinking” in the Soviet Union, which was eventually headed by Gorbachev, the 1968 Soviet
foreign policy was characterized by the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Brezhnev Doctrine was
remarkably similar to U.S. Cold War foreign policy in form. Instead of arguing that capitalist and
democratic nations must make the world safe for democracy, Leonid Brezhnev argued, “When
forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards
capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and
concern of all socialist countries.” 131 This doctrine justified the invasion of communist countries
for the sake of keeping them communist, supporting the principle of the limited sovereignty of
the Soviet Union. The principle of limited sovereignty meant that nations in the Eastern Bloc
were to act cohesively, and thus were not fully independent states.
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Around the same time that Leonid Brezhnev popularized what became known as the
Brezhnev Doctrine,132 an intellectual elite was emerging in the Soviet Union. These intellectuals
ushered in a new global imaginary characterized by international integration and rooted in “the
cultural thaw, domestic liberalization, and burgeoning foreign ties of the early post-Stalin era.”133
By the early 1970s, before the worsening of relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union, this
minority group of elites was promoting foreign and domestic policy reforms, paving the way for
Gorbachev’s perestroika.134 When Gorbachev came to power, he brought “new thinking” with
him, shifting the Cold War paradigm of previous Soviet leaders during the Cold War. Instead of
positioning the Soviet Union against the “West,” “new thinking” positioned the Soviet Union’s
national identity as members within the international community and in cooperation with the
“West.”135 This “new thinking” is apparent in the discussions between Bush and Gorbachev in
Malta, and it aided in ending the Cold War.
2.2

Setting: Malta
Bush and Gorbachev’s meeting at Malta was surprisingly significant, even to the two

leaders who arranged it. The meeting was intended as an “interim” session before a full-scale
summit in 1990. But as Sventlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton note, it took on a “life of its
own, symbolically bringing the Cold War to a close.”136 In part, this was because of radical
reform in the Soviet Union. As revolutionary changes were taking place in Eastern Europe, for
instance, Gorbachev refused to use force to suppress them, even providing explicit permission to
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Hungary in March 1989 to open its borders.137 Additionally, Gorbachev pledged to drastically
reduce arms and his stated commitment to Bush that the Soviet Union would “never start a hot
war against the United States of America.138 Together, Gorbachev’s words and actions
exemplified a global imaginary of a world in which self-determined nations worked in
cooperation with one another.139 While this global imaginary was not the same as Bush’s—as
Bush was committed to a world led by NATO and “Western values,” there was also overlap
between these two visions. For instance, Bush and Gorbachev agreed on many values—what
Bush called “Western,” Gorbachev insisted were “universal.” And “self-determinism” to some
extent aligned with the U.S.’s call for “democracy.” During their time at Malta, the two were
able to collaborate at the points where these visions intersected. This is interaction and the
resulting vision that, to a certain extent the two leaders shared, is important for understanding the
contemporary role of the president as it shows how presidents manage interpersonal relationships
with people who have the power to affect the globe.
Gorbachev and Bush first held several private meetings over the course of two days. The
meetings were deliberative, each exchanging their views for how the two nations should move
forward. This was the first substantial amount of time the two leaders had spent together since
Bush became president. Those meetings marked the beginning of “actual diplomacy” between
the two leaders.140 The transcripts of these meetings reveal two leaders coming to terms with one
another and creating a plan for a cooperative future. The success of the meetings is evident in the
joint press conference that took place at the end of their time in Malta. At this point, the
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rhetorical context shifted from an interpersonal collaboration of global visions between two
world leaders and the enactment of that vision before a global audience.
The rhetorical and political functions of a joint press conference are complex. A joint
press conference is both performative and epideictic, evincing the transnational role of national
leaders as well as some degree of solidarity between the two. It is also deliberative, requiring
accountability of both leaders to the cross-section of national audiences in attendance of the
event as well as the transnational and global audiences who consume mediated versions of the
event. These speech acts accomplish the rhetorical work of enacting a pluralistic, antagonistic
global community, qualities that were only sometimes within the scope of the leaders’ global
visions.
Moreover, joint press conferences are transnational presidential rhetorical events, and
they are moments in which presidents enact their global role. George H. W. Bush was the first
president to regularly hold joint press conferences with foreign leaders.141 Since then, joint press
conferences have been a standard event for presidents, both in the White House and during
presidential trips. Now joint press conferences account for over half of all press conferences for
modern presidents.142 The role of these press conferences, according to Aditi Bhatia, is the
presentation of a “joint and united front between two leaders.”143 For Bush and Gorbachev to
decide to have a joint press conference shows that the relationship between the two nations were
stronger than ever before, and it signaled a cooperative future.
Bhatia also finds a generic sequence of the joint press conference. First, the host
welcomes the guest politician, usually noting the previous meetings of the two leaders before
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moving on to the topics discussed in the present meeting. Second, there are individual statements
by each leader, with the host providing the first statement. Third, the politicians answer questions
by the press. Finally, each speaker provides a closing statement.144 Bush and Gorbachev’s press
conference followed this sequence. Though press conferences are formulaic, they make possible
an “increased intimacy between the people and their leader” because the press conference, unlike
formal public address, create the potential for dialogue.145 Presidents and foreign leaders are to
some extent prepared to answer questions by the press; still, the question-and-answer part of the
joint press conference brings a degree of “mutuality and spontaneity,” forcing the leaders to
interact with citizens.146 In short, presidential press conferences are opportunities for democratic
talk. In December 1989, as representatives of ideologically opposed nations, Bush and
Gorbachev showed a somewhat unified image of national leadership, while also being held
accountable to transnational press. In doing so, they figured themselves, to some extent, as global
leaders.
Presidential press conferences are, as Roderick Hart and Joshua Scacco note, a collision
of institutions—the presidency and the press—and occasions that neither institution particularly
enjoys. While most presidents prefer to avoid press questions and maintain their own rhetorical
agenda, members of the press are often disappointed with their interactions with presidents
because press members have to be so easy on them.147 Still, press conferences persist. They are a
reminder that the president is held accountable to the people. Joint press conferences between the
U.S. president and the leader of another nation are, arguably, a collision of at least four
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institutions—the U.S. presidency, the office of the international leader, the U.S. press, and the
international press. Joint press conferences are both institutional speech acts and opportunities
for transnational democratic talk. Just as the presidential press conference brings to bear the
relationship between the president and the people, joint press conferences are driven by the
relationships between the two leaders and the immediate transnational audience, the two
secondary national audiences, and a larger global audience.
This joint press conference exemplifies at least three important aspects of the Malta
meetings. First, by holding a joint press conference with Gorbachev, Bush enacted the
democratic values that the “West” espoused, thus continuing the role of U.S. president as “leader
of the free world.” Second, Gorbachev’s enthusiastic participation in the press conference reveals
another instance in which Bush’s “Western values” and Gorbachev’s “universal values” overlap,
showing a shift in global politics. It is because of this overlap that Bush and Gorbachev were
able to make interpersonal and transnational progress at Malta. Third, Gorbachev and Bush
enacted joint leadership, symbolizing drastic political realignment. This joint press conference
was possible because of the preceding discussions between the two leaders, and specifically,
their negotiation of the “East-West” frame. Thus, the next section analyzes all of the meetings at
Malta along with the joint press conference.
2.3

East and West as Controlling Metaphors
In Cold War discourse generally, and Bush and Gorbachev’s talks specifically, it was a

common rhetorical strategy to use the terms “East” and West” to distinguish between people
groups, ideology, and, of course, geopolitical spaces. Specifically, in U.S. Cold War discourse,
“East-West” was used as a geo-political abstraction that essentialized and homogenized the
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“East.”148 I use quotation marks around “East” and West” to signify that these terms were most
often used symbolically in political discourses as relative terms that promoted a political agenda,
often representing or upholding “past and present divisions.”149 In other words, “East-West” was
“symbolic geography”—a metaphorical, historical, and political distinction, not always related to
cardinal directions at all.150 The discursive treatment of the East and West can be traced back to
Edward Said’s well-known theory of Orientalism. Said argues that Western Europeans, and later
Americans, distributed “geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological,
historical, and philological texts” which elaborated on both “basic geographical distinction” (that
the world is divided between the Orient/Occident, or East/West) and knowledge about the East
that the West both creates and maintains. This knowledge about the East exists within “an
uneven exchange with various kinds of power,” including political power (“as with a colonial or
imperial establishment”), intellectual power (“as with reigning sciences like comparative
linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences”), cultural power (“as with
orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values”), and moral power (“as with ideas about what
‘we’ do and what ‘they’ cannot do or understand as ‘we’ do”).151 Orientalism, the study of the
East by the West, created and sustained an division between “us” (European and later U.S.
imperial powers) and “our” culture, values, knowledge, and ideology, against that of “them” (the
East). In doing so, Orientalism has provided an important aspect of the Western modern
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political-intellectual culture of normative judgments that has less to do “with the Orient than it
does with ‘our’ world.”152
Said observes that Britain and France, and, since World War II, the U.S., circulated
particular “knowledge” about the East that positioned the West as superior in relation to the East.
This relationship between the West and the East is made possible because “East-West” is a
spatial metaphor.153 “East” and “West” do not exist outside of discourse. Holly Taylor and
Barbara Tversky explain that “knowledge about space is one of the earliest forms of knowledge
people use.” This knowledge is critical to our interpersonal interactions as well as our
interactions with our environment. Spatial language is so common, in fact, “that it is used to
describe non-spatial things as well.”154 That is, spatial language is used metaphorically. The
metaphor “East-West” invents likenesses and differences. It creates an “us” through the
exclusion of a “them,” functioning within the container schema. The container schema,
according to Paul Chilton, “constitutes the basis for understanding the words inside and outside,
and enters so fundamentally into our conceptual and linguistic systems we do not normally
attend to it.”155 In the context of the Cold War, there were those on the inside, “us” or “the
West,” and those who the U.S. tried to keep out, separated from the rest of the world—“the
East.”
While Said’s theory of Orientalism focused on discourses of the “Near” or “Middle East”
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and not the Communist Bloc during Cold War, there
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are clear discursive continuities between the two.156 Western Europe, as several scholars have
noted, has viewed Eastern Europe through a lens of Orientalism shaped by conquest and
colonialism.157 During the Cold War, U.S. discourse was similar to that of Western Europe as
both regions found its Other in the Soviet Union. Specifically, William Pietz observes, the
Western alliance categorized communism as “traditional Oriental despotism.”158 The communists
were totalitarians, which Orientalists assumed was a natural part of what it meant to be Eastern.
Nazi Germany was merely an accident explainable by the West’s invention of technology that
made totalitarianism first possible in Europe. George Kennan, a prominent Cold War diplomat,
policy strategist, and intellectual, wrote that while Germany “relapsed” into “barbarism,”
Russians were engaged “natural and instinctive urges” that caused the Russian government to be
pervaded by an “atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy.”159 That is, Soviets, like
other “Orientals” were inherently barbaric and savage, and they did not hold the same values of
the West. The Soviet Union, like the “Middle East” was discursively, culturally, and politically
separated from Western Europe and the U.S. through the use of “East-West” and related spatial
metaphors such as “Iron Curtain” and the Berlin Wall (which was, of course, also a physical
boundary).160 The use of “East-West” by U.S. politicians traced back to this distinction between
the Orient and the Occident.
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Just as other Cold War policy thinkers relied on the “East-West” frame and its normative
judgements about the Communist Bloc, Bush’s rhetoric, throughout his discussions with
Gorbachev, hinged on the polarity of the “East” and the “West.” Gorbachev’s did not. Instead,
Gorbachev’s speech relied on the spatial and orientational metaphor of “openness.” This is not to
say that Gorbachev’s intentions were more closely bound to a more united worldview than
Bush’s, but it does suggest a strong cognitive distinction between the “East” and “West” on
Bush’s part, as his rhetoric worked to sustain that distinction. When Bush presented a New
World Order, it was one led by “Western values” as “leader of the free world”—a nomination
bound to the Western Bloc. Bush’s “East-West” distinction and Gorbachev’s “openness” are
both spatial metaphors, and understanding them as such reveals how the two leaders negotiated
their global imaginaries and defined a new political reality. “Openness,” as a spatial metaphor,
suggests the opposite of the “East-West” metaphor. While “East-West” divides nations and
connotes differences, “openness” works to undo those boundaries and divisions. Furthermore,
“openness” recalls Gorbachev’s commitment to glasnost. Glasnost, a Russian word translated in
English as “openness,” was a Soviet policy Gorbachev instituted related to “Soviet patterns of
communication control.”161 Glasnost, according to the 1989 edition of a Soviet political reference
work, required “maximum openness and truthfulness in the activity of state and public
organizations.”162 The term Gorbachev used to increase transparency between the Soviet Union’s
government and the people translates into the same word he used repeatedly in his talks with
Bush. Just as glasnost was tied to Soviet restructuring, so was “openness” connected to global
political restructuring.
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Bush and Gorbachev’s uses of spatial metaphors such as “East-West” and “openness”
demarcate clear differences in global visions. In this section, I discuss how the two world leaders
negotiated their visions through these metaphors, eventually bringing about the end of the Cold
War. These global visions, I show, were concerned with leadership and security as well as
national identity.
2.3.1

Leadership and Security
By the time Gorbachev and Bush met in Malta, the U.S. and the Soviet Union had two

very different global imaginaries, though with Gorbachev’s “new thinking,” they were more
compatible than ever before. Still, Bush did not drastically alter Cold War foreign policy. Bush’s
hesitancy is tied to several factors. For one, the administration did not trust the Soviet Union’s
sudden shift in thinking.163 For instance, NATO created proposals on the assumption that the
Soviet Union would never agree to them. When it did, “some of the allies began to wonder if
they could live with their own proposals.”164 Second, the White House was anxious that
Gorbachev was more popular the Bush on a global scale, which they believed might give
Gorbachev more initiative on proposing new departures in security policy.165 Still, Bush and
Gorbachev’s rhetoric both reflected the importance they place on international and global
security, which required a level of cooperation—cooperation that the East and West were finally
able to consider despite continued efforts of the U.S. to contain communism.
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The global imaginary, in part, is about framing problems as global instead of national
and, in turn, declaring who should solve those problems. The visions for leadership varied
between the two leaders, though they were able to both agree on the metaphor of a “New World
Order.” Gorbachev argued that the world was undergoing a natural process of globalization that
necessitated cooperation between national leaders. Bush, following the presidents before him, 166
envisioned a world becoming more interconnected through, and led by, organizations such as
NATO (and thus the United States). Paying specific attention to how the two leaders use
conflicting spatial metaphors of “East-West’ and “openness,” I show how these national leaders
negotiated the end of the Cold War—their different visions of the global shaping their speech on
leadership and security of the world, attending to how the two leaders propose to work with one
another and their positions toward the “Third World,” the nations outside of the Eastern and
Western Blocs. While the U.S. continued its Cold War foreign policy of democratic expansion,
the Soviet Union, under Gorbachev, shifted to a policy of self-determination and multilateral
leadership.
2.3.1.1 Bush’s U.S.-Led Democratic World Order
Bush opened the joint press conference by stating that he “first approached Gorbachev
about an informal meeting of this kind” after his July trip to Europe. While this particular
meeting was Bush’s idea, Gorbachev had requested a summit-type meeting with Bush just after
Bush was elected, during Gorbachev’s trip to speak before the United Nations in 1988.167 Despite
Bush’s hesitancy to meet with Gorbachev during the beginning of his presidency, Bush’s
discourse reflected a global imaginary that positioned the U.S. as a global political leader. Part of
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this leadership was rooted in the idea that the U.S. was a democratic exemplar—a key
ideological reason for the tension between the U.S and the Soviet Union. Thus, Bush’s discourse
was consistent with that of past presidents, which was steeped in American exceptionalism and
the promotion of universal democratic practices.168 Bush’s proclamation that the meeting at
Malta was his idea exemplifies how Bush positioned himself as a global democratic leader.
Throughout Bush’s discussions with Gorbachev, and within the joint press conference at the
conclusion of the Malta Summit, Bush cultivated the U.S. presidential persona as global leader
by drawing upon the “East-West” metaphorical frame. This frame elevated the moral and
political status of the U.S. and its NATO allies, thus providing justification for the U.S. to lead
the post-Cold War world while sustaining the “knowledge” that the West is superior to the East.
Bush employed the “East-West” frame in his claims that the West had held historically
correct positions, according to “Western” (democratic) values to which the East was beginning to
align itself. For example, Bush explained that the Western alliance had been working for
“freedom” for forty years, expressing that “now, with reform underway in the Soviet Union, we
stand at the threshold of a brand-new era of U.S.-Soviet relations.”169 In this instance, and
throughout his discourse at Malta, Bush implied that the Soviet Union was joining in with what
the West had already been doing. There are different ways Bush could have framed the
developing relationship between the Soviet Union and the U.S. It would have been possible, for
instance, for Bush to stress the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the U.S. that began
before his presidency as instrumental to progress. Instead, Bush focused on the longstanding
position of the “Western alliance” and its work for “freedom.” He also referenced democratic
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changes in Poland and Hungary—another example of the East joining the position the West
already inhabited. In doing so, Bush created a warrant for U.S. leadership.
In Bush’s speeches, NATO embodied “the West.” Thus, Bush used NATO to establish
his own authority as its leader. By establishing that NATO (the West) had always been on the
right side of history, it would follow that Bush would be the appropriate leader for a post-Cold
War world. This leadership role extended into the “Third World,” another geopolitical metaphor
made necessary with the use of “East-West.” Unaligned nations (and some Communist nations)
remained outside of the “East-West” binary and were thus part of a “Third World,” existing as
ideological and geographical battlegrounds of the Eastern and Western Blocs. Without the
political binary of the “East-West,” there would be no need to imagine a “Third World.” When
speaking about Cuba, Bush used his position as leader of NATO to claim authority in the “Third
World.” Bush argued that the U.S., more so than any other NATO member, cared about
communism in Latin America. He said, “If we take our NATO allies, including Thatcher, Kohl,
[and] Mitterrand, in general they do not care about Central America. Of course, they say good
words about democratization and free elections, but they have no vital interests in what is going
on there.” This is unlike “the overwhelming majority of the American people, who he said “take
this issue very close to heart” along with “young fledgling democracies to the south of the Rio
Grande.”170 Here, Bush argued that, at times, even NATO did not meet the democratic
exceptional standard of the U.S. Still, it was the “Western alliance” that would work “patiently
together” to “realize a lasting peace.”171
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Gorbachev challenged Bush’s position as the leader of NATO, an institution, he noted,
that was “created in another age.” Gorbachev argued that “existing instruments for supporting
the balance must not be shattered but modified in accordance with the demands of the age.”
NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, Gorbachev pressed, must be political, more than
military, and “must change their confrontational nature.”172 For Gorbachev, while NATO was an
important institution, the world was changing, and NATO, thus, needed to change as well. In
challenging the practices of NATO, Gorbachev pushed back on a structure that upheld the “EastWest” polarized blocs. This marks a clear difference of global imaginaries between Gorbachev
and Bush, the latter never changing his position that NATO would be vital in a post-Cold War
world. Immediately following the Malta conference, Bush went to Brussels for a NATO meeting.
He reported that he had “made clear” to Gorbachev that the U.S. supported perestroika, and
credited all “positive developments” between the Soviet Union and the U.S. to the “enduring
foundation of the North Atlantic alliance.”173 NATO, Bush claimed, was the “bedrock of
peaceful change in Europe,” and thus should be credited for the burgeoning reunification of
Europe, the protection of the “freedom for the peoples of the West” and the “hope of a better
future for the peoples of the East.” 174 The second part of Bush’s quotation reflects the view of
the “West” that “‘Eastern Europe’ had become a lifeless, monochrome realm where people
walked bent under the leaden weight of an awful System.”175 Bush, as a leader of democratic
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principles, established by his position as president of the U.S. and thus also a leader of NATO,
would bring these poor, barbaric Others out of the Communist “East.”
In his conversations with Gorbachev, Bush revealed his global vision, which continued
to rely on a polarized “East-West” understanding of the world. Because the “East” and “West”
were inherently different, the world needed protection from institutions like NATO, and
especially the U.S. Because the Western alliance was concerned with the freedom of citizens
throughout the world, it was in the best position to lead and intervene in the world, not the Soviet
Union. In fact, when asked in the press conference about joint efforts in the Middle East, Bush
responded that:
It doesn't require joint initiatives to solve the Middle East question. But we have found
that the Soviet Union is playing a constructive role in Lebanon and trying throughout the
Middle East to give their support for the tripartite agreement, which clearly the U.S. has
supported. And so, there's common ground there. That may not always have been the
case in history. And that may not always have been the way the United States looked at it
as to how constructive the role the Soviets might play.
Bush’s response here exemplified his position that the U.S. should intervene and lead in
international problems. If the Soviet Union happened to be on the side of the U.S., perhaps the
Soviets could assist, but the U.S. would not assume any long-term partnership or multilateral
leadership. Throughout Bush and Gorbachev’s discussions in Malta, Bush drew global authority
from U.S. moral exceptionalism and through the institution of NATO. In each of these cases,
Bush reflected a global imaginary unilaterally controlled by the U.S. This is distinctive from
Gorbachev’s global imaginary which was decidedly multilateral.
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2.3.1.2 Gorbachev’s Multilateral World Order
Gorbachev’s vision for a post-Cold War world was quite different from Bush’s. Bush
used the “East-West” metaphorical frame to position himself as a representative of the West, and
thus a unilateral leader of the world. Gorbachev, on the other hand, resisted the “East-West”
framework, and thus presented a multilateral perspective. In this section, I discuss how
Gorbachev challenged the “East-West” framework in at least two ways. First, he relied on
“openness,” a spatial metaphor that framed geopolitical realities as having a global, boundaryfree orientation, thus conceptually different from the “East-West” division. Second, and
relatedly, Gorbachev denied being a representative of Eastern Europe (the “East” of the Cold
War). In doing so, he contributed to a global imaginary that was not cleanly or clearly divided
between East and West and its representatives, as it had been throughout the Cold War.
Gorbachev’s discursive move away from “East-West” as a framework for understanding the
contemporary political situation was undergirded by his belief that globalization was a natural,
inevitable process. Gorbachev’s speech suggests that he viewed multilateral leadership and
cooperation as the best way for nations to engage in an increasingly global world.
The first way Gorbachev resisted “East-West” metaphorical frame was by employing a
different geopolitical and spatial metaphor altogether— “openness.” “Open” is such a common
metaphor, it seems inconspicuous. As Ilana Frederick Silber notes, spatial metaphors are
“insidious and almost invisible” because they are more abstract than other metaphors. Consider,
for instance, economic metaphors such as “market” or “capital,” which are more concrete than
spatial and orientational metaphors such as “up/down” or “open/closed.”176 In addition to being
more abstract that some metaphors, spatial metaphors are “deeply intertwined with and thus
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harder to distinguish from their equivalents in ordinary language” that “inform our taken-forgranted, daily lexicon.”177 The pervasive and abstract nature of spatial and orientational
metaphors makes them often go unnoticed as they shape our discourse and understanding.
“Open” works in distinction to its dialectical spatial opposites such as “close” and
“divide.” Gorbachev used “openness” to refer to a possible relationship between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union as well as the means to that relationship, which he proposed was “open”
conversation. During the press conference, for instance, when asked about the end of the Cold
War, Gorbachev stated that he had “assured the President of the United States that the Soviet
Union would never start a hot war against the United States of America,” but rather that he
would like their “relations to develop in such a way that they would open greater possibilities for
cooperation.”178 In order to “open” this cooperative potential, Gorbachev said that he and Bush
had a “wide” discussion that was “straightforward” and “characterized by openness, by a full
scope of the exchange of views.” 179 Gorbachev repeatedly used “openness” throughout the Malta
meetings in similar ways. Spatial metaphors, such as “open,” proved useful to Gorbachev, in part
because spatial metaphors can transcend “the limits of bounded polities… in a globalized
framework.”180 That is, spatial metaphors helped end the Cold War by reflecting and constructing
a new imaginary—a world undivided between “East” and “West.”
The use of “openness” recalls Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost. Glasnost, most often
translated as “openness” in English, also meant “publicity,” revealing another valence of
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Gorbachev’s political agenda. Glasnost affected “pervasive Soviet patterns of communication
control.” Before glasnost, Joseph Gibbs notes, Soviet mass media channels were required to
transmit “goal-oriented” news, “formulated to influence the receiver in certain ways.”181 With
glasnost, these communication outlets produced messages that offered more government
transparency. In other words, Soviet media could publicize selected government activities. Still,
glasnost did not equate to freedom of speech. Instead, it allowed mass media to provide “the
public with information it need[ed] to make the economy work better.”182 Speech about the
government, according to Gorbachev’s policy, was therefore instrumental—it should work on
behalf of socialist ideals. Understanding Gorbachev’s use of “openness” through this larger
political lens reinforces the idea that Gorbachev hoped for “open” discussion with Bush for
instrumental political purposes. The context of his use of “openness” suggests that Gorbachev
attempted to flatten global authority in this transitional era, which leads me to how Gorbachev
framed global leadership outside of an “East-West” frame.183
The second way Gorbachev rejected the “East-West” metaphorical frame was by denying
that he was a representative of the East. When asked by a reporter during the press conference if
he “assure[d] President Bush that the changes in Eastern Europe…[were] irreversible,”
Gorbachev responded:
I wouldn't like you to consider me here or to regard me as a full-fledged representative
of all European countries. This wouldn't be true. We are a part of Eastern Europe, of
Europe. We interact with our allies in all areas, and our ties are deep. However, every
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nation is an independent entity in world politics, and every people has the right to choose
its own destiny, the destiny of its own state. And I can only explain my own attitude.184
In this statement, Gorbachev distanced himself from the role of global representative for Eastern
Europe while also stressing his commitment to self-determination. For Gorbachev, these two
concepts were interrelated. Throughout the Cold War, Third World nations were presented as
ideological battlegrounds—the U.S. seeking to “protect” the nations from communism and the
Soviet Union trying to “defend” communist nations. Bush and Gorbachev’s discussion in Malta
reveals a shift in ideology for the Soviets. Instead of protecting and spreading communism as
social justice, Gorbachev defended “self-determination” as a human right. Self-determination
worked as a superficial point of stasis between the two leaders. The U.S. also defended “selfdetermination,” but for the U.S., self-determination was bound to the concept of democracy; for
the Soviet Union, self-determination meant the ability of each nation to choose its own form of
governance, democratic or otherwise.
Gorbachev, Bush, and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, discussed self-determination
directly. Gorbachev said:
The main principle which we have adopted and which we are following in the framework
of the new way of thinking is the right of each country to a free election, including the
right to reexamine or change its original choice. This is very painful, but it is a
fundamental right: the right to elect from within without interference. The U.S. adheres to
a certain social and economic system, which the American people chose. So let other
people decide for themselves which God, figuratively speaking, to worship.185
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Baker, though, said he would like to “clarify” the U.S. approach to self-determination. “We
agree that each country must have the right to free elections. But all this makes sense only when
the people in the country are really in a position to choose freely. This also falls under the
concept of ‘Western values,’ and by no means is it a right to thrust one’s ways upon others.” 186 If
citizens cannot participate in free elections, a component of American values, Baker clarified,
they are not truly self-determined. Thus, it would be appropriate and necessary for the U.S. to
intervene. Gorbachev, on the other hand, believed that this intervention would be violating the
very self-determinism the U.S. vowed to protect.
These two ways of understanding self-determination flow from the two global
imaginaries. In Bush’s global imaginary, it was the exceptional role of the U.S. to lead the world
toward global peace. For Gorbachev, on the other hand, the world was becoming more
interconnected on its own, providing an impetus for global cooperation and the rejection of
polarizing ideologies. Bush responded to Gorbachev that he did not differ on this subject, while
Gorbachev further explained his view of globalization, saying that Europeans were figuring out
new and different ways of doing things in the fields of economics and technology and that this
was “natural.” Gorbachev often stated the belief that globalization is an objective process
“making our world more and more interrelated and interdependent.”187 This organic view of
globalization supported Gorbachev’s call for nations, including the Soviet Union and U.S., to
work together to problem-solve for the sake of world peace. Gorbachev’s understanding, and
public discussion, was a major factor in ending the Cold War, shifting from Soviet foreign policy
from communist expansion and defense to global collaboration and, specifically, transnational
dialogue. Gorbachev spoke extensively about globalization and the changing political spaces
186
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during his 1988 speech before the United Nations. He said that “changes in philosophical
approaches and in political relations form a solid prerequisite for imparting, in line with
worldwide objective processes, a powerful impetus to the efforts designed to establish new
relations among States.”188 Nations, in other words, were not leading a process of globalization;
instead, worldwide processes of globalization made it imperative for nations to begin working
together. He noted that politicians who had been critically invested in the Cold were even “now
drawing appropriate conclusions” of the interconnectedness of the world. They, who “find it
particularly hard to abandon old stereotypes and past practices” are “changing course because
they understand the need for peace.” This change in attitude, according to Gorbachev, was the
first step toward a “healthier international environment and towards disarmament.”189 The very
people who had upheld the Cold War polarization, in other words, understood that they needed
to change their mindset for the sake of the world.
In the bilateral meetings with Bush, Gorbachev said, “And what lies ahead in terms of
economics, the environment, and other problems? We must think about this together. . . . For a
long time the Soviet leadership has pondered this. And we are coming to the conclusion that the
U.S. and the USSR are simply doomed to dialogue, joint action, and cooperation. It cannot be
otherwise.”190 If they are “doomed” to talk to one another because they are interconnected,
leaving little room for empire. Here, Gorbachev’s speech exemplified pluralistic politics in a
democratic context. As Charland Mouffe argues, a pluralistic polity “consists of people . . . who
are stuck with one another,” who address one another not as an evil enemy, but as an
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adversary.191 Gorbachev offered a rhetorical way out of the “enemy” metaphors in Cold War
rhetoric. As people affected by the objective process of the Cold War, they needed merely to let
go of polarized ideology and work together for peace.
Gorbachev’s discussion with Bush echoed his speech before the United Nations when he
also focused on open communication between adversaries. “Of course,” he said, “I refer, above
all, to political dialogue— a more intense and open dialogue aimed at the very heart of problems
instead of confrontation, at an exchange of constructive ideas instead of recriminations. Without
political dialogue, the process of negotiations cannot advance.”192 Gorbachev’s objective view of
the global neutralized the rhetorical frame for the U.S. and Soviet leaders, inviting open dialogue
among agonistic equals.
2.3.2

Transnational and Global Identity
The “East-West” frame, in addition to structuring discourse about leadership and

security, also framed discussion about international and global identity. The global imaginary is,
in addition to transnational leadership and security, about the construction of transnational and
global identity.193 In other words, it is concerned with how citizens relate to one another across
national boundaries and imagine themselves as part of the global. Because this study is
concerned with the presidency, I consider the role Bush played in this particular moment in
time—as geopolitical powers realigned—in framing U.S. national identity within the larger
global context. Additionally, I consider how Bush understood the role of other nations within this
global context, and how he negotiated this vision with Gorbachev. “Globality,” according to Ulf
Hedetoft and Mette Hjort, “changes contexts (politically, culturally, geographically) for . . .
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[nation states], situates national identity and belonging differently, and superimposes itself on
‘nationality.’”194 Bush and Gorbachev were both concerned with how national identity fit within
the context of a changing global political reality. And because globalization (or the construction
of a global imaginary) “lays claim to the homogeneity of the planet from above,” as Walter
Mignolo writes, the way Bush and Gorbachev framed the relationship between nation-states
influenced identity-formation.195
Bush and Gorbachev’s visions for transnational and global identity are reflected in the
leaders’ geopolitical metaphors, specifically in their constructs negotiations of the terms
“Western values” and “common European home.” Geographic and spatial metaphors were
important throughout Cold War rhetoric—the division of the “East” from the “West” a standard
metaphor important for upholding the geographic and ideological division of the polarized super
powers. This “East-West” metaphorical frame persisted throughout the two leaders’ global
visions, extending past leadership of nations and into how nations and their peoples ought to
relate to each other. In this section, I first show that Bush began the meetings by framing values
as “Western” before eventually adopting Gorbachev’s descriptor of “universal values.” Second, I
discuss Gorbachev’s metaphor of the “common European home” as an alternative to the “EastWest” frame that guided discourse and policies in Eastern and Western Europe. This section
shows how Gorbachev and Bush negotiated their global imaginaries through geopolitical
metaphors.
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2.3.2.1 Western Values
A major theme in both bilateral sessions between Gorbachev and Bush at Malta was that
of the descriptor of “Western values.” Critical geographers Gearóid Ó. Tuathail and John Agew
note that Cold War discourse consisted of a “regularized set of geographical descriptions by
which it represented international politics.” 196 “Western” and “Eastern” were foreign policy
operators—representations that enabled foreign policy decisions. Paul Chilton observes that
political discourse invokes geographical frames not simply as “objective geographical
knowledge, but as deictically organized geopolitical knowledge.”197 These frames often trigger
separate mental spaces, or discourse worlds, which are “the ‘reality’ that is entertained by the
speaker, or meta-represented by the speaker as being someone else’s believed reality.”198 That is,
speakers who discuss foreign policy invoke geographical frames that function as geopolitical
knowledge. These geopolitical designators trigger discourse world for speakers and audiences,
which rely on the “recurrence of, and links between different discourse referents of the discourse
world” to achieve coherence.199 In the case of Bush and Gorbachev, the geopolitical frame
“Western” triggered different discourse worlds. For Bush, “Western values” operated as an
objective framework for understanding values such as “liberty” and “democracy.” For
Gorbachev, these values were universal, and thus Bush’s framing of them as “Western” was
problematic.
Gorbachev arrived at Malta already concerned with Bush’s framing of agreed-upon
values as “Western.” In early December, 1989, before the Malta summit, Gorbachev met with
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Pope John Paul II, to whom he expressed his concerns, saying, “It is already being said that
Europe should only be renewed on the basis of Western values and anything differing from these
values should be cut off. This is no way to treat nations, their history, traditions, and identity.” In
this statement, Gorbachev connected values to national identity, arguing that nations should not
be required to uphold “Western values” in order to fully participate in the global community.200
To this, the Pope replied that “It would be wrong for someone to claim that changes in Europe
and the world should follow the Western model.” According to the Pope, “Europe, as a
participant in world history, should breathe with two lungs.”201 The Pope, too, invoked the “EastWest” frame here. Significantly, though, his use of the frame was inclusive, rather than
exclusive. Instead of positioning Western values as superior, as is pervasive in “Western”
political discourse, the Pope advocated for a reality in which “Eastern” and “Western” values
contributed to European identity.
Gorbachev introduced his concern about “Western values” in the second expanded
bilateral session at Malta, saying:
Now let me mention a concept of U.S. origin: The division of Europe should be
overcome on the basis of Western values. If policy is made on that assumption the
situation could become quite messy. You used to make similar accusations against the
USSR the export of revolution.202
Here, Gorbachev criticized the framing of solutions to Europe’s division as being “Western.” In
doing so, he invoked and challenged the Cold War narrative that these geopolitical descriptors
activate— “the simple story of a great struggle between a democratic West against a formidable
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and expansionist East.”203 Gorbachev argued instead that “Western values” signified American
imperialism and should be treated as no different than Eastern revolutions. By equating the
exportation of Western values with that of communism, Gorbachev challenged the superiority of
the “West” and thus the usefulness of an “East-West” discursive frame.
Bush responded that it is natural for members of NATO and Western Europe to “talk of
Western values.” In fact, Bush argued, glasnost is also a Western value because “we value lively
debate, pluralism and openness. Western values are free markets and openness.” These values,
Bush said, are particularly Western because “these common values have been there in U.S.Western European relations for a long time.”204 Bush’s claim to Western and democratic values
situated himself alongside Gorbachev’s Western European counterparts, the same people in the
same geopolitical area with whom Gorbachev sought to reunite.
Gorbachev insisted that openness and pluralism were shared, common values, and that to
speak of them in geopolitical terms like “Chinese or Eastern values” was ideological. 205 Bush
responded that these values were the “solid foundation” of the West, but that it is “much more
important” that the West and the Soviet Union “share those values today than twenty years
ago.”206 In this part of the dialogue between Gorbachev and Bush, we see a contest over values
that, seemingly, both parties want the other to possess. But because Bush called these “Western,”
he excluded Gorbachev from being identified with them.
David Zarefsky argues that one way presidents frame a situation is by creating
associations with other terms, “expanding the meaning of a term to cover the new case at
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hand.”207 In this interaction, Gorbachev demanded that glasnost and pluralism, openness, and
democracy be considered “shared, common values” instead of “Western values.” 208 The risk of
expanding the frame of these values to one that encompassed the Soviet Union would be taking
away the U.S.’s claim of moral superiority—and a justification for the Cold War. As Tuathail
notes, “it is through discourse that leaders act, through the mobilization of certain simple
geographical understandings that foreign-policy actions are explained and through ready-made
geographically-infused reasoning that wars are rendered meaningful.”209 Thus, when the two
dropped “Western values,” settling on the Western-privileging, but not geopolitically framed
designator of “democratic values” to describe common ground between the Soviet Union and the
U.S., the U.S. lost justification for continued polarization and othering of the USSR. More
importantly, it provided a way for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to cooperate with one another.
2.3.2.2 Gorbachev and the “Common European Home”
The second spatial and geo-political frame important to the conversations between
Gorbachev and Bush was that of Europe and the “common European home.” While political
figures before Gorbachev had used the term, Gorbachev publicized the metaphor in 1985,
challenging Cold War discourse structures that continued to shape Europe.210 The concept was
based on universal values, collective security and economic integration in Europe. It
incorporated a vision of a continent without borders, where people and ideas would move freely
without fear of war or hunger. 211 In Gorbachev’s vision, the militarization of the Eastern and
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Western Blocs would “gradually dissolve,” the security function being left to a unified Europe
and the United Nations.212 The idea of the common European home rested on the notion that the
Soviet Union is part of Europe, and that Europeans, together, were changing.
The two leaders spoke explicitly about the geopolitical frame of Europe when Bush
stated that the Soviet Union was “closer to Europe” than the U.S. Gorbachev responded:
I do not agree that we are “closer to Europe.” The USSR and the U.S. are equally
integrated into European problems. We understand very well your involvement in
Europe. To look at the role of the U.S. in the Old World any differently is unrealistic,
erroneous, and ultimately unconstructive. You must know this; it is our basic position.213
Bush clarified that the U.S. is not “historically… as close to Eastern Europe. Of course
we are close—and will be close—to Europe; we are vitally interested and involved in
NATO. The U.S. is, properly speaking, the leader of NATO.”214
In this interaction between Bush and Gorbachev, we see a confusion of spatial designators and
geopolitical designators. While Soviets, Gorbachev said, “consider… [themselves] European,”
and thus a part of the envisioned common European home, there was disagreement about the
U.S.’s role in Europe. Of course, the U.S. is not part of Europe, but Bush had already established
their unified identity based on common “Western values.” These spatial and geopolitical
designators are important because they play a legitimizing function in political action.215 When
Bush then used the deictic indicator “closer” to describe the relationship between the Soviets and
Europe, he moved the U.S. further away from Gorbachev’s plea that the two leaders work
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together to help build a common European home.216 Gorbachev corrected Bush by arguing that
the Soviet Union and the U.S. are equally involved in European political affairs, once again
using the geopolitical frame for “Europe” rather than the spatial one.
The two leaders eventually agreed that they were both responsible for events in Europe—
the U.S. because of its leadership in Western Europe, and the Soviet Union because of their
geographical relativity as well as their political identity as Europeans. The discussion of Europe
and the common European home shows how transnational leaders can toggle between spatial and
geopolitical deictic indicators to implicate or disassociate themselves and each other from
political action. These geopolitical frames also reveal the negotiation of the global imaginary, as
ties between countries evince authority.
By the end of their discussions, Bush and Gorbachev had agreed that their nations were
both interconnected with Europe. This represented a shift in their global imaginaries in so far as
these global imaginaries related to national and international identity formations. By this time,
Bush had also agreed to drop the “Western” designator from the values that he, and the U.S.,
represented. By negotiating these geopolitical and spatial metaphors, Bush and Gorbachev
shifted away from a strict “East-West” metaphorical frame that vilified the Other, thus moving
toward global cooperation and ending the Cold War.
2.4

Conclusion
Walter Fisher wrote that the presidency is a “symbolic, suasory force, a source of

inducement to belief, attitude, value, and action… [and] a focal point of national reason and
rationality.”217 The president is also a focal point of global reason and rationality. This chapter
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shows that one way presidents shape national and global reason is through geopolitical and
spatial metaphors. In negotiating the “East-West” metaphor, Bush and Gorbachev were able to
bring to fruition complementary, though not identical, global imaginaries. These global
imaginaries, in turn, helped facilitate the end of the Cold War.
Gertjan Dijkink offers a similar concept to global imaginaries, which he calls
“geopolitical visions.” These geopolitical visions, he argues, are used by political and foreign
policy elites to explain how states relate to one another in a global system. They are formed to
cope with “threats arising from the environment, in order to maintain pride, or just to legitimate
aggression.”218 The changing political context of the Cold War presented layers of threats to
national identity. In Bush and Gorbachev’s conversations, we see each of them grasping to keep
retain or change the conception of their nation’s identity. Bush did so by relying on the “EastWest” frame, a socio-political and geographical understanding of the world that is so normalized
it is almost invisible, yet so poignant as to be drawn upon to rationalize an enemy Other. The
frame provided the “knowledge” of superior Western values and thus provided justification for
U.S. leadership. Gorbachev, on the other hand, sought to attain an agreed-upon understanding of
the Soviet Union as a nation that supported self-determination and universalization. To do so, he
had to resist the normative “East-West” discursive frame of the Cold War. Territorial bases,
Dijkink notes, provides the vantage point for constructing visions of the world. It was no small
feat, then, for Gorbachev and Bush to come to some understanding of each other and future
global realities through their meeting at Malta.
The meetings, of course, did not solve every problem, and there was not an insubstantial
amount of diplomatic appeasement. Gorbachev joked during the joint press conference that “the
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President wrote a note to me in English. I don't read English, but I answered in Russian—he
doesn't read Russian—but we agreed on it anyway.”219 While clearly said in jest, this statement
does suggest that the two leaders did not end the meetings completely like-minded. Another
example of this is when Bush opened the press conference noting that the meeting with
Gorbachev was his idea while Gorbachev closed the press conference noting that their “share is
50-50.”220 These statements align with the global imaginaries projected by the two leaders
throughout their meetings—Bush’s position being that the U.S. is the leader and Gorbachev’s
that nations should work together multilaterally.
This chapter is significant in at least three ways. First, it provides historical insight into
meetings that symbolically ended the Cold War. Second, it contributes to rhetorical theory by
explaining how geopolitical and spatial metaphors can be used by political elites to reframe
contexts and assist in ending wars—at least wars of words. Finally, it shows how presidents
interact with foreign leaders both privately and in a joint press conference. While studies in
presidential rhetoric usually attend to speeches before audiences, this chapter shifts the locus of
study to transnational presidential interactions with foreign leaders. The next chapter will focus
on presidential interactions with another transnational audience—the United Nations General
Assembly.
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3

PRESIDENTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: CLINTON AND BUSH
UNIVERSALIZE “DEMOCRACY”

As discussed in the previous chapter, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev ended the
Cold War in part through their negotiation of the global imaginary. The global imaginary, of
course, is the consciousness of belonging to a global community.221 The two world leaders met in
Malta and teased out their international identity in private meetings, breaking down the division
between “Eastern” and “Western” values and the role of the “East” and the “West” in global
affairs. In doing so, Bush and Gorbachev came to terms with certain “universal” values, such as
self-determination and pluralism, that guided their unifying decision-making. Still, there were
differences between the global imaginaries of the two leaders—namely, Gorbachev imagined a
multilateral world driven by these universal values, while Bush imagined one led by the U.S.
This moment was significant politically because it symbolized the end of the Cold War.
Rhetorically, it provided insights for how the two leaders negotiated national identity in a global
context—which they did mostly through geo-political metaphors that signified values. This
chapter also reveals an important aspect of global presidentiality, which is interpersonal
collaboration with other world leaders.
This second case study moves from the interpersonal dialogue followed by a joint press
conference as forums for transnational discourse to U.S. presidential speeches before the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA). In shifting the focus to the UN as a discursive arena, I show
how U.S. presidents use different political structures to shape the global imaginary in a post-Cold
War world. The choice to focus on the UN serves both theoretical and methodological ends.
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Because one purpose of this project is to create a framework for understanding different facets of
presidential transnational discourse, I shifted from interpersonal interaction between world
leaders to interaction between the president and an audience made up of representatives across
the globe. Moreover, by homing in on the United Nations, I show how international
organizations contribute to the global imaginary. Methodologically, this dissertation takes an
historical perspective to understanding world politics at the end of, and after, the Cold War. As
this chapter reveals, the United Nations became increasingly important in post-Cold War
international politics, beginning with Clinton and Bush. Thus, studying Clinton and Bush’s
interactions with the UN provides insight into the global role of the president.
U.S. presidents were instrumental in forming the United Nations and its predecessor, the
League of Nations, which was the world’s first intergovernmental organization.222 These
organizations are manifestations of a global imaginary. That is, they were created because a
significant number of nation-states acknowledged transnational interdependence and were
willing to participate in a kind of global community. This is evidenced in the constitutions of the
two organizations, which are written agreements between independent nations to submit
themselves to joint goals in an effort to create and sustain universal peace, human rights, and
international law, as outlined in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the
United Nations.223 The constitutions of these organizations indicate a sense of global
consciousness among participating nations. Part of this consciousness is the adherence to belief,
if not the practice, of “universal” human rights.
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The United Nations is the only organization that has a type of global constitution, and the
only one that seeks to protect universal rights. As articulated in the first article of the UN
Charter, signed by member nations in 1946, the purposes of the UN are four-fold: (1) “to
maintain international peace and security”; (2) “to develop friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”; (3) “to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian
character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”; and (4) “to be a centre
for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.”224 Each of these
purposes universalizes values for both nation-states and individuals—fifty-one nation-states
collaborated and consented to these purposes in 1945; in 2017 there are 192 countries that have
signed the Charter. This means that 192 countries have entered into a type of constitutional
agreement that coheres and grounds some elements of their global imaginary. language of the
Charter encompasses more than the people in these nation-states, though. The United Nations
seeks to attain “universal” peace and to achieve “fundamental freedoms for all.” Of course, the
member states of the United Nations are the arbiters of what constitutes “universal peace” and
“fundamental freedoms” despite their aspirations that these purposes be for all of humanity. The
UN Charter both acknowledges and calls forth a global consciousness, setting into action
guidelines for participation on the global scale.
Universalization and the global imaginary are an inseparable pair. Theories of
globalization are concerned with universals because to universalize is to globalize; to imagine on
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the scale of the global is to imagine the universal.225 As societies become more interconnected,
cultural artifacts—such as artistic, religious, and political texts— increasingly flow between
nations. These flows create a need for universals. That is, in the event that nations are so
interconnected that global issues become just as important to the nation-state as national issues,
the leaders of nation-states are compelled to collaborate to find supranational solutions. In doing
so, they must identify and propound universal values and systems of governance.226 Because
transnational flows are uneven, the ideas and values that elites universalize affect nations and
peoples disproportionately.227
With universalization comes the problematic of authority. While nation-states have
somewhat clear boundaries and leaders that represent its interests, there are no supranational
leaders except those in intergovernmental organizations, such as the UN. Still, their authority
derives only from the will of the participating nation-states. This chapter considers the ways in
which Clinton and Bush gained authority from the UN while also compounding the UN’s
authority. They did so by connecting with the UNGA through discourse on universals.
Specifically, I argue that U.S. presidents use the UN to inform the global imaginary
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through a universalization of the trope “democracy.” I use quotation marks to signal that
“democracy” is a controlling rhetorical trope that promotes U.S. interests and a particular way of
understanding “democracy.” I refer to the active meaning of “trope,” taken from the Greek root
tropos, which means “to turn.” Tropes work discursively by bringing new meaning of an idea
through the repetition of a figure. That is, as new figurations are repeated, the tropes bring with
them particular, thematic understandings of that concept. 228 As Diane Marie Keeling notes,
tropes are “figures of entanglement,” and include all “concepts, apparatuses, and material–
discursive practices.”229 That is, rhetoric itself is tropic, always reconfiguring through practice.
This is important to note because it allows us to consider tropes not only as literary figures (i.e.,
Burke’s four master tropes of metonymy, synecdoche, metaphor, and irony), but also as part of
rhetorical processes in particular rhetorical contexts.230 In this case, the tropic process refers to
how Clinton and Bush became one with the UNGA, consubstantiating the universal values
proclaimed by their audience and those of the U.S. Through this process, presidents (and
particular nations aligned with their values) gain power and authority in a global context.
Presidents Clinton and Bush universalized the trope of “democracy” in at least two ways.
First, they did so through the symbolic work of their speech setting at the UN—which is most
often before the UNGA. The UNGA is the world’s largest transnational body of representatives,
a group of people representing 193 nations who engage in deliberation as equal voting
members.231 The act of speaking before the UNGA, specifically, illustrates democratic action,

228

Michael Carrithers, Louise J. Bracken, and Steven Emery, “Can a Species Be a Person? A Trope and Its
Entanglements in the Anthropocene Era,” Current Anthropology 52 (2011): 661-662; Diane Marie Keeling, “Of
Turning and Tropes,” Review of Communication 16 (2016): 317-333.
229
Keeling, “Of Turning and Tropes,” Review of Communication 16 (2016): 327.
230
Kenneth Burke, “Four Master Tropes,” The Kenyon Review 3 (1941): 421-438.
231
United Nations, “Functions and Powers of the General Assembly,”
http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml.

79

aligning the ideologies of the U.S. and the UN through collective political approval. Second, the
speech texts universalized “democracy” by conflating “democracy” with “global market” and
“human rights.” In their speeches before the UN, presidents universalize a particularly American
understanding of these terms that benefits the U.S. and its allies. Both the setting and the
speeches themselves construct a global imaginary in which the U.S. is a participant, leader, and
arbitrator of what it means to be “democratic” and work with other nations; all the while, the
frequent disregard of the UN’s recommendations by U.S. presidents shows the instrumentalism
of their participation.
This chapter proceeds in five parts. First, I discuss the role of U.S. presidents in creating
and directing the League of Nations and the United Nations. Second, I explain the role of the
“universal” in the creation of a global imaginary. I do so through Chaïm Perelman and Lucie
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theoretical concept of the “universal audience.” In this section, I introduce
the idea that presidents build their own global authority by establishing both the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) and the U.S. as arbiters of universals. Third, I show how Bill
Clinton links U.S. interests in the form of “global democracy” to the universals established
through the UNGA. Fourth, I explain how George Bush made the U.S. consubstantial with the
UNGA through the universal of “human rights,” connecting “human rights” to U.S.
“democracy.” Both Presidents Clinton and Bush universalized the trope of “democracy” by
drawing upon the UNGA as a rhetorical resource. They did so symbolically by reducing the
“universal audience” to that of the United States, in the person of the president. They did so
discursively by appealing to the founding documents of the U.S. and UN, equating the universal
values of the two, and, thus, compounding the synecdochal relationship of the U.S. to the UN.
Finally, I discuss the significance of this chapter. Scholars of political communication have
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explored the ways in which “democracy” functions in U.S. presidential discourse. These scholars
note that presidents, especially since Wilson, argue that the only way to secure peace is through
ensuring the success of worldwide democracy.232 Presidents in these instances use “democracy”
as a way to name different nation-states and their leaders as friends or enemies, good or evil,
civilized or savage.233 They also use terms such as “human rights,” “freedom,” and “liberty” in
their public discourse to allude to the American myth of democracy.234 This study extends the
line of research that explains how presidents use “democracy” to justify national and foreign
policy by taking a step back and attending to the specific ways in which presidents constitute
“democracy” as a universal, and thus as a way of ordering a global world—the world order being
unequal among nations, as there is an unequal power distribution. In studying Clinton and Bush’s
interactions with the UN, I find a continuation of Bush Senior’s understanding of a post-Cold
War world characterized by universal values and led by the U.S. Together, my study shows how
presidents use the audience of the UNGA and the trope of democracy to create a particular global
imaginary.
3.1

Role of U.S. Presidents and International Organizations
Woodrow Wilson delivered the last speech of his Western Tour, in which he traveled the

U.S. to persuade the people to support the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations,
proclaiming, “There is only one power to put behind the liberation of mankind, and that is the
power of mankind. It is the power of the united moral forces of the world. And in the Covenant
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of the League of Nations, the moral forces of the world are mobilized.”235 Wilson’s tour began a
month after the end of World War I, and these words portrayed his vision for avoiding a second
such war. Wilson failed in his attempt to persuade the isolationist and nationalist Senate to vote
in favor of joining the League of Nations, which he proposed in his Fourteen Points speech
before a joint session of Congress in 1918.236 Forty-two nations agreed to sign the Covenant to
“promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security,” forming the
League on January 10, 1920.237 Of course, the League did not find longstanding success. By
1937, most of the permanent members had abandoned the League, causing it to be insufficiently
supported by world powers.
Wilson’s role in creating the League is important, despite the U.S.’s ultimate refusal to
join, for at least two reasons. First, Wilson’s foreign policy vision continues to influence
presidential policy decisions today. Jason Flanagan notes, for instance, “almost every American
president since Franklin Roosevelt has claimed to be ‘Wilsonian’ in foreign policy.”238 What is
means to be Wilsonian, of course, is contested, with scholars arguing it means world-wide
democracy promotion or liberal internationalism concerned with “building rules and institutions
that advance collective security and cooperation among democracy.”239 These descriptions show
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varied degrees of imperialism, though they are consistent in that they center on international
liberal, democratic ideals. Both, in fact, provide support for U.S. participation and leadership in
the UN, which brings me to the second reason Wilson’s role in the creation of the League
remains significant—the League was the blueprint for the UN.
The emergence of World War II presented the final event that proved the League’s failure
as an international peacekeeping organization, and was also the impetus for its successor, the
United Nations.240 The League provided the foundation for this new organization. In fact, the
League and the United Nations were so closely tied together in the minds of the U.S. public that
one New York Times reporter opened a 1944 article with the line, “As things stand now with the
new League of Nations, which will probably be called The United Nations, is off to a good
start.”241 For this reporter, the only distinguishing mark between the two organizations was in
name. Debate over this new League, the United Nations, occurred during the presidential
election season between incumbent Franklin Roosevelt and Republican challenger Thomas
Dewey—each of whom supported initial plans for the United Nations. By June 1944, the idea of
the U.S. joining a new League was supported by both Democrats and Republicans, with seventytwo percent of the public answering “yes” to the question of whether they favored the U.S.
“joining a League of Nations after the War.”242 Of course, Roosevelt won the 1944 election, and
just as President Wilson was intimately tied to the League of Nations in U.S. public discourse,
the United Nations was a part of President Franklin Roosevelt’s legacy.243 In 1945, at the end of
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World War II, the U.S. and fifty other nations ratified the UN Charter, which promised the same
universal peacekeeping mission of the League.244
The UN was created through a treaty in the form of an ambiguously worded UN Charter
in 1945—though President Franklin Roosevelt made its first Declaration in agreement with
twenty-six other nations in 1942.245 Since its founding, U.S. presidents have continued to spend
time and energy shaping messages to the UN. They have exerted influence over and through the
United Nations since its creation, which is evidenced by the centrality of presidential messages
in the agenda of the UN. Each institution—the U.S. presidency and the UN— garners global
authority from the other, with U.S. presidents at the forefront of some of the UN’s most effective
resolutions and activities, for good or for ill. For instance, as Johannes Morsink notes, the
drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “paid tribute” to Franklin Roosevelt and,
specifically, his 1941 State of the Union speech, when they wrote “the freedom of speech and
belief and freedom from fear and want ha[ve] been proclaimed as the highest aspirations of the
common people.”246 Harry Truman played “the decisive diplomatic role,” in conjunction with the
UN, in the creation and recognition of the nation-state of Israel.247 Dwight Eisenhower wrote a
resolution for the Security Council calling for a cease-fire at the Suez Canal, which became the
first UN peacekeeping operation to monitor a cease-fire.248 George H.W. Bush worked with the
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UN to secure logistical and financial support for the Persian Gulf War.249 As these examples
indicate, while support for the UN has waxed and waned over the years, the U.S., and the
president in particular, has had a significant role in the creation of the UN and its initiatives.
The efficacy of the UN is debatable. Even so, as John Gastil notes, “whatever its
failings,” the UN managed to endure the Cold War, arguably prevent a third world war, and has
established effective global aid programs such as the Food and Agriculture Organization.
Perhaps most importantly, it provides a forum for member nations to deliberate within one
another—maintaining an “ongoing conversation within the larger world community.”250 That is,
member nations participate in, and thus help constitute, a global imaginary. The president is a
prominent leader in this worldwide conversation.
3.2

United Nation’s Legitimacy and the Universal Audience
The legitimacy, and even existence, of the United Nations is evidence of the rise of a

global imaginary—the UN’s globalism inherent in both the consciousness that led to its creation
and in its founding constitutive documents. As Manfred Steger argues, World War II, and the
Cold War after it, brought forth realizations that nations and peoples organized in vast
transnational networks. The end of World War II legitimized the creation of the United Nations
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, each of which is predicated on background
social knowledge that “the global” exists, and that it contains universal ideals.251 So the UN is
legitimized, in part, because of increased global consciousness to recognize the global—it is an
apparatus through which states engage in this global consciousness. States gain legitimacy for
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their actions in relation to the United Nations in two ways. One is from adherence to
international law. The other is from collective political approval.252
First, by engaging, and subjecting to, the UN, states gain legitimacy to act in accordance
to international law, codified in the UN Charter. According to Peter Malanczuk, until the period
between World War I and World War II, legal scholars largely agreed that international law, that
which would direct the logics of a global constitution, referred to law that governed relations
between and among states.253 That is, international laws were meant for states, not for
organizations or individuals. Between World War I and World War II, the concept of
international law became more complicated as states began to establish and govern over nonstate entities, such as intergovernmental organizations and transnational companies.254 Legal
scholars debated whether laws formed by these intergovernmental and transnational
organizations were in fact legitimate “laws”—the complication being that, because they were
inter- and trans- national, laws were difficult for nation-states to enforce. As Malanczuk argues,
though, this is inconsequential, for even if international law is not often enforced, its role is still
significant. With increased globalization and international interdependence, the role these world
organizations play also increase, and their laws structure relationships between nations. Thus,
when disputes arise, nations comply and refer to international law. This reciprocity lessens the
significance of the lack of enforcement for its effectivity.255 Regardless of whether the Charter is
binding, when states act, they choose to do so in compliance or out of compliance with the UN,
thus taking a political stance toward the UN and its member states. Thomas Weiss, David
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Forsythe, and Roger Coate note that the importance of the UN is often missed in “thinking too
statically about international law.” The UN shapes global politics, largely, by providing
collective political approval.256
Collective political approval is the second and most important way states gain legitimacy
through the United Nations. This political approval, according to Weiss, et. al, “may induce
recalcitrant political authorities to accept a UN policy or program” because “it is better to have
UN approval than otherwise.”257 That is, the UN holds relational, symbolic power that directs the
actions among nation-states. William Starosta notes two examples in which states acted in
accordance with the UN because of collective political approval, or what he calls “symbolic
solutions to world crises.” During the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets used the “semantic forum
of the United Nations,” turning around the ships that were bound for Cuba “under the cover of
words”—the UN Secretary General had called for the Soviets to return in the name of world
peace. This offered the Soviets a face-saving semantic reason to stop their mission.258 In another
instance, the U.S. was let off the hook, so to speak, for not helping Hungary after the Soviets
invaded. In this instance, the U.S. did not engage the Soviets, despite its commitment to support
Hungary. Instead, the U.S. responded that they were unable to come to the aid of Hungary
because the UN would not provide a mandate for the venture. Thus, as Starosta argues, the
nations for whom it was important to remain an ally of the U.S. could “believe the excuse
offered through the scapegoating of the United Nations.”259 In these two cases, semantics
transcended the political situations, allowing continued alliances between nations. Nations used
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the collective approval of the United Nations to legitimate its inaction. These examples show that
all nations participate within a network. The UN is an important apparatus in that network,
particularly because it provides a mediation between states in the form of symbolic collective
approval of political actions.260
The UNGA is the symbolic center for the creation of transnational political approval
because it is the body that represents all the nation states, whose main responsibilities hinge on
democratic deliberation and consensus among nations. According to the Charter, the role of the
Assembly is to, among other things, “discuss and make recommendations” on “general principles
of cooperation for maintaining international peace and security” and any other issues “within the
scope of the Charter.”261 That is, the Assembly’s role is broad, and it is centered around
deliberation among all member states. Moreover, according to the United Nations website, the
Assembly seeks to not only make decisions based upon formal votes, but to also reach consensus
on issues. 262 The Assembly’s representative structure and its duty to a deliberative process, along
with what it produces—namely, universal claims formalized as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights—makes it an appropriate audience for U.S. presidents to draw upon universal
values. U.S. presidents use this forum to engage an audience that already seeks “the universal,”
and, because of the structure of the General Assembly, perform the universal value it seeks to
promote—a U.S. version of democracy. This relationship between U.S. president and the UN
exacerbates inequality between nations as the U.S. establishes more global authority.
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From its inception as a project driven by U.S. presidents, presidents have continued to
invest in the UN, and especially in its General Assembly. For instance, Harry Truman set the
precedent for speaking before the UNGA at the Assembly’s first meeting in 1946. Between 1946
and 1982, presidents addressed the UNGA regularly, and since 1982, each president has spoken
before the Assembly every year.263 The U.S. Department of State website states that the UNGA
“has been an important platform for U.S. Presidents to address the world's most challenging
issues, from poverty and development to peace and security.” 264 It is important, in part, because
the UNGA is the only forum “that the United States President has the opportunity to raise U.S.
foreign policy priorities and global issues of concern to heads of state and national leaders that
represent all 193 member states at the same time.”265 That is, from the perspective of the U.S.
government, an important aspect of the Assembly is its function as a forum to engage with
representatives from each member state. It is politically significant for the presidents to speak
before the UNGA more often and regularly than he does with other, more powerful organs, such
as the Security Council, because the UNGA is the organ most concerned with representation.
The representational aspect of the Assembly is connected to the UN’s most significant source of
legitimacy—collective political approval. It is rhetorically significant for the president to speak
before the UNGA because, as I show in this section, presidents use this platform to reduce the
“universal audience” to that of the U.S., synecdochically represented by themselves. This
increases their legitimacy as global leaders.
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3.2.1

The President, The U.N., and the Universal Audience
Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s conception of the “universal audience”

connects universal values—most often an idea within the realm of philosophy—to rhetoric, a
study of judgments made within particular situations for particular audiences.266 The universal
audience can be understood in two ways. First, the universal audience is the judge and arbiter of
“what counts as a shared and accepted reality.” This means that the universal audience
establishes what is characterized as fact.267 Second, the audience is the judge of the strength of
the arguments and whether to accept, adhere to, and act upon the conclusion of those
arguments.268 As James Crosswhite notes, an “appeal to universal values” is “always an appeal to
a universal audience.” 269 Thus, the response by the universal audience is the litmus test for the
universals produced by the argument.
A truly universal audience would be unable to respond to a speaker’s universal claims.
That is, and abstract and transcendent arbiter of universal truths do not materially exist in space
and time. But that is not Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s definition of a universal audience.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s universal audience is grounded in particular speech situations
and particular audiences. As John Louis Lucaites and Celeste Condit note, a universal audience
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is “the intersubjective imagination of a particular speaker and a particular audience in a particular
historical moment.”270 This audience is created when a speaker successfully relies upon the
“audience’s recognition and acceptance of specific and concrete rhetorical characterizations of
the various acts, scenes, agents, and agencies employed to make the [speaker’s] narrative
coherent.”271 In other words, speakers call forth universal audiences by connecting with the
particular audience’s understanding of a situation and, through persuasion, transforming these
particularities into universal dimensions.272 For presidential speech before the United Nations
General Assembly, part of the speaker’s work to persuade a universal audience is already
accomplished—the audience has decided upon what it believes to be universal values, as
established in both the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The concept
of the universal audience helps us understand the relationship Clinton and Bush created between
the U.S. and the realm of the universal, which is embodied in the UN. Presidents Clinton and
Bush drew upon the explicit universals proclaimed by the UNGA and connected them with U.S.
values and interests around the world, which, of course, do not always align with the interests of
other nations.
In closely identifying the universal values as presented by the UN with those stated by
the U.S., Clinton and Bush increased legitimacy for U.S. actions abroad. Clinton did this by
conflating the presidency with the universal audience, while Bush appealed to the similarities of
the UN and U.S. founding documents. In each case, the presidents closely identified the UN with
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the U.S. until the two were consubstantial with one another.273 With consubstantial audiences,
closely identified by their shared understanding of universal values, the U.S. took on the
authority of the UN, while also providing the UN with its own global power. In cases like this,
presidents become arbiters of what is universally true, universalizing the trope of democracy.
When a powerful nation decides what the values of all other nations should be, there are global
consequences.
3.3

Clinton’s (Market) Democratic Enlargement
There are two complementary parts to Clinton’s process of linking U.S. interests (using

the trope of “democracy”) to universal values expressed by the UNGA. For one, Clinton makes a
realist-materialist argument for democracy. His “democracy” is inherently market-based, which
Clinton provides as a way to attain universal rights. Second, Clinton figures himself as a
representative of the universal audience, thereby arbitrating the universal value of his own
claims. Thus, when the U.S. intervenes throughout the world on behalf of the global market,
these actions are justified by the UN’s universal values. It is important to understand that global
capitalism produces winners and losers. By acting on behalf of the best interests of the U.S. in a
global market, some nations do not fare well. Therefore, the “universal” good of market
democratic enlargement is not universal at all.274
3.3.1

Democracy as Global Market
In August 1993 President Clinton asked his national security advisor, Anthony Lake, to

select a word or slogan that would signify Clinton’s foreign policy vision and priorities—much
like “containment” had represented the foreign policy goals of the U.S. during the Cold War.
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Lake and his colleagues settled on the phrase “democratic enlargement,” which would
encompass Clinton’s foreign policy priorities he had articulated during his campaign.275 Indeed,
the phrase guided his foreign policy for the rest of his presidency.276 “Democratic enlargement”
made a clear post-Cold War shift from “containment.” While “containment” is a metaphor that
divides nations from one another, “democratic enlargement” suggests just the opposite.
Democracies would not, according to this policy, be separated from nations with different
ideologies, like communism, but rather democracy would spread throughout the globe. Clinton
disconnected “democracy” from a system of governance and shifted “democracy” into the realm
of the market. That is, Clinton was concerned with market, or “neo-liberal” globalism.277 In
making “global market” inherent to the meaning of “democracy,” Clinton combined a god-term
(democracy) with a global U.S. interest (global capitalist market).278 Moreover, Clinton
connected with the universal audience by tying the material necessity of market democracy to
universal values.
Clinton was the first president elected after the Cold War. As such, his foreign policy
rhetoric differentiated from that which dominated the Cold War—what Philip Wander named
“prophetic dualism” and “technocratic realism.” His foreign policy rhetoric also differed from
Bush’s New World Order drama.279 Mary Stuckey describes Clinton’s rhetoric as “dominated by
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Power Politics,” explaining that he engaged the U.S. in the world “predominantly for practical,
not moral reasons” such as economic reforms.280 Kathryn Olson agrees that Clinton was mostly
concerned with the market, which he used to warrant U.S. involvement in world conflicts. Olson
notes that Clinton would juxtapose a chaotic world with American market democracy, which
justified his plan for democratic enlargement.281 Clinton’s 1993 speech to the Assembly, like his
body of foreign policy rhetoric, pointed to a quest for enlargement, but not as a moralist or an
idealist, but as a realist.282 He spoke of U.S. values, but mostly insofar as they related to the
global market—for the purpose and benefit of the U.S. and world economy. For instance, the
four components of the strategy for enlargement, according to Lake, was to “strengthen the
community of major market democracies” including that of the U.S.; “foster and consolidate new
democracies and market economies”; “counter the aggression and support the liberalization of
states hostile to democracy and markets”; and “help democracy and market economies take root
in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.”283 In each of these points, enlargement was rooted
in the marketplace, avoiding any claims of the moral good of democracies.284 Even so, Clinton’s
rhetoric on democratic enlargement entered the realm of the universal.
Clinton’s “democratic enlargement” universalized “democracy” by positioning it as a
necessary material condition for human flourishing, or even existence. Celeste Condit argues that
material conditions exert a “semi-universal force” upon human existence, thereby also exerting
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“objective force upon human language structures.”285 That is, human material conditions bind
language to itself, constraining it to its meaning within human relationships to material. When a
universal experience exerts itself upon humans, language is bound to that experience. Condit’s
example of this is food—because of the “physiological process of starvation,” food is usually a
positive term. That is, because all humans have felt hunger, which is a negative experience, the
term food is constrained to be a positive term.
Condit’s argument assumes an effective constraint of universal experience on language.
Clinton’s rhetoric shows that material conditions associated with universal experiences are also
constrained by language. For instance, Clinton used the word “democratic” or its cognate
nineteen times. Twelve of these times, he paired the word with an economic term such as
“market-based” or “free market.”286 Free markets are not, of course, universal material
experiences; therefore, they lack a connection to objective truth. In these instances, Clinton
associates the “market-based democracies” with dialectical pairs of universal material
experience. For example, Clinton said the “overriding purpose” of the United Nations “must be
to expand and strengthen the world's community of market-based democracies. During the Cold
War we sought to contain a threat to the survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the
circle of nations that live under those free institutions.”287 Here, the universal human experiences
of “threat,” “survival,” and desire for “freedom” impress upon the term “democracy” as well as
its descriptor, “market-based.” In this process, the deregulation and globalization of the free
market elevates to the category of universal ideal, and in doing so is inherently linked to the
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concept of “democracy.” In this way, Clinton demonstrated a need for global capitalism, U.S.
interest, through the trope of democracy.
In a similar vein, Clinton argued that an “expanded community of market democracies
not only serves our own security interests, it also advances the goals enshrined in this body's
Charter and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For broadly based prosperity is clearly
the strongest form of preventive diplomacy.”288 Here, we see the connection between the
universal human experience of wealth/poverty and “market democracies” in which prosperity is
attributed to a market-based democracy, warranting its category as a human right. As previously
discussed, the UNGA proclaimed universals, including that of human rights. Universals are
claims about either that which is inherent or that which is ideal for all. In either case, it is a claim
of absolute truth. Western democratic culture is not inherent to human nature or it would not
need to be argued. Whether it is ideal for all is, of course, is contentious. President Clinton
universalized U.S. (or Western) conceptions of democracy by linking the type of democracy he
wanted to promote with universal human conditions. These universal human conditions
transformed “democracy” into a universal because of the way language is constrained by human
conditions. Some experiences are universal and this universality informs language—thus, as
Condit argues, language and truth are not “merely intersubjective.”289 As we have seen in
Clinton’s application of the human condition onto market democracy, this material-linguistic
constraint offers the president creative potential for the universalization of particulars.290
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Usually, the universalization of U.S. values is made through arguments “based on selfevident human virtue” of an exceptional nation.291 In this case, Clinton took a different approach,
connecting universal material conditions to connect universal values with the U.S. aspiration to
enlarge global democratic markets. Thus, Clinton used the trope of “democracy” to persuade the
UN to act in a way that would benefit the U.S.
3.3.2

U.S. as Synecdoche of Universal Audience
In discursively universalizing global democracy, Clinton used the specific audience of the

UNGA to align U.S. interests abroad with the United Nation’s universal values. Clinton did this
by using the “United Nations” and the “United States” interchangeably throughout his speech,
creating the opportunity for his own enactment of his argument to the UN to be proof of the
Assembly’s agreement to its universal correctness. Clinton’s audience was the UNGA—an
audience that Perelman himself considered to be universal. 292 Perelman argued that shared
beliefs across nations and cultures, culminating in the United Nations Declaration of Human
Rights, was “a statement that captured the values of forty-eight nations [and which] was in part a
function of an actual universal audience.”293 The forty-eight participatory nations judged
arguments on human rights and acted upon their agreement by generating the Declaration of
Human Rights. The universal audience, in this case, both accepted certain arguments as facts and
then acted upon them, thus generating more universal claims.
The speaker’s task, according to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, is to inspire the
audience to action through argument.294 Clinton inspired the audience to act by showing that he
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was a part of the universal audience, sometimes reducing the universal audience, of which he
was a part, to the United States. Through his speech, he stood in for the universal audience by
alternating between speaking for the United Nations and speaking for the United States such that
there was at times no discernable distinction between the two. For example, for the first section
of his 1993 speech, Clinton used “we” to refer to the United States. Later, Clinton spoke
specifically about the role of the United Nations, saying, “Ultimately, the key for reforming the
United Nations, as in reforming our own Government, is to remember why we are here and
whom we serve. It is wise to recall that the first words of the UN Charter are not ‘We, the
government,’ but, ‘We, the people of the United Nations.’”295 Here, he spoke for the United
Nations, continuing with “That means in every country the teachers, the workers . . . . It is their
futures that are at risk when we act or fail to act, and it is they who ultimately pay our bills. As
we dream new dreams in this age when miracles now seem possible, let us focus on the lives of
those people.” 296 Without specifying a shift in identity, Clinton continued a few lines later saying
“During the course of our campaign in the United States last year, Vice President Gore and I
promised the American people major changes in our Nation's policy toward the global
environment. Those were promises to keep, and today the United States is doing so. Today we
are working with other nations to build on the promising work of the UN's Commission on
Sustainable Development.”297 Here, Clinton took back on the role of U.S. representative,
speaking directly about the leadership of the United States in the workings of the United Nations.
Throughout the speech, Clinton seamlessly moved from “we” as a member of the United Nation
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and “we” as the representative of the United States. According to Perelman, the universal
audience a speaker seeks to convince “must necessarily include himself, who is the principal
judge of the value of his arguments.”298 By shifting back and forth between the two roles as
speaker for the United States and as a member of the United Nations, Clinton took on the subject
position of UN audience—that is, the universal audience—as well as representative of the United
States. In this melding of personas, Clinton placed himself in a synecdochal relationship with the
United Nations and the United States. Both were reduced (the function of synecdoche) to
Clinton, the speaker and audience member, arbiter of universal truths.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca argued that the proof of an effective argument before a
universal audience is in the way the audience grapples with and enacts (or fails to enact) the
conclusions of an argument.299 Clinton’s argument universalizing market democracy was
effective, because Clinton, as a stand-in for the universal audience, acted upon the aspiration of
“market democracy” throughout his presidency. Clinton acted upon these facts—specifically
expanding NATO, signing NAFTA into law, and deregulating financial markets. Clinton
foreshadowed these presidential actions in his speech: “We will work to strengthen the free
market democracies by revitalizing our economy here at home, by opening world trade through
the GATT, the North American Free Trade Agreement and other accords, and by updating our
shared institutions, asking with you and answering the hard questions about whether they are
adequate to the present challenges. We will support the consolidation of market democracy
where it is taking new root, as in the states of the former Soviet Union and all over Latin
America. And we seek to foster the practices of good government that distribute the benefits of
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democracy and economic growth fairly to all people.”300 Clinton used the words “we” and
“shared institutions,” hinting that the universal desires shared by the U.S. and the UN could
come to fruition through other collective security venues, such as NATO. Clinton, who produced
the argument for the universalization of market democracy, acted on behalf of the universal
audience to judge his argument as good and act upon it through enlarging market-base
democracies.301 In effect, Clinton constituted himself (and the United States) as the universal
audience; thus, the U.S. and the UN were consubstantial. This speech expanded Clinton’s global
authority and thus to legitimate his actions that would affect the world.
3.4

Bush: U.S. “Democracy” and Universal Human Rights
Clinton stood in for the universal audience as both a representative of the U.S. and the

UN. George W. Bush, too, conflated the U.S. and the UN by appealing to the universal value of
human rights claimed by both institutions. He did so in two ways. First, he first appealed to the
founding documents of the U.S., arguing that the U.S. and the UN promote the same universal
value of human rights, which he connected to American democracy. In doing so, he
consubstantiated himself, and the U.S., with the UN. Second, he used a combination of the
“nation as family” metaphor and the “world community” metaphor to exert himself in the
position of the moral and authoritative “father” of the member nations who would protect human
rights through democracy. By positioning himself as part of the universal audience, Bush’s was
able to figure himself as a global leader in his speeches addressed to the UN.
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3.4.1

Consubstantiation through Founding Documents
Bush’s first speech before the UN General Assembly was November 10, 2001. President

for less than a year, and only two months after 9/11, Bush’s administration was already known
for being less than enthusiastic about multilateral cooperation.302 The administration had
removed the position of U.S. ambassador to the UN from the cabinet, for instance. The UN
seemed to have a similarly negative stance toward the U.S., voting the nation off the UN
Commission on Human Rights in Geneva earlier that year.303 His address to the UNGA had the
tone of a lecture as he spoke of the UN’s “obligations” as he implied that the UN had failed to
live up to them. In his second speech to the UN, a year later, Bush took a different approach. He
appealed to the founding of the UN and its connection to the U.S, a rhetorical tactic he repeated
in several of his later speeches before the UNGA. In doing so, he identified the two entities with
one another, calling forth a universal audience consubstantial to himself—and thus the U.S.
Kenneth Burke argues that individual motives become shared through a process of
identification. Identification occurs when one a person can “talk…[the] language” of another
person, the two sharing motives.304 The effect of such identification, for Burke, is
consubstantiation. When two people are consubstantial, they are not identical, but their interests
are joined so that they identify with one another. They are at once distinct substances while also
consubstantial with the other.305 Though Burke does not bring consubstantiality into the realm of
the universal, identification and consubstantiality are helpful concepts for analyzing the
relationship between a speaker before the UN. Through identification and consubstantiation, a
president can persuade the UN to promote U.S. interests.
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In order to become consubstantial with the audience, the president would need to
“talk…[the] language” of the United Nations. Bush did so by appealing to the founding
documents of the U.S. and the UN, showing that he and the nation he represented have always
supported the universal truths espoused by the UN. Bush attended to this similarity in his 2003
speech before the UN, saying:
The founding documents of the United Nations and the founding documents of America
stand in the same tradition. Both assert that human beings should never be reduced to
objects of power or commerce, because their dignity is inherent. Both require— both
recognize a moral law that stands above men and nations, which must be defended and
enforced by men and nations. And both point the way to peace, the peace that comes
when all are free. We secure that peace with our courage, and we must show that courage
together.” 306
Bush pointed to joint interests in human rights, appealing to the authority of the constitutive
documents of the U.S. and the UN. An appeal to founding U.S. documents brings with it
paradoxical U.S. values. National memory, as passed down through public address, suggests that
the U.S. was founded both through democratic dialogue and an “unquestionable and unauthored
divine-right narrative.”307 That is, circulated narratives of the founding of the U.S. contain
signature elements of both democracy, which is dialogic and dependent on the choices of the
people, and exceptionalism, which is predestined and directed by God. Bush used these
paradoxical understandings of the founding of the U.S. to promote identification among
members of the UN. The UNGA, as a deliberative and representative body, is similar to the
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democratic beginning of the U.S., on the one hand, and the universal aspect of America’s divine
rights narrative is attributable to the UN (and all persons) on the other. As Stuckey notes, some
American values in founding documents, such as equality, are presented as universal
principles— “all men are created equal.” If all men possess this trait, equality is independent
from nationhood.308 This leaves an opening for Bush to associate the universal values dispelled in
the founding documents of both the UN and the U.S. Both were founded on universal rights,
making the UN and the U.S. consubstantial. Because the U.S. claims that these rights are
simultaneously uniquely American, Bush could also position himself as an authority on these
human rights.
Though the word “democracy” is not found in the Charter of the UN (nor the Covenant of
the League of Nations), both Clinton and Bush claimed upholding democracy was the primary
purpose of the United Nations.309 While Clinton usually tied democracy to market freedom, Bush
connected democracy with social and political freedom, or “liberty,” and “security.”310 This
difference is, of course, related to both the ethos of the two presidents and the different political
contexts. In each case, democracy was universalized for the good of the U.S. through the
institution of the UN.
For instance, in 2003, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s removal,
Bush said that the Iraqi people’s “future promises lives of dignity and freedom” because “across
Iraq, life is being improved by liberty.” Because of the certain and impending success of Iraq’s
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democracy, according the Bush, Iraq would “inspire the Middle East,” and set “an example that
others… would be wise to follow.” 311 This better life, according to Bush, would affect the peace
of people beyond Iraq and into the rest of the world. “Across the Middle East,” Bush said,
“people are safer because an unstable aggressor has been removed from power. Across the
world, nations are more secure because an ally of terror has fallen.”312 Bush expressed the
universality of democracy (here, “liberty”) by explaining how democracy in one place (Iraq) is
connected to the well-being of the rest of the world—in other words, the universal good.
This idealist/moralistic rhetoric can be seen throughout Bush’s speeches before both U.S.
audiences and the UN. This is because Bush applied U.S. exceptionalism to the UN member
states that align with the U.S. In Bush’s 2007 speech to the UN, he focused on education as a
human right, which he connects with democracy promotion. He said:
The mission of the United Nations requires liberating people from the chains of illiteracy
and ignorance. Article 26 of the Universal Declaration states, ‘Everyone has the right to
education.’ And when nations make the investments needed to educate their people, the
whole world benefits. Better education unleashes the talent and potential of its citizens
and adds to the prosperity of all of us. Better education promotes better health and greater
independence. Better education increases the strength of democracy and weakens the
appeal of violent ideologies. So the United States is joining with nations around the world
to help them provide a better education for their people.313
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This quotation shows that Bush conflated human rights—as defined by the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights—with democracy. Education, in this instance, was connected to democracy
with the logic that through education, democracy will be strengthened and violent ideologies will
be weakened. Bush juxtaposes “violent ideologies” and “democracy” in this sentence, implying
that democracies are peaceful. In this way, Bush connected democracy back to the stated goal of
the UN, to “maintain international peace and security”314 and to the Declaration of Human
Rights. Bush could have connected any of the human rights to democracy, because for Bush,
human rights cannot fully exist without democracy, or vice versa. This was a signature argument
for Bush, not only before the UN, but throughout his presidency. After 9/11, Bush’s presidency
was defined by, as Jason Berggren and Nicol Rae argue, “democratic evangelism.”315 That is,
Bush combined religious conviction with political decision-making. This came through his
speeches before the UN when he focused on the need to stand up for human rights and liberty in
non-democratic nations throughout the world. Notwithstanding his political intentions, Bush’s
speeches reflected a belief in the power of the U.S. (and by extension the UN) to grant universal
values, in the form of democracy, to the rest of the world. His speeches were particularly
impactful before the UN, because he attached the U.S.’s founding to that of the UN, increasing
the U.S.’s legitimacy as a global leader—at least insofar as the UN is concerned.
In associating the UN’s Declarations of Universal Human Rights with American values,
Bush also increased his authority as the leader of the U.S. “The United States helped found the
United Nations,” Bush said. “We want the United Nations to be effective and respectful and
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successful.”316 Just as presidents often invoke the moral leadership of the U.S., based on its selfproclaimed constitutive and historical commitment to human rights and democracy, by aligning
U.S. and UN values and interests, its moral authority could also align. Bush said that the world
needs “principled leadership.” The United Nations, thus, must act in accordance to its founding
documents, as a protector of human rights, to defend and preserve “its moral authority.”317 Bush
attempted to constitute an audience of UN members that would act in alignment with the U.S.
through identification their universal oneness as exceptional moral leaders and protectors of
human rights.318
The case that there are similarities between the founding documents of the UN and the
U.S. is not a complicated one to make. The language of the UN founding documents mirrors
important U.S. rhetoric. For instance, Archibald MacLeish, a U.S. poet and public intellectual,
helped compose the preambles to the UN Charter and the UN Declaration of Human Rights.319
As Moore and Pubantz, note, the language is reminiscent of both U.S. founding documents and
more recent language of the New Deal.320 And we know that presidents played a key role in the
development of both the United Nations and its predecessor, the League of Nations. This does
not mean that presidents should have the authority to lead the global institution. It does mean that
there is a foundational premise to the argument that the U.S. and the UN share a basic
foundational character. Bush appealed to the past in order to persuade the UNGA that it should
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also act a certain way in its future. This is one way in which presidents create and express a
global role.
3.4.2

“World Community” and “Strict Father” Metaphors
In addition to appealing to the founding ideologies of the U.S. and UN, connecting the

UN’s goal to protect the universal of human rights to a U.S. understanding of democracy, Bush’s
speeches also constructed identities of the U.S. and UN using metaphor. Specifically, Bush used
what George Lakoff calls “world community” and “nation as family” metaphors to establish the
relationship between the U.S. and the UN, and thus the U.S. and the rest of the world. In the
“world community” metaphor, nations are understood as individual people connected to one
another within a global sphere.321 That is, nations are personified. Each national territory is a
home. International relationships, in this metaphorical model, are social relationships with
friends, enemies, and rogue individuals (nations) that do not abide by the norms of the world
community.322 The world community metaphor is often used in discourse about the UN, as UN
documents center on the values of universal human rights and equality.323 Bush adjusted this
metaphor by blending it with the “nation as family” metaphor, a metaphor that positioned Bush
as the head of the family unit—in this case, the UN.
When U.S. politicians use the “nation as family” metaphor, “the government is parent,
self-reliant citizens are mature children, and non-self-reliant citizens are dependent children.”324
U.S. presidents usually draw upon the “nation as family” metaphor to speak specifically about

321

George Lakoff, “Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy: Why Strategic Framing Matters,” The Frameworks
Institute (1999), 11.
322
Lakoff, “Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy,” 11.
323
See United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations”; United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,”
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html; See also, Lakoff, “Metaphorical Thought in
Foreign Policy,” 12.
324
Lakoff, “Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy,” 7.

107

the U.S., and the president himself represents the government/parent. According to Lakoff, a
conservative president usually places himself in the subject position of the “strict father,”
concerned with moral authority, moral strength, moral self-interest, moral order, and moral
health, while a liberal president often positions himself as a “nurturant parent” who is
empathetic, but who also wants to protect the child from danger.325 Lakoff argues that these
metaphors are often used in domestic discourse to promote conservative or liberal ideology as it
relates to policy. For instance, a conservative president might use the narrative that children must
be disciplined to advocate for harsher criminal punishments, whereas a liberal president might
speak about the dangers of drugs in communities to advocate for these punishments. Bush’s
speeches before the UN show that these metaphors are also useful within the context of global
institutions.
In Bush’s speeches before the UN, Bush positioned the UN as the family (so
“supranational institution as family” instead of “nation as family”) with Bush as the “strict
father.” Iraq, and sometimes other rogue nations are the badly behaved children. Only by coming
alongside Bush in his views of how to handle Iraq could UN member nations keep their rightful
place as members of the family/world community. The “strict father” metaphor promotes U.S.
interests by relying on the identification Bush established between the U.S. and UN, and then
extending the “strict father” role to the UN. Bush’s use of the metaphor in the context of the UN
is premised on the idea that the U.S. and the UN are founded on like-values. Through the “strict
father” and “nation as family” metaphors, Bush argued that because the UN’s values are
universal, and in alignment with the UN’s founding values, the UN should engage in the world
for the same purposes as the U.S. This is politically significant because if the UN were to act as a
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“strict father” aligned with the U.S. president, the UN would legitimize and promote U.S.
interests abroad, with unequal consequences for other nations throughout the world.
Throughout his speeches, Bush figured the UN as a person within the larger unity of
world community or family. For instance, Bush said, “The United Nations was born in the hope
that survived a world war, the hope of a world moving toward justice, escaping old patterns of
conflict and fear.” 326 Only living organisms can be “born.” In this instance, he used the “nation
as family” metaphor for the UN. Other nations fit in his metaphor as either “partners” or
children. Bush said, “Right now …[UN] resolutions are being unilaterally subverted by the Iraqi
regime. Our partnership of nations can meet the test before us by making clear what we now
expect of the Iraqi regime”327 Here, we see that good nations—those that work with the U.S.—
are “partners,” which is part of the world community metaphor. Bad nations—or those who go
against the will of the U.S.—on the other hand, are spoken of as if they are children. Bush said,
“In 1991, Iraq promised UN inspectors immediate and unrestricted access to verify Iraq's
commitment to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. Iraq broke this
promise, spending seven years deceiving, evading, and harassing UN inspectors before ceasing
cooperation entirely.”328 In the nation-as-family metaphorical system, the father (president)
should not meddle in the lives of self-reliant citizens, but should punish those who break the
moral order.329 Because this metaphor is working on the supranational scale, it follows that the
father (UN) should not meddle in the lives of self-reliant nations, but should punish those who
break the moral order (Iraq). It is bad children/citizens/nations who “deceive” and “evade” the
strict father/UN Bush uses the “strict father” and “nation as family” metaphor to position the UN
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as the head of the family. By using examples of nations that act against U.S. interests, Bush used
the “strict father” to conflate the roles of the U.S. president and the UN.
Bush said, “The United States helped found the United Nations. We want the United
Nations to be effective and successful. We want the resolutions of the world’s most important
multilateral body to be enforced.” 330 Here, Bush positioned himself/the U.S. as the father of the
United Nations. The U.S., like a parent, helped create the United Nations. This parent also knows
what is best for the child/member states. What is best, of course, is for the member states to take
on the strict father ideology of the U.S. When “partner nations” abide by Bush’s will, they too,
are positioned as good/strict/moral fathers. “The founding members resolved that the peace of
the world must never again be destroyed by the will and wickedness of any man. We created a
United Nations Security Council so that … our deliberations would be more than talk, our
resolutions would be more than wishes. After generations of deceitful dictators and broken
treaties and squandered lives, we dedicated ourselves to standards of human dignity shared by all
and to a system of security defended by all.”331 That is, when member nations behave in the way
the U.S. president believes they should behave—in this case acting against Iraq—they become
partners and fellow creators of the UN, and defenders of that which is moral and universally
good.
Bush combined the “world community” metaphor and “nation as family” metaphor,
saying, “The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations and a
threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of UN demands with a decade of defiance. All the
world now faces a test and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security
Council resolutions to be honored and enforced or cast aside without consequence? Will the
330
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United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?”332 Here, Bush
positioned the UN as the strict father, as fathers should be “honored.” Iraq is positioned as the
rogue child. Bush further characterized Iraq as a child when he said, “The Security Council
renewed its demand three more times in 1997, citing flagrant violations, and three more times in
1998, calling Iraq's behavior totally unacceptable.” 333 In these examples, Iraq is not a part of the
world community; Iraq is a child who behaves badly, and it is up to the strict father
(Bush/aligning member states) to take care of the situation because of their exceptional, but
universal, values.
By positioning himself as the father of the United Nations, Bush drew upon the rhetoric
of American exceptionalism. U.S. citizens have drawn upon this rhetoric to justify U.S.
worldwide engagement (and isolationism) since the founding of the nation.334 Presidents have
also used this discourse throughout their speeches for and against their participation in world
organizations. Wilson argued, for instance, that “the Mission of America in the world is
essentially a mission of peace and good will.”335 Bush’s rhetoric, which positioned Bush as the
authority figure for the UN in a foreign policy speech about Iraq, continued this note of
exceptionalism, magnifying the global role of the president.
3.5

Conclusion
In this chapter, Clinton and Bush both established authority through the trope of

“democracy.” Clinton did so by positioning market democracies as a universal material
requirement. Bush did so by conflating democracy with human rights. This was persuasive, in
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each case, because the presidents closely identified their roles as the president of the U.S. with
the role of the UN in engaging with the world. While Clinton did so by offering himself as a
synecdoche for the universal audience, Bush appealed to the likeness of the foundational
universal values of the U.S. and UN Bush also appropriated U.S. exceptionalism to paradoxically
claim these universal values as unique to the U.S., establishing himself as a rightful global
leader. Each president magnified the importance of democracy as a universal good, which
strengthens the role of the U.S. in the world.
Both presidents built upon a U.S. conception of the global imaginary using the trope of
“democracy.” Because this trope was exclusively Western and neo-liberal, they failed to consider
or acknowledge how “democracy” or “human rights” could function outside of the Western
frame. As Raka Shome notes, nations such as China operate from an authoritarian regime, but
also fully participate in global capitalism. Dubai’s citizenship is cosmopolitan, though not
democratic.336 Democratic countries, including the United States, violate the Universal
Declaration of Human rights.337 In other words, there is no inherent link between democracy and
material prosperity or between democracy and human rights. Still, the U.S. presidents continue
taking action that affect the world. They do so with or without the approval of the United
Nations, though this analysis shows that they try to cultivate the authority provided by collective
approval.
The presidents’ speeches before the UN are less helpful for understanding if the U.S.
president should play a global role, and more helpful for understanding how the president plays a
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global role. One aspect of the contemporary president’s role is communicating with members of
the UN, and establishing authority from, and for, the UN. This chapter provides a way of
understanding the relationship between U.S. presidential discourse and the UN by offering
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s concept of the “universal audience.” Presidents engage with
the UN as a universal audience, thus connecting U.S. interests to the universals established by
the UN. The next chapter analyzes Barack Obama’s transnational town hall meetings, shifting
focus from the audience of the UN to audiences of transnational citizens.
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4

PRESIDENTS AND FOREIGN CITIZENS: OBAMA’S TRANSNATIONAL TOWN
HALL MEETINGS

In the previous chapters, I examined interpersonal dialogue between a president and
another world leader; an international joint press conference; and presidential speeches before
the United Nations General Assembly. In those chapters, I showed that presidents use different
techniques for developing a global imaginary that are specific to particular speech situations and
audiences. For instance, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev negotiated geopolitical metaphors
representing regional/national values privately before holding a joint press conference in
discursive solidarity about universal values, symbolically ending the Cold War. Bill Clinton and
George W. Bush used the trope of “democracy” to identify with, and persuade, a universal
audience embodied by the United Nations General Assembly to pursue U.S. interests. These two
case studies provide a deeper understanding of the role of the contemporary U.S. president
outside the bounds of the nation-state. Presidents consistently negotiate the role of the U.S.
within the rest of the world, competing with other leaders and representatives for dominance in
the global imaginary. Central to this imaginary are questions of national interests, universal
values, and leadership.
I explained that U.S. presidents use rhetorical strategies to tie “democracy” to these three
elements of their global role. The first chapter showed that “democracy” can help presidents
argue for the exceptional status of the U.S. (or the West), thus making a case that U.S. leadership
is natural. The second chapter explained that “democracy” can also be tied to “universal values,”
thus making a case for other nations to engage in the world in a way that will promote U.S.
interests. This chapter extends the argument and argues that presidents circulate certain
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democratic practices to transnational citizens, thereby negotiating the president’s national and
transnational identity as well as that of the foreign citizens. This reveals another facet of the
global presidency— identity formation.
Each case study also shows how different audiences shape presidential speech. Previous
chapters investigated transnational audiences—institutional leaders and representatives,
respectively. Negotiations with a world leader followed by a joint, globally broadcast press
conference shaped George H.W. Bush’s discursive world vision from being U.S. and Westerncentric toward inclusivity. The United Nations General Assembly provided a foundation for Bill
Clinton and George W. Bush to draw upon universal values, thereby creating a consubstantial
identity between the U.S. and the UN. In this final analysis chapter, I focus on a third
institutional dimension of the global presidency— transnational town hall meetings. This brings
the locus of study to citizens, a central element of the global imaginary.
Throughout his presidency, Barack Obama, in an unprecedented presidential move,
hosted regular transnational town hall meetings. These speech events comprised audiences of
young citizens from countries other than the United States. The meetings primarily took place in
international settings, but a few were hosted in Washington D.C. with only foreign participants
permitted to interact with the president.338 These town hall meetings provide insight into how
presidents as global leaders interact with foreign citizens. While Obama did not technically
represent the audience members at these town hall meetings, in that they are not citizens of his
nation, his presence in the democratic forum suggested otherwise, and his position as the U.S.
president afforded him the opportunity to navigate an emerging transnational citizenship. These
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town hall meetings, in addition to offering a site at which to compare the elements of identity
formation in speeches directed toward foreign citizens, included dialogue between the presidents
and the audience members. This dialogue provides evidence for how citizens interact with and
negotiate these extra-national identities.
Rhetorical scholars have long been interested in how presidents call forth national
identities in U.S. citizens. Usually these studies begin with Benedict Anderson, who argues in
Imagined Communities that citizens understand themselves to be in communion with all other
members of their nation even though they will never know or meet most of their fellow citizens.
Thus, according to Anderson, one aspect of nationhood is that it is imagined. 339 There are myriad
ways people could organize themselves. people could organize themselves. Through historical
necessity and rhetorical practice, one way they choose to do so is through nationhood.340 Scholars
of presidential rhetoric embrace this understanding of the nation and argue that presidents have a
role in creating this social and political imaginary. Presidents help to create the national
imaginary by telling the people who they are (often by way of who they are not) and by acting as
representatives of the people.341
Arguments concerning national identity are present in all presidential speech. Presidents
portray ideal American values through both ceremonial and deliberative speech, in well-attended
and circulated speech occasions, and in small local speeches, through the inclusion and exclusion
of particular citizens and issues surrounding them.342 Inaugural addresses and state of the union
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addresses, specifically, provide opportunities for presidents to portray ideal American values and
to “reassure the people that they are a people after all.”343 When presidents discuss foreign policy
in any of these speech settings, national identity is sometimes revealed in the ways presidents
explain the role of the U.S. within the context of the rest of the world. “The people” are often
framed by who they not. That is, there can be no “us” if there is not also a “them.”344 The people
are also framed in the terms of American exceptionalism, which positions the U.S. as superior
and unique to all the other nations and peoples, thereby justifying how the U.S. engages with the
rest of the world.
In addition to constructing and reflecting national identity, political scientists Kevin Coe
and Rico Neumann find that modern presidents also help shape international identity—the
relationship U.S. citizens have with the rest of the world—through the discursive treatment of
foreign entities in their State of the Union Addresses.345 Because one of the challenges of the
global imaginary is the need to situate citizens simultaneously as both national citizens and
citizens of the world, I build off of Coe and Neumann’s work to find extra-national identity
construction by U.S. presidents.346 Instead of studying speeches directed toward U.S. audiences
to understand how presidents define international identities of U.S. citizens, I turn to speeches
directed toward non-U.S. citizens. In doing so, I look for how presidents provide answers to the
questions “Who am I?” and “Where do I belong?” to foreign citizens.347
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Specifically, I consider ways in which Obama figures citizens in these transnational town
hall address, using the lens of American exceptionalism. The rhetoric of American
exceptionalism can make sense of policies that set the U.S. apart from the world, such as
isolationism; policies that impose upon the world, such as imperialism and manifest destiny; or
policies that “lead” the world in democracy enlargement and a new world order. Reading U.S.
foreign policy through the lens of American exceptionalism enables us to understand how
presidents construct and reflect the national identity of U.S. citizens. Presidential speech on
foreign policy directed toward international audiences, likewise, can provide insight into how the
president evokes a sense of extra-national identity to non-U.S. citizens. Thus, in this chapter, I
analyze a set of speech occasions in which President Obama interacted exclusively with foreign
audiences. This chapter makes two theoretical contributions by both describing elements of
transnational foreign policy and by delineating how this rhetoric constructs transnational and
global identity of both foreign citizens and Obama.
This chapter begins with an overview of transnational foreign policy speech and
American exceptionalism, as well as a justification for using this lens to understand how the
president builds transnational and global identity among citizens, figuring himself as a global
representative. Second, I focus on Obama as a representative of transnational citizens. In this
section, I provide four anecdotes in which foreign citizens asked Obama to embrace the
hypothetical that he represents them and tell them what he would do differently in their nationstate or region. I then discuss the rhetorical strategies Obama used during his town hall meetings
that might have encouraged this understanding of Obama’s global role. This section broadens our
understanding of the president’s global role in practice. Third, I show how Obama figured
transnational citizens. He positioned these citizens with at least two character markers. First, that
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they were transnational and global entities, rather than national. Second, that they were
exceptional, and worthy of emulation. While in the first section, I discuss how Obama revealed
U.S.-centric and exceptionalist rhetoric as he positioned himself as a global leader, in the second
section I show that Obama paradoxically built transnational identity among citizens while
denying American exceptionalism. This is significant in understanding the rhetorical and
political complexities of citizenship and representation in a global era.
4.1

Transnational Foreign Policy
Foreign policy is, most simply, the strategy of a nation for dealing with other nations.

Matters of foreign policy are technically split between the executive and legislative branches, but
modern presidents both create and administer foreign policy, even sending troops into foreign
conflict without the approval of Congress.348 It is also the role of the president to define foreign
policy and frame the situation surrounding the policy to the public. These definitions shape how
the public understands the policy and the national conversation about the policy.349 Moreover,
and importantly to this study, the way the president talks about foreign policy relates to the
national identity of citizens.
Transnational policy is the strategy that deals with issues between and across nations. The
president’s role in transnational policy is less clear than it is within the U.S., and he does not
have a ceremonial occasion, such as a State of the Union address, to define these policies and the
situations that surround them. The new town hall meeting is a forum for discussing transnational
policy issues between nations. At the Southeast Asian town hall meetings, Obama and the
audience members discussed the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement among twelve
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Pacific Rim countries.350 With the Young Leaders of the America, Obama and the foreign
citizens spoke about the legalization of trading marijuana with the U.S., the U.S. opening
relations with Cuba, and a transnational education and economic development plan.351 With the
Young African Leaders, Obama and the audience discussed anti-terrorist strategies, the Food
Security Initiative, and the Global Health Initiative.352 In every town hall meeting, issues of
transnational policy were central to both Obama’s introductory speech and the following
dialogue.
In the same way that we locate appeals to, and the construction of, national identity
within U.S. foreign policy speech, Obama both appealed to and constructed transnational—and,
at times, global—identity between citizens at these town hall meetings. One significant
difference between presidential transnational policy speech and foreign policy speech is the
president’s treatment of American exceptionalism. In Obama’s transnational policy speech, other
nations were elevated as exemplary and, relatedly, the president sometimes used the U.S. as a
model to avoid. In these cases, Obama transformed the American exceptionalist vocabulary to
benefit the nations these citizens represented. This speech was characterized by an explicit
rhetoric of partnership among nations, though the implicit meaning throughout Obama’s
transnational policy rhetoric was that the U.S. remained in the position of leadership.
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These characteristics of transnational foreign policy broaden our understanding of how
presidents shape transnational and global identity. They also show the malleability of U.S.
exceptionalism. Transnational policy rhetoric in these town hall meetings does not break from
U.S. exceptionalist rhetoric completely. Instead, transnational policy rhetoric shares
exceptionalism with other nations while upholding the U.S. as a transnational leader. Thus, by
analyzing presidential use of transnational foreign policy rhetoric we can better understand how
central U.S. political discursive markers such as American exceptionalism help presidents
position themselves as global representatives.
4.1.1

American Exceptionalism
American exceptionalism is the belief, and the discourse surrounding the belief, that God

uniquely blessed the United States and its people, and that the blessing brings with it national
responsibilities. This exceptionalism is tied both to U.S. national identity—how the people
imagine their national community—as well as to U.S. international identity—how U.S. citizens
imagine themselves in relation to the rest of the world. American exceptionalism, a term coined
in 1957 by Max Lerner, can be traced conceptually from the Puritans, and it is present
throughout U.S. political and presidential discourse to the contemporary age.353 When presidents
use a discourse of American exceptionalism they do so to justify policy decisions. For instance,
when Abraham Lincoln said the U.S. is “the last best hope for man on earth,” he used a belief in
U.S. moral exceptionalism to appeal to end slavery.354 When Woodrow Wilson wanted to make
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the world “safe for democracy,” he used American exceptionalism to call for war.355 Ronald
Reagan’s “Crusade for Freedom” garnered appeal for U.S. Cold War policies.356 Bill Clinton’s
description of the U.S. as the world’s “one indispensable nation” encouraged democracy
enlargement.357 George W. Bush used a rhetoric of American exceptionalism when he said the
U.S. was attacked on 9/11 for being “the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the
world.”358 In each of these instances, the belief that the United States is the most moral and
blessed nation provided a warrant for particular political actions either within the U.S. or outside
the U.S. Likewise, the description of the foreign policy reflects the national identity of the
people.
The discourse of American exceptionalism is such a norm for presidential rhetoric that
presidents may be criticized for inadequately relying on it. Republicans in the 2012 presidential
campaign, for instance, claimed that Obama’s tour through Middle Eastern countries at the
beginning of his presidency was an “apology tour.”359 The accusation that Obama had an
“apology tour” and that this made him untrustworthy as a president signals how closely
American exceptionalism is tied to some versions of national—and international—identity. For
adherents of these versions, a president cannot appear to fault the U.S. in any way, because doing
so would concede that the U.S. is not the moral authority of the world. The U.S. must always be
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set apart from the “other.”360 It is a national narrative— a national fantasy that tells Americans
who they are to each other and who they are in relation to the rest of the world. American
exceptionalism becomes trickier in presidential speeches outside the U.S. borders, especially in
foreign policy speeches—the subject of which is how the U.S. will relate with other nations. The
following sections analyze the identity construction of Obama and foreign citizens. The analysis
reveals that the president uses American exceptionalism to figure himself as a global leader and
representative, while paradoxically challenging this discursive theme when figuring his
audiences as transnational and global entities.
4.2

Obama as Global Representative
Each of Obama’s transnational town hall meetings consisted of a speech by Obama

followed by a question-and-answer session with the transnational audience. During the questionand-answer session, several citizens implied an understanding of Obama as being more than a
representative of the American people, their discourse suggesting Obama potentially represented
them as well. In this section, I describe the scenarios in which students seemed to not only
identify with the president, but also position him as their leader. These interactions show the
potential power of transnational identity formation by a U.S. president. I then discuss four
rhetorical strategies Obama used to figure himself into this global role, and how American
exceptionalism plays into this global role.
4.2.1

Audience Response to Obama: Four Anecdotes
During the first town hall meeting between Obama and the Young African Leaders, a

group that met sporadically with the president over a period of five years, a student asked the
president if the United States was “committed to ensuring a partnership that might not
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necessarily be beneficial to America, but truly beneficial to the sovereign interest of the
countries” that the students represent. Obama answered that “countries look out for their
interests” and that his job is “to look out for the people of the United States,” but that “the
interests of the United States and the interests of the continent of Africa greatly overlap.”361
While highlighting the interconnectedness of nations, Obama stated that he is concerned with the
people in other nations to the extent that they relate to the well-being of the U.S. That is, Obama
emphasized his position as President of United States of America, and, thus, was primarily
concerned with the interests of the United States. Despite Obama’s statement to the contrary, the
discourse of the Young African Leaders suggests that they imagined the president as more than a
national leader and representative of the U.S. They saw him as at least a potential partner.
During Obama’s third meeting with the students involved in the Young African Leaders
Initiative, a young man from Senegal stated, “President Obama is the first President of the
United States of Africa. I would like to know [:] can you share the two important issues you will
discuss as the first President of the United Nation of Africa?” The student, here, asked a question
that positioned the president as the leader of a “united Africa.” The question led to confusion,
with Obama clarifying that he is the first African American President of the United States, not a
president of Africa. After some back and forth, Obama asked the student if this was an
“intellectual exercise… the idea is if somehow Africa unified into a United States of Africa,”
what would he say?362 The student concurred with the president that this was his intent. If we are
to take the Senegalese student at his word, the student was asking Obama to place himself in the
role of the leader of Africa and to imagine how he might act in that role.
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It was not only Young African Leaders who superimposed the president into the position
of the leader of their own country. At the Young Southeast Asian Leaders town hall meetings,
students first treated the president as a powerful person who had the potential to help them. As
meetings progressed, citizens began to discursively position Obama as a potential representative.
For instance, one citizen asked in the first meeting, “How exactly can America lead us youth
internationally in championing such issues, …[as] climate change, women empowerment,
poverty eradication?”363 By the second meeting, another audience member asked Obama how he
would develop their country if he “were the President of Myanmar.” Like the audience member
at the Young African Leaders town hall meeting, this citizen requested Obama engage in the
hypothetical that he were their actual political representative.364 Obama responded with actions
that he would take if he were, indeed, the president of Myanmar. He suggested first
“transitioning to democracy.” In order to transition to a democracy, Obama said there “needs to
be an election next year,” that there “should be constitutional amendments that ensure a
transition over time to a fully civilian government,” and that “there needs to be laws put in place
to protect freedom of the press, freedom of expression, freedom to politically organize.”365 He
also said he would work on economic and agricultural development plans as well as create a free,
compulsory educational system. Each of these advances, Obama said, would “happen
naturally…[with] a democratic system in place.” 366 Obama engaged in the audience member’s
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hypothetic and provided steps he would take as their president. Significantly, Obama tied each of
his leadership plans with the concept of democracy.
A final example of foreign citizens imagining—or rather, asking Obama to imagine—the
president as their own political representative took place at a town hall meeting in Shanghai,
among about three hundred Shanghainese students. The event was broadcast on local Shanghai
television stations, streamed on an official Chinese news agency’s website for several hours, and
live-streamed on the White House website (which is not censored in China). Before the event,
Obama’s administration selected some of the students’ questions, submitted in advance online,
for Obama to answer during the meeting. Unlike the previous examples, where the questions
were raised in the moment, the Obama administration controlled which questions he would
answer. The administration chose one question about Obama’s thoughts on internet censorship,
creating a situation in which Obama could speak about the freedom of speech—not a topic that
would have likely been broadcast if it had been broached in interactions between Presidents
Obama and Hu Jintao earlier in Obama’s visit.367
The question, read by U.S. Ambassador to China Jon Huntsman, asked: “In a country
with 350 million Internet users and 60 million bloggers, do you know of the firewall?” And
second, “Should we be able to use Twitter freely?”368 Obama responded to these questions by
stating that while there is “a price you pay for openness,” he believed the “good outweighs the
bad so much that it's better to maintain that openness” and that technology that allows for more
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communication, like Twitter, “helps to draw the world together.”369 Obama spoke about values
that he argues are good for the world. He did so in a forum in which he was answering questions
by foreign citizens he did not represent in any of the ways we usually understand representation.
One Chinese Twitter user said of Obama’s response, “I will not forget this morning. I heard, on
my shaky Internet connection, a question about our own freedom which only a foreign leader can
discuss.”370 The interaction—with Obama speaking in a country other than the one he has part in
governing, responding to questions written by citizens of that country, positioning himself as a
global representative—is illustrative of one aspect of presidential rhetoric under conditions of
globalization.
“Mr. Obama, do you know about our firewall” and “Should we be able to use Twitter
freely?” does different political work than “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.” These
sentences distill a complex relationship between globalization and democracy. Citizens of a
polity outside that which Obama governs wrote the questions directed toward Obama, and
Obama then spoke about global values and democracy—the format of the town hall meeting with
Obama effectively cut Hu Jintao out of the interaction. In this meeting, Obama represented
global democracy. Reagan, on the other hand, called upon the leader of another nation-state to
take political action. In between these moments, something changed. With increased political,
economic, and communicative flows and connectivity, the role of the U.S. president shifted from
that of an exclusively national institution to one that also implies an imagined global institution.
In each of these situations, transnational citizens asked Obama to interact with them as if
he were their representative. Obama, for the most part, obliged. He provided answers that
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reflected ideal American values—not necessarily representative of the reality of the U.S. In
doing so, he enacted global representation, by responding to questions that figured himself as
such, and global leadership, by offering “universal” ideas and plans for achieving them.
4.2.2

Obama’s Rhetorical Strategies
The discourse of these three transnational audiences presents a shift in how citizens

understand the role of the U.S. president—from a leader who could potentially help transnational
citizens to a potential active representative of these citizens. U.S. presidents, in any official
capacity, only represent U.S. citizens. However, different rhetorical strategies may influence how
foreign citizens understand the role of the president. I argue that Obama positioned himself as a
leader and teacher of universal values, taking on this leadership role both through the forum of
town hall meeting and through his speech. In this section, I discuss four rhetorical strategies that
suggested Obama’s role as a transnational representative during his town hall meetings. First,
Obama’s physical presence in the town hall meetings provided the opportunity for face-to-face
dialogue, which is a culturally normative way for representatives to meet with their constituents.
Second, Obama’s defining of the rhetorical situation as a “town hall forum” provided context for
a specific understanding of representation. Third, Obama uses deliberative principles to govern
the town hall meetings, presenting himself as a teacher of democratic values. Fourth, Obama
identified with his audiences by presenting a transnational identity. Together, these rhetorical
strategies invited audiences to interact with Obama as a potential action-oriented political
representative, suggesting a dimension of the U.S. president’s global role, which was marked by
U.S. exceptionalism.
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4.2.2.1 Physical Presence
Obama’s physical presence at the town hall meetings is a type of rhetorical circulation
that amplifies his position as a potential representative. Rhetorical scholars have theorized about
the circulation of texts—both linguistic and visual—and the methods by which to analyze these
texts. These studies, when considered in the context of the presidency, help scholars discern
colonial logics within circulated texts371; they help us understand what happens when presidential
speech texts are condensed and circulated as fragments372; and they clarify the relationship
between circulation of texts and democracy373 and the public sphere.374 These studies make clear
that understanding the fragmentation and circulation of texts is vital for rhetorical studies. We do
not yet, however, understand the circulation of embodied presidential texts—that is, no studies
attend to a president’s movement into different rhetorical situations around the world and the
unique implications of that circulation.
In the case of Obama’s transnational town hall meetings, Obama’s physical circulation—
his presence in particular transnational situations—invited audiences to imagine Obama as a
global representative. It is because Obama’s speech is embodied by the president himself (rather
than by any other medium) that the president was able to interact with citizens on a transnational
scale through the rhetorical forum of town hall meetings. Studying embodied presidential
371
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circulation includes not only the movement of presidents from place to place and the importance
of that movement to the institution of the presidency, but also how presidential speech and the
physical presence of the president works in conjunction with the institution of the presidency and
all the connotations, traditions, and symbolic and political power that the institution entails. My
analysis of the constitutive work of Obama’s transnational town hall meetings, then, considers
the presence of the president, the interaction between the president and transnational citizens
within the context of the particular rhetorical forum, and the constitutive rhetorical effects of this
interaction.375
Embodied speech works differently than disembodied speech, or speech embodied by a
medium other than the speaker in that it allows for contextual specificity of messages and more
trust between the speaker and the listener. Embodied speech also works differently for presidents
than for other speakers. First, the ethos of the president is revealed through his discourse in
which he reflects his understanding of the image of the people. Presidents reflect that
understanding of the people by being physically present with them. Second, there is an historical
link between presidential travel and the power of the president over the people.376 Presidents
travel to be nearer to the people, to better understand them and reflect their values, and to garner
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their support. This theoretical framework for embodied presidential speech helps us understand
Obama’s performance of representation at his transnational town hall meetings.
Embodied speech allows for a tailoring of a message specific for that particular audience,
a point that has been contentious at least as far back as Plato. In Phaedrus, for example, Socrates
lamented that writing created too much distance between the speaker and the message, and thus,
between the speaker and the audience. Socrates said, “No one will ever possess the art of
speaking, to the extent that any human being can, unless he acquires the ability to enumerate the
sorts of characters to be found in any audience, to divide everything according to its kind.”377 In
other words, for Socrates, there needs to be an intimate relationship between the speaker and
audience such that the speaker can teach the hearer what is good for the hearer’s soul. As John
Durham Peters notes, Socrates’ view is that “indiscriminate dissemination is bad; intimate
dialogue or prudent rhetoric that matches message and receiver good.”378 Broad dissemination, in
this line of thought, is less valuable to the relationship between the speaker and the hearer than
embodied discourse because it disallows contextual specificity of the message. And with less
contextual specificity, there is a potential distancing in the relationship between the speaker and
the hearer.
Peters notes that with the advent of radio, presidents had to compensate for the
disconnect between themselves and their audiences. They did so using different strategies with
varying degrees of success. For example, Franklin Roosevelt inserted his physical presence in
one of his fireside chats by interrupting himself and asking, “Where’s that glass of water?”
Roosevelt’s bodily necessity increased his “presence” through the radio address providing “the
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ultimate ethos.”379 Ethos is derived through physical presence both because of the authenticity
the body brings and the ability of speakers to tailor their messages to their specific audiences.
The president is a “one man distillation of the American people,” which gives him a
unique relationship to the message and the hearer.380 According to Walter Fisher, the president’s
ethos is directly connected to the image the president has of the people as expressed in his
discourse, and thus, how well he fulfills the expectations of the people.381 Likewise, Mary
Stuckey notes that “presidents must unite contemporaneous occasions with appropriate traditions
and innovations so that enough of us will continue to see ourselves—and sometimes even our
better selves—reflected in the national mirror of public discourse.”382 In other words, it is
important for the president to be intimately connected to the people and to reflect the best version
of these constituents. While this connection does not necessitate physical proximity, as Plato
might argue it would, presidents have historically traveled to be near the people they represent.
This travel suggests that physical proximity to the people is also symbolic of political proximity
to the people.
Since George Washington, presidents have traveled in an effort for presidents to “see and
be seen.”383 While the reasons for presidents to travel are expansive—such as collaborating on
transnational peace-treaty deals and creating environmental policies internationally, or, within
the U.S., “articulating administration policies, cultivating or dramatizing popular support, putting
public pressure on other politicians, boosting the president’s reelection chances, and bolstering
the electoral prospects of other candidate’s in the president’s party”384—a core purpose for the
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circulation of the presidential body has been to connect with “the people.” For instance, George
Washington first toured New England for a month, hoping to, in part, make himself “more
accessible to numbers of well-informed person, who might give him useful information and
advice on political subjects.”385 That is, for the sake of his presidential ethos, Washington needed
to make connections with the people. Since Washington, U.S. presidents have traveled in an
effort to “consolidate national power” by increasing the visibility of a national head throughout
the colonies. The arrival of Andrew Jackson ushered in a new commitment to travel that focused
on “continually mingling with large masses of people.”386 With more technology and greater
democratic, rather than republican, inclinations, presidential tours increased—with every
president between Jackson and James Buchanan (with the exception of William Henry Harrison)
touring the nation during their presidency.387 While presidential travel has increased both
nationally and internationally, one purpose of the travel, according to political scientist Richard
Ellis, remains the need for presidents to be physically near the people.
While presidents certainly travel to be symbolically near the people, the presence of the
president with the people is an antecedent to a constitutive rhetorical experience in which the
people imagine the president as a reflection of themselves and as their leader. The relationship
between speaker and audience is important in the relationship between the president and the
people he represents. According to Fisher, we can understand the president’s ethos by
considering how the president imagines the people, as related in his speeches. How the president
imagines the people is directly connected to how the people understand the president because the
president is a figure of the people. When presidents travel, a unique experience occurs between
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the president and the audience that cannot occur through disembodied speech. Thus, Obama’s
physical presence with transnational audience strengthened his ethos as a representative, helping
him to move from the realm of the national to the transnational and global.
4.2.2.2 Definition of a Situation
According to David Zarefsky, presidential rhetoric “defines political reality.” That is,
Zarefsky notes, characterizations of social realities are not “given,” but rather “chosen from
among multiple possibilities.”388 Thus, Obama’s naming of these meetings with foreign citizens
“town halls” has meaning, and it has the potential to shape and define political realities such as
the role of the president in relation to the citizens in the town hall meetings. In addition to
shaping the political reality, Obama’s defining of the situation as a town hall meeting had the
potential to “shape the context in which events . . . are viewed by the public.” 389 The power of
definition, in this instance, could extend from the transnational audience present at the events to
the wider audiences that broadcast or read about the events, potentially also informing how the
U.S. audience understood the role of the president.
Moreover, the naming of these events as town hall meetings plays an important role
shaping Obama’s rhetoric at the meetings. The U.S. town hall meeting is a rhetorical tradition.
Rhetorical traditions, as John Murphy notes, “provide inventional resources which offer actors
the opportunity to construct political authority.”390 Obama drew upon the rhetorical tradition of
the town hall meeting to frame his dialogue with transnational audiences. By naming the events
town hall meetings as opposed to “question and answer forums,” for instance, Obama invoked
U.S. national mythos of direct democracy and thus implied particular rhetorical norms of
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participation. New England town hall meetings were, as political scientist Frank M. Bryan
argues, the only instances of “real democracy” in the history of U.S. politics. These meetings
functioned as democratic forums by inviting all eligible citizens to legislate themselves.391 They
were moments of direct, rather than representative, democracy—arguably as pure in form as ever
experienced in the U.S. The cultural memory of town hall meetings, especially as articulated by
political theorists such as Alexis de Tocqueville, is that they were central to municipal
governance. Tocqueville argued that these meetings were “to liberty what primary schools are to
science; they bring it within the people’s reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy
it,”392 a description that reflects the idea that town hall meetings are democratic events in the
truest sense. Within town hall meetings, or at least the public memory of town hall meetings,
“the people” have direct access to power. They make effective change; they actively consent to
laws that are binding upon themselves and their communities.
Of course, the power of presidential definition is constrained. Just because the president
calls a rhetorical situation a “town hall” meeting, does not make it so. There are many
differences between New England town hall meetings and Obama’s town meetings abroad, not
the least of which is that Obama doesn’t represent the foreign citizens with whom he participated
in the meeting; therefore, these citizens could not expect results from their dialogue with the
president. These transnational town hall meetings risked offering false hope to transnational
citizens, as Obama did not have actual power to make effective change in their national
governments.
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That Obama did not offer political representation, however, does not preclude the
possibility of positive effects from the rhetorical interaction, either. There is a potential value in
creating a better understanding between a person who holds enormous global power—the U.S.
president—and foreign citizens. In other words, Obama’s power to define could have effects in
the symbolic realm, not only the political realm.
4.2.2.3 Leader and Teacher of Democratic Practice
Obama’s town hall meetings drew upon certain norms for democratic participation in
historical U.S. town hall meetings. This forum invited Obama’s audience members to enact,
momentarily, a version of transnational democratic deliberation—by engaging with him on
issues of their own agenda. Vanessa Beasley notes that “ritualized instances of presidential
speech can be expected to affirm idealized cultural norms.”393 In this case, the idealized cultural
norms are those of the United States, and they were transferred to a transnational scale.394 That is,
they were not shared norms among the audience and the speaker. Obama transposed U.S.
practices to citizens of other nations. Thus, if idealized cultural norms were affirmed, they were
the cultural norms of the U.S. In this way, the “transnational democratic deliberation” that
Obama circulates remained within the value-frame of the U.S. This is significant, because it
shows that if transnational citizens identify with Obama as a potential representative, Obama’s
“global role” is more imperialistic than it is anything else. That Obama positioned himself as a
teacher of these “democratic” norms suggests that, like his predecessors, Obama used of the
tropes of democracy and U.S. exceptionalism for the benefit of the U.S.
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The aspect of the town hall forum that differentiates it from other speeches delivered to
international audience is that it relied on dialogue with foreign citizens. Dialogue offers an
orderly way to express disagreement. At a Young Southeast Asian Leaders town hall meeting,
some of the students brought protest signs with them. Obama responded to the signs by asking
the audience members to put them away. “We’re here for a town hall,” he said. “See, that’s the
thing, when you have a town hall, you don’t have a protest because you can just ask the
questions directly.”395 In this moment, Obama exerted control over his audience by silencing it,
thereby reinforcing a norm of a deliberative democratic forum common to the U.S., which, as
several rhetorical scholars have noted, has always feared the demos. 396 Despite silencing the
demos for the sake of order, Obama used the dialogic format to show that the town hall meeting
was a democratic event.
Obama’s town hall meetings also modeled national, racial, and gender equality. Obama
advised the students to not divide themselves “on religious and ethnic lines and racial lines” and
not to “discriminate against women.” He said that if they refrain from these types of
discrimination, they are “not guaranteed success but at least … not guaranteed failure.”397 He
explained, perhaps presumptuously, to the Young African Leaders, that he would call on “girl,
boy, girl, boy” because one of the things he wanted to “teach… Africa is how strong the women
are and how we've got to empower women.”398 By alternating between women and men and by
calling on students from all nations and people groups present in the meetings, Obama modeled
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the value of equal representation in democratic events. When young leaders participated in these
meetings, then, they engaged in a dialogic process of civic participation that Obama proposed as
a model for global citizenship. Obama’s performance as the leader of these town hall meetings—
the one who set the rules, the one who modeled representation, dialogue, and democratic norms,
in a deliberation over transnational policy, invited the audience to understand him as an active
political representative.
Obama’s performance as a representative is not without its complications. Scholars often
criticize democratic deliberation, which Obama modeled, as Western-centric, meaning that it is
not inclusive of other types of thought or styles of participation, and that its values are framed by
the West.399 Obama’s positioning of himself as a leader of values, such as equality, is also
potentially patronizing. In a town hall meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Obama stated that the
“interesting thing about being President of the United States” is that he is “not just President of
the United States . . . [because] if there are problems elsewhere, people still expect you to solve
them, even though they're not your country. And that's part of the leadership and obligation and
responsibility that we have as a powerful nation.”400 Obama’s speech on his relationship with the
rest of the world reflected American exceptionalist discourse of modern U.S. presidential
rhetoric—the U.S. president is the leader, the teacher, and the savior of the world.
The U.S. president not only positioned himself as exceptional through the power of the
nation-state, but also through its democratic values, which he described as universal. One way
that Obama demonstrated global leadership of these (U.S.) values was through the forum of the
town hall. Obama used the trope of democracy to lead transnational citizens in a pseudo-
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democratic event. In doing so, he increased authority for himself as a global leader, while also
listening to, and engaging with, the concerns of transnational citizens. He used American
exceptionalism to perform global representation and leadership, demonstrating one way
presidents use traditional U.S. public discourse to strengthen their global role.
4.2.2.4 Transnational Identification
Obama’s final rhetorical strategy was to identify with his audience through
transnationalism. Obama consistently recalled his own transnational background in these town
hall meetings. With the Young African Leaders, for instance, Obama spoke about his Kenyan
father. With the Young Leaders of the Americas, Obama reminded the audience that he was born
on an island and that a million Americans trace their ancestry to Jamaica.401 With the Young
Southeast Asian Leaders, Obama mentioned both his Indonesian sister who is married to a
Chinese man and his mother’s work abroad, reciting versions of the following:
As you know, I've got a strong personal connection to Southeast Asia. I spent time as a
young boy in Indonesia. Indonesia is in the house. My sister, Maya, is half-Indonesian—
she was born in Jakarta. My mother spent years working in rural villages in this region,
empowering women. And so the rich tradition of the Pacific—the food, the people—
which I like the people and I really like the food—this is part of who I am and how I see
the world.”402
These stories helped the president relate to his audience while inviting the audience to identify
with Obama. Obama shared a transnational identity similar to the identity he imposed onto the
audience. By drawing attention to the transnational aspects of his identity, Obama was able to

401
402

Obama, “Remarks by President Obama in Town Hall with Young Leaders of the Americas,” April 9, 2015.
Obama, “Remarks by President Obama in Town Hall with Young Leaders of the Americas,” April 9, 2015.

139

consubstantiate with his transnational audience, bolstering his role as symbolic global
representative.
4.3

Obama Figures Foreign Citizens
In addition to providing a forum in which Obama could discursively and physically

present himself as a symbolic representative of transnational citizens, the town hall meetings also
provided a rhetorical context for Obama to define extra-national identity markers. Namely,
Obama figured his audiences as transnational/global, rather than national citizens. He also altered
American exceptionalist rhetoric, arguing that foreign citizens were exemplary. Together, these
characteristics offer a differentiation between transnational policy speech and foreign policy
speech, traditionally exclusionary American myths providing a rhetorical resource for the
characterization of foreign citizens.
4.3.1 Citizens as Transnational/Global
Obama constructed transnational identification for the town hall audiences through the
grouping of nations and through his discourse about these groups. Town hall meetings rarely
contain single nation states. For instance, Obama met with the Young Leaders of the Americas,
Young African Leaders, and Young Southeast Asian Leaders throughout his terms. These town
hall meetings were then institutionalized into White House Initiatives, a practice Obama hoped
his successors would continue.403
The grouping of these citizens provided a context for the audiences to think of themselves
collectively. Obama encouraged this collective thinking throughout his discourse in several
ways, including presenting statistics that reflected the citizens’ transnational, rather than national,
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makeup; focusing on policies that affect those particular geopolitical regions; and discussing the
groups’ collective vision. In these ways, Obama invited citizens to understand themselves as
having transnational, rather than solely national, identities. For instance, Obama told Young
Southeast Asian Leaders that he visited with them “because the ten nations of ASEAN are home
to about one in ten of the world’s citizens. About two-thirds of Southeast Asia’s population is
under thirty-five years old…. [This region has] growing economies and emerging democracies,
and a vibrant diversity.”404 In this example, Obama focused on the power of these citizens only in
relation to other citizens across national borders.
Obama also bolstered transnational identification by focusing exclusively on the merits of
policies that would benefit Obama’s determined region of citizens. For instance, Obama told the
Young Southeast Asian Leaders that the “landmark Trans-Pacific Partnership” would “grow our
economies and support jobs in each of our countries. Together, we're working to stand up for
human rights and democracy.”405 Obama argued that nations are partners with one another—they
succeed or fail together. Obama was able to talk about transnational policies because he
presented these citizens as holding a singular purpose. To the Young African Leaders, Obama
positioned a group of nations as one entity with one vision. He said:
You represent a different vision, a vision of Africa on the move—an Africa that’s ending
old conflicts, as in Liberia, where President Sirleaf told me, today’s children have “not
known a gun and not had to run”; an Africa that’s modernizing and creating
opportunities— agribusiness in Tanzania, prosperity in Botswana, political progress in
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Ghana and Guinea; an Africa that’s pursuing a broadband revolution that could transform
the daily lives of future generations.406
Here, Obama presented the stories of several nations alongside each other, implying that these
nations have similar qualities to one another—so much so that they qualify as a single entity—
“an Africa.” By presenting “an Africa,” Obama shaped his audience’s identity as transnational
rather than national, revealing another aspect of how U.S. presidents perform a global role.
Transnational citizenship is part of a global, rather than national, imaginary. As such, it has the
potential to help audiences imagine extra-national representative and leadership possibilities.
The exceptions to the creation of transnational audiences include one meeting in China
with a primarily Chinese audience, one meeting in India with a primarily Indian audience, and
one meeting in France with a primarily French audience. Still, the meeting in France took place
in a border town, which Obama called out explicitly, saying, “Strasbourg has been known
throughout history as a city at the crossroads . . . . It’s fitting because we find ourselves at a
crossroads as well—all of us—for we’ve arrived at a moment where each nation and every
citizen must choose at last how we respond to a world that has grown smaller and more
connected than at any time in its existence.”407 Here, Obama stressed the importance of
understanding the world as interconnected and dependent. Obama constituted his audiences as
purposefully transnational, and he identified with these constructed audiences by enacting
transnationalism as well.
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Furthermore, Obama consistently proposed that his audience members would become
global rather than national leaders. For instance, when one of the Young African Leaders asked
if the president would continue the Young African Leaders Initiative once he had left office,
Obama responded that he was working toward institutionalizing the program so that future
presidents would continue to sustain the program. Here, he pointed out that this initiative was not
only in Africa—that it is also in Asia and Latin America, because “as I said before, ultimately
you’re going to be global leaders, not just leaders in your own country.”408 The vision of his
audience members being global leaders rather than purely national ones also appeared in his
speeches when he stated the goals of the town hall meetings. When he met with the Young
Southeast Asian Leaders, he told them that his vision is one of a “shared future” that “America
cannot impose” and that this future “is one we need to build together, in partnership, with all the
nations and people of the region, especially young people.”409 Obama’s message displayed the
implications of the town hall meeting forum: that the students were equal, democratic citizens
who were to work together to make effective change.
The students’ interactions with the president, though, never reflect that they understood
themselves in such a way, instead identifying as citizens of particular nation-states, or even
regions of nation-states. In the final meeting of Young Southeast Asian Leaders, for instance,
questions included, “What is your view on the democracy in Malaysia with the recent jailing of
Anawar Ibrahim, the opposition leader, and the crackdown on opposition?” and “What do you
see . . . [as] critical issues . . . [in which] the U.S. can contribute economic development in
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Burma?”410 Both of these questions regarded the specific country of the audience member who
asked Obama the question. Likewise, Young African Leaders asked if the President “will support
Africa’s condition for permanency at the U.N. Security Council.”411 The audience members’
political subjectivity remained within the realm of their nation states or region of nation-states.
This is important because it shows that Obama’s transnational citizen-making was not entirely
successful. Though citizens came together across nations to meet with Obama, they did not
identify as transnational or global citizens—they remained in the realm of the nation-state.
Citizens, in these cases, were more willing to believe that the U.S. president has power to make
effective change in their lives, and potentially shift the identity of the president, than they were to
believe they are connected to other citizens across state borders.
4.3.2

Transnational Citizens as Exceptional
To a group of young Southeast Asian citizens, Obama said that the ASEAN region has

“incredible potential…as a place of religious diversity and ethnic diversity,” and this region can
“set an example, not just to stand up to violent extremism, but to build interfaith dialogue.”412
While seemingly innocuous, this statement veered dramatically from traditional foreign policy
rhetoric, which rarely describes other nations as places that may set a moral example for the rest
of the world. The president exemplified a region of nations as being uniquely able to lead against
violence and to promote diversity—a common refrain in domestic political speech when
referring to the U.S.
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It is rare for presidents to ever exemplify other nations as models. Kevin Coe and Rico
Neumann find that from 1934 to 2008, presidents only held up foreign entities as exemplars three
times (out of 2,480 total mentions) in State of the Union (SOTU) speeches.413 Sheila Croucher
notes that Obama made sixty-eight references to foreign entities in SOTUs from 2010 to 2014
and only three of those references can be considered “cosmopolitan,” or acknowledging common
humanity and moral reasoning.414 In Obama’s final two SOTU addresses, I found approximately
thirty references to foreign entities (including the world or the “global”), only one of which
named another nation as cosmopolitan or exemplary. The exception to the rule was when Obama
said that the U.S. is the only “advanced country on Earth that doesn't guarantee paid sick leave or
paid maternity leave to our workers.”415 Here, Obama strayed from an expected discourse of
exceptionalism to show that the U.S. lags behind other countries in employee rights.
In Obama’s SOTU addresses, the references he made to foreign entities were almost
exclusively about terrorism or economic competition. For example, regarding China, Obama
said: “twenty-first century businesses, including small businesses, need to sell more American
products overseas. Today, our businesses export more than ever, and exporters tend to pay their
workers higher wages. But as we speak, China wants to write the rules for the world's fastest
growing region. That would put our workers and our businesses at a disadvantage. Why would
we let that happen? We should write those rules.”416 For Obama, as a representative and leader of
the U.S., the U.S. should have the power and authority to “write the rules” for trade in Asia,
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rather than the most populated country in Asia writing the rules for themselves. This is
exceptionalist speech that contrasts with how Obama broached the topic of economy and trade at
his town hall meeting in Shanghai. There, Obama used China’s economic success as a marker of
strength, saying the United States admires China’s “growing economy . . . [and] extraordinary
commitment to science and research.” 417 It is not common in presidential speech on foreign
policy to admire another country’s growing economy. According to exceptionalist precepts,
another country’s competitive economy would threaten the U.S.’s God-given right to be
supreme.
In Strasbourg, France, Obama admitted “failure” for the U.S. to “appreciate Europe’s
leading role in the world.” In fact, Obama says, “America has shown arrogance and been
dismissive, even derisive.”418 Here, the president not only acknowledges a U.S. failure—but also
admitted to shared leadership and responsibility. While it is not surprising that a president would
speak well of a country when he stands before them on their own turf and less well of a foreign
country when he addresses the state of the union, it is nonetheless important to note that there is
now a forum in which a president might not only mention foreign entities, but also treat them as
worthy of emulation. So far, this is unique to the Obama presidency and it signals a potential
shift in presidential policy speech. Moreover, it reveals how presidents might shape the extranational identity of citizens outside of the United States. Just as U.S. exceptionalism shapes and
reflects national identity, the exemplification of foreign nations invites these nations to imagine
their role within the rest of the world—or at least their role according the U.S. president.
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In addition to exemplifying foreign nations and admitting past mistakes, Obama also
described the U.S. as a model to avoid. This, of course, is in direct opposition to the rhetoric of
American exceptionalism. A Malaysian citizen asked what advice Obama would give to
potential young leaders in the Southeast Asian region “to avoid the pitfalls of challenges facing
the U.S.” Obama responded that “it is very important to avoid any political system where money
overwhelms ideas” and then explained that the political process in the U.S. “has become so
expensive and it lasts so long . . . and when politicians have to raise so much money all the time,
then they start listening a little bit more to the people who have money, as opposed to ordinary
people.”419 In this quotation, Obama revealed corruption in the U.S. political system and
undercut the U.S. as a democratic nation. He also told the Southeast Asian audience that “politics
in the United States increasingly is defined by personal attacks and saying very sensational
things in the media.”420 In this response, Obama did not use American exceptionalist rhetoric. He
did, however, continue to position himself as a moral leader and teacher. By figuring
transnational citizens as exceptional, and at the same time denying American exceptionalism,
Obama strayed from traditional foreign policy speech, exemplifying a difference between foreign
policy and transnational policy speech. Moreover, this speech reveals how a president can
connect to foreign citizens, an important aspect of a global presidential role.
4.4

Conclusion
In this chapter, I examined a third audience relevant to the global role of the president—

transnational citizens. Obama’s town hall meetings provided a case study in which presidential
speech was directed toward, and in dialogue with, these transnational citizens. By analyzing
these speeches through the lenses of transnational policy speech and the myth of American
419
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exceptionalism, I found two important aspects of the president’s rhetoric toward foreign citizens.
First, that the president used American exceptionalist rhetoric and practices to position himself as
a global leader, teacher, and representative. And second, that he paradoxically dropped this
exceptionalism as he called forth a transnational and global identity among these citizens. These
two aspects of Obama’s rhetoric display the complicated dynamic of representation and
citizenship under conditions of globalization.
Furthermore, this chapter provided a deeper understanding of rhetorical circulation—of
both rhetorical practices and of the orator himself. There is reason to understand these town halls
meetings as modeling global citizenship through a transnational circulation of rhetorical practice.
Thomas Farrell argues that a rhetorical forum provides a “provisionally constrained context and
an avenue of mediation among discourses that might otherwise be self-confirming,
incommensurable, or perhaps not even heard at all.”421 It is possible that these citizens’ concerns
would not have been heard by a political leader had they not been a part of Obama’s town hall
meetings. However, the citizens still experienced little power in these rhetorical forums. While
the foreign citizens might be heard, to an extent, in these town hall meetings, there was also
significant uneven power structure at play. The president held political power, whereas these
audience members, in this rhetorical forum, did not. So while the citizens and the president may
enact a type of discursive global citizenship in these forums, the citizens were not making their
own laws that would be binding for them—which was the power of true New England town hall
meetings.
Thus, while embodied presidential circulation did the constitutive work of inviting a new
global imaginary of the relationship between the U.S. president and the foreign citizen, it was, in

421

Thomas B. Farrell, Norms of Rhetorical Culture (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993), 282.

148

the end, not entirely successful. Jason Edward Black argued that “circulation involves
interpretive communities whose cultural workings provide their own ways to evaluate and live
their public lives based on the circulated texts that mesh with their civic mythos.”422 In this case,
the circulation was the president himself and the forum of the town hall meetings, not discursive
texts—and, ultimately, the citizens could not share civic mythos because they belonged to
different nations. Thus, they retained their own national interests and identity. Moreover, these
audience members did not actually possess the power of self-governance as implied by the town
hall meeting forum—the forum that invited them to understand themselves and each other as
global citizens was unable to provide the political power necessary for them to make political
decisions. They could only ask the president for his help. So, it follows that the invitation to
understand Obama as a global leader was accepted and the invitation to understand themselves as
active global citizens was rejected.
This chapter is rhetorically significant because it extends a study of rhetorical circulation
to include rhetorical forums and presidential presence. Politically, it reveals how President
Obama used a democratic practice to position himself as a global representative and to create
identity formations among foreign citizens. In the next chapter, I explain the rhetorical and
political implications of this dissertation as well as provide some discussion of how Donald
Trump’s rhetoric fits within this schema of the global imaginary.
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5

CONCLUSIONS

On March 20, 2016, President Obama became the first sitting president to visit the
Republic of Cuba since Calvin Coolidge traveled there by battleship in 1928.423 Obama’s
presence in Cuba displayed a new era of relations between the U.S. and Cuba. This event and the
discourse that surrounded the event echoed that of George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev’s
meetings in Malta, itself significant for ending the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the
U.S. Just as Gorbachev’s spokesman declared the Cold War “buried at the bottom of the
Mediterranean Sea,424 Obama stated that he had come to Cuba to bury the last remnant of the
Cold War in the Americas.”425 Also like Bush and Gorbachev’s meeting in Malta, Obama’s trip
to Cuba included a joint press conference with the estranged nation’s head of state. This
collaborative event displayed a degree of solidarity between the two nations as they appeared
together before international press. Moreover, it provided an opportunity for Obama to perform a
global role—engaging in a cooperative act of leadership with the leader of one of the U.S.’s
long-standing adversaries and employing democratic ideology throughout the joint press
conference.
Democratic ideology, and U.S. actions justified by democratic ideology, is a significant
element of the tense relationship between the U.S. and Cuba. It is also foundational to the
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rhetorical frame U.S. presidents use to construct a global imaginary.426 For instance, in the joint
press conference with Castro, Obama made a case for the universal nature of democracy, saying:
America believes in democracy. We believe that freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly and freedom of religion are not just American values but are universal values.
They may not express themselves exactly in the same way in every country. They may
not be enshrined in the founding documents or constitutions of every country in the same
way or protected legally in exactly the same ways, but the impulse, the human impulse
towards freedom, the freedom that José Martí talked about, we think is a universal
longing.427
Obama, as a representative of the U.S., claimed the values of democracy and human rights.
Extending this argument, Obama maintained that human rights and democracy, as defined by the
U.S., are not only American values, but also the impulses of humanity— meaning they are
universal. He then referenced Cuban nationalist hero José Martí, figuring him as a synecdoche
for the world. Not only do Americans believe in these democratic ideas, the argument goes, so
do all great people from other nations, as represented in Martí.428 In this speech, Obama made a
case that the U.S. was in the position to be a model for other nations because of its commitment
to democracy and human rights. Furthermore, Obama appealed to his audience and established
his global role by providing evidence that these values were transnational, crossing the
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ideological and geographical borders of nations that had somewhat remained within the polarized
blocs of the Cold War frame.
Further, Obama used the press conference to promote U.S. global ideology by pressuring
Castro into engaging with the press and thus responding to questions about human rights
violations. Obama, after answering a question that U.S. Andrea Mitchell posed to both leaders
about human rights, said to Castro, “Okay, now I’m done, but Señor Presidente, I think Andrea
had a question for you just about your vision. It’s up to you . . . . if you want to address that
question [about human rights].”429 At this moment, Obama presented himself as a leader willing
to engage in a democratic practice and positioned Castro as a potentially uncooperative Other
who might not want to address the topic of human rights. Castro took the reporter’s question,
defending Cuba’s human right’s record. The press conference presented an opportunity for
democratic performance by both leaders, though it is clear that Obama navigated the reporters’
questions with more ease than did Castro. Thus, the press conference offers another example of
how presidents use institutions to promote their image abroad.
Obama’s trip to Cuba provides a representative anecdote of several through lines in this
dissertation. First, it shows how elements of the Cold War discursive frame persist in
contemporary presidential rhetoric and are used on behalf of the global imaginary. Second, it
shows how presidents use “democracy” to legitimate themselves as global leaders. Third, it
shows how presidents use institutional elements to promote the global imaginary.
This chapter continues with an overview of each case study. I then discuss the themes of
the dissertation, which include (1) the institutional facets of a global presidency, including
bilateral conversations with other world leaders; joint press conferences; and transnational town
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hall meetings. Each of these elements provide transnational audiences, with whom presidents
collaborate, and for whom presidents craft messages specifically for extra-national citizens and
contexts. (2) The discursive construction of universals, through which presidents ground their
authority. (3) The ways in which presidents shape identity among nations and citizens in a global
context. (4) Globalization as a subjective phenomenon created through the rhetorical
construction of a global imaginary. Then, I discuss the political and rhetorical implications of
this study. Rhetorically, this dissertation helps us better understand the relationship between
speakers and transnational audiences; expands our understanding of the rhetorical presidency in a
global context; and provides case studies that connect rhetoric to the imaginary. Politically, this
dissertation provides insight into post-Cold War presidential speech; transnational relationships
among nations; and how globalization, and the presidential construction thereof, has shaped
political realities. Finally, I present Donald Trump’s presidency as an example of backlash
against U.S. presidential involvement in globalization. Applying the lens of the global imaginary,
I briefly discuss Trump’s discourse to show the potential of this rhetorical framework to analyze
presidential discourse even when this discourse presents an aberration from the norm.
5.1

Chapter Summary
The first case study examined George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev’s discourse at

the end of the Cold War. These world leaders represented the Western and Eastern Blocs,
respectively. When they met in Malta, Bush and Gorbachev expected their time together to be
merely a preparatory meeting for a larger summit that would bring the war to a close. The talks
were so successful that by the end of their time in Malta, Bush and Gorbachev held an
unprecedented joint press conference, symbolically ending the Cold War. In this analysis, I show
that Bush and Gorbachev negotiated the “East-West” metaphorical frame pervasive in Cold War
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discourse during their private meetings. In doing so, they formed global imaginaries that aligned
sufficiently for the two leaders to perform a degree of unity that joint press conferences demand.
This chapter, then, revealed an aspect of the global role of the president—that presidents interact
with other world leaders on the global stage to negotiate new political realities.
The second case study examined Bill Clinton and George W. Bush’s speeches before the
United Nations General Assembly. Clinton and Bush used the UNGA to universalize the trope of
“democracy,” thus increasing their authority and legitimacy as global leaders. They did so first
by enacting democratic leadership though the speech setting of the UNGA, the most deliberative
and representative body of the UN, thus gaining collective political approval. Second, they
conflated “democracy” with “global market” and “human rights.” In doing so, they served U.S.
interests in a global context. This chapter used the rhetorical theory of “universal audience” to
explain how presidents may relate to the UN to universalize U.S. values, protect U.S. interests,
and strengthen their role as a global leader.
The third case study analyzed Barack Obama’s transnational town hall meetings. In doing
so, I shifted the focus toward a third audience central to the role of the contemporary president—
transnational citizens. These town hall meetings revealed that foreign citizens imagined, to some
degree, that Obama was their leader and representative. In analyzing Obama’s performance,
embodied circulation, and speech in these town hall meetings, I discussed several of Obama’s
rhetorical strategies that might account for these students’ global imaginary. Furthermore, I
described Obama’s speech as transnational foreign policy speech, differentiating it from
traditional foreign policy speech and outlining its characteristics. Finally, I delineated how
presidents can use this speech to construct transnational and global identity for both themselves
and their audiences.
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5.2

The Rhetorical Presidency and the Global Imaginary
This dissertation builds off previous scholarship that critiques and extends the rhetorical

presidency as a paradigm for studying the institution of the presidency, and especially the
relationship between the presidency and the people, through the use of rhetoric. The rhetorical
presidency model, as developed originally by James Ceaser, Glen Thurow, Jeffrey Tulis, and
Joseph Bessette, notes a shift in the institution of the presidency in the latter half of the twentieth
century in which presidents began to appeal directly to the public through rhetoric. The causes of
this shift, they argue, was a combination of a modern doctrine of presidential leadership, a rise of
mass media, and the modern presidential campaign.430 Studies in the fields of political science
and communication built upon this theory of the rhetorical presidency, focusing primarily on
how the rhetorical presidency changed the institution of the presidency or the speech,
respectively.431 What all of these studies have in common is that they focus on the presidency as
a national institution. I used the rhetorical presidency paradigm as s starting point for
understanding a global presidency, grounding it in an understanding of the presidency as an
institution that has the potential to shift over time, and providing context for how the president
has related to “the people” over time. The dissertation departed from the model in that “the
people” I considered were transnational, not national. The dissertation also considered additional
institutional elements of the presidency as it focused on the role of the president outside the
bounds of the nation-state.
This dissertation also fits within the realm of scholarship on presidential rhetoric. Martin
Medhurst distinguishes the rhetorical presidency model from the study of presidential rhetoric,
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arguing that while scholars of the rhetorical presidency are “concerned with the nature, scope,
and function of the presidency as a constitutional office,” those who study presidential rhetoric
are concerned with the “principles and practice of rhetoric” within the construct of the
presidency.432 This dissertation concerns both sub-disciplines. I analyzed presidential public
address, gaining insight into transnational rhetoric broadly, and how presidents construct a global
imaginary more specifically. I analyzed the relationship between the president’s character, his
audience, his appeals, and the context of his speech. The context of the speech, of course,
includes the institution of the presidency—bound by tradition and generic expectation. The
dissertation revealed both how the institution of the presidency functions rhetorically under
conditions of globalization and how presidents use rhetoric to negotiate new global political
realities with other world leaders, intervene in supranational institutions, and imagine new
identities between nations and citizens.
In order to study the multi-faceted global presidency, I attended specifically to how
presidents have engaged with different transnational audiences since the Cold War. I made this
methodological choice because the end of the Cold War presents a moment in which global
alliances realigned. There was also a shift in the role of the president and in presidential rhetoric.
In negotiating new political realities, presidents constructed new reasons for international policy
and forged new relationships with international audiences. For example, George H.W. Bush’s
presidency presented an opportunity, and perhaps a need, for the president to (re)construct a
global imaginary. This imaginary functioned as a rhetorical framework for future presidents to
engage in the world and among transnational audiences. Of course, Bush did not invent the
global imaginary out of thin air and then pass it down to his successors. Instead, the global
432
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imaginary contains elements of the U.S. rhetorical tradition from different moments in its
history. For instance, U.S. public address has always relied on American exceptionalism to
justify international intervention. Since at least the creation of the Declaration of Independence,
politicians have espoused American values as “universal.” Politicians have always created an
Other to war against. And since the Cold War, U.S. public address has relied on the “East-West”
frame to explain foreign policy decisions. My case studies show that presidents draw upon this
American rhetorical tradition to create a global imaginary, and it is through this tradition that
they ground their authority as global leaders.
This global imaginary works differently in different contexts and for different ends, but it
coheres with common themes. George H.W. Bush’s presidency was characterized by the end of
the Cold War. He used the global imaginary to present a new world order in which the U.S. was
the leader. Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, as the first presidents to begin their terms after the
Cold War, used the global imaginary to universalize democracy through speeches before an
increasingly important supranational institution, the UN, thus emboldening Bush’s claim to
global leadership. These presidents, through their role as leaders of the U.S. as well as
supranational institutions, provided a global imaginary that was grounded in the idea that the
U.S. was exceptional because of its commitment to values, which they argued were universal.
Barack Obama, then, used this as a warrant to enact global representation and leadership. In
other words, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush’s construction of a global
imaginary provided background knowledge for Obama’s performance of a global presidency.
The global imaginary functioned as a rhetorical tool to both construct and justify a global role for
the contemporary president, which extends the interests of the U.S. throughout the world,
undoubtedly exacerbating global power inequalities.
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While I focused on different types of audiences to understand how presidents develop a
global imaginary, the global presidency model has dimensions that would benefit from different
methodologies. For instance, further studies could consider the global “image” of the president—
how presidents construct an aesthetic to appeal to transnational audiences and how these
transnational audiences construct images of presidents; how different presidential personas
appeal to transnational audiences; how the circulation of mediated messages change the
relationship between the president and transnational audiences; and how presidents engage with
transnational citizens within the U.S. Each of these studies would deepen our understanding of
the global role of the contemporary president and presidential rhetoric.
5.3

Implications
This dissertation has rhetorical and political implications. Rhetorically, it deepens our

understanding of the relationship between speakers and transnational audiences, expands our
understanding of the political rhetoric in the context of the global, and connects rhetoric to the
concept of the imaginary. Presidents, as powerful political actors, use different types of
transnational audiences to figure their own role in the world and to figure the relationship
between their audience and the rest of the world.433 Moreover, presidents draw on aspects of the
global imaginary and, in turn, alter this imaginary.
For instance, in Chapter Two, when George H.W. Bush engaged with Mikhail Gorbachev
in Malta, Bush figured himself as a global leader. In these discussions, he also collaborated with
Gorbachev’s vision of how nations should relate to one another as members of a global society
that had similar values, rather than exceptional Western values. The two leaders drew upon the
transcendent notions of justice and freedom to forge particular global imaginaries. Chapter Three
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showed how presidents used the trope of “democracy” to make themselves, and thus the U.S.,
one with the UNGA, their universal audience. To do so, they expanded a national ideograph
(“democracy”) into the realm of the universal, constructing a global imaginary that relied on a
U.S. concept. That is, “democracy” referred to a specifically U.S.-brand of democracy, which
Clinton used to alter the global imaginary. Finally, Chapter Four revealed how Obama presented
himself not only as a global leader and representative of the foreign citizens in his immediate
audience, but he also constructed transnational identities between citizens in his town hall
meetings. He drew upon an aspect of the global imaginary that had been established by
presidents and other political elites before him— universal democracy—to present himself as a
representative as well as a leader within a transnational democratic forum, thus expanding the
role of the president in the global imaginary. These cases show how presidents use the global
imaginary as an inventional resource to create new realities and relationships between speakers,
audiences, and the rest of the world.
This dissertation is politically significant in that, as presidents create these new global
realities, they also establish and reinforce often problematic global hierarchies. Furthermore,
through understanding the relationship between the rhetorical and the imaginary in the context of
political leaders and transnational audiences, we can better understand global problems. Global
problems, in addition to the power inequalities include, for example, immigration, global
warming, and war. Understanding “the global” as a rhetorical construction provides a starting
point for analyzing political speech about these problems. Political actors and discourses are part
of a global network with multiple global imaginaries. By untangling this web, we can more
clearly understand the background knowledge that provides warrants for these discourses.
Another example of a global problem, for some, is globalization itself, and the role of the U.S.
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president in it. In the next section, I turn to anti-globalization rhetoric and the presidency of
Donald Trump. Using the rhetorical lens of the global imaginary and the historical understanding
of how post-Cold War presidents have used the global imaginary to shape their role in the world,
I provide initial insight into Trump’s presidency as an anomaly of the global presidency.
5.4

Backlash Against Globalization
On September 26, 2016, presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Donald

Trump engaged in a televised debate. During this debate, Clinton said the following:
I want to reassure our allies in Japan and South Korea and elsewhere that we have
mutual defense treaties and we will honor them. It is essential that America's
word be good. And so I know that this campaign has caused some questioning
and worries on the part of many leaders across the globe. But I want to say …
our word is good. It's also important that we look at the entire global situation. …
People around the word follow our presidential campaigns so closely, trying to
get hints about what we will do. Can they rely on us? Are we going to lead the
world with strength and in accordance with our values? … I intend to be a leader
of our country that people can count on, both here at home and around the world,
to make decisions that will further peace and prosperity, but also stand up to
bullies, whether they're abroad or at home. We cannot let those who would try to
destabilize the world to interfere with American interests and security.” 434
Hillary Clinton’s statement in the first presidential debate with Donald Trump is representative
of contemporary U.S. presidential speech— until Trump. Clinton’s run for president was
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unsuccessful, yet her speech reflected a similar understanding of the role of the U.S. president as
the previous four post-Cold War presidents. The discourse of these presidents— George H.W.
Bush, William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama— reflected the idea that the
presidency resides simultaneously in the sphere of the national and the global. Their rhetoric was
characterized by the notions that presidents must answer, to some extent, to other world leaders,
acknowledge and respond to non-U.S. citizens, and “look at the entire global situation” all the
while protecting “American interests and security.” Presidents perform this global role largely
discursively, which candidate Clinton self-reflexively demonstrated with her commitment to
“America’s word” toward other nations and being “a leader… people can count on, both here at
home and around the world.” 435 That is, the contemporary president (or in this case, candidate)
figures himself or herself rhetorically and politically as a global president. Donald Trump is an
exception that potentially proves this rule.
Trump’s speech throughout his campaign, and the beginning of his presidency, provides
an example of an aberration from post-Cold War presidential discourse, and his election a
populist backlash against globalization.436 By way of comparison, in their first debate, Clinton
spoke directly to world leaders, recommitting the U.S. to transnational treaties and deals. Trump,
on the other hand, criticized relationships between the U.S. and other nations that were, in his
judgment, not beneficial to the U.S. He said, “We defend Japan, we defend Germany, we defend
South Korea, we defend Saudi Arabia, we defend countries. They do not pay us. But they should
be paying us, because we are providing tremendous service and we're losing a fortune.” 437 That
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is, Trump argued that spending resources on other nations and their security was not in the
interest of the U.S. While the four presidents before him often connected the interests of the U.S.
with the global economy—social, economic, or political—Trump linked the good of the state
with its separation from international entanglements. For instance, part of Trump’s solution to
the problem of globalization, as stated in campaign speeches, was to withdraw from trade deals
such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP). In doing so, he said, America would be “put first again.” 438
Trump’s anti-globalization stance in this speech aligned with populist discourse in other
parts of the world. For instance, in a campaign speech on trade, Trump argued that political and
financial elites have used globalization to their advantage at the expense of U.S. workers. Trump
said that “Pennsylvania towns, once thriving and humming, are now in a state of total disrepair.
This wave of globalization has wiped out totally, totally, our middle class. It does not have to be
this way. We can turn it around and we can turn it around fast.”439 The argument—that
globalization takes away jobs at home—is a common refrain of politicians and blue collar
workers in other parts of the world. As David Rennie, a British journalist for The Economist,
noted, citizens throughout Western Europe say they have “lost the French dream” or “lost the
British dream” like U.S. citizens say they have “lost the American dream.”440 This “dream” is
tied to upward mobility and job stability. Citizens, in Western Europe and the U.S. alike, recall a
“golden era” of finding stable work and building a life without an advanced degree. While surely
there was never a utopian time during which everyone held jobs, there was a time when there
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was less market competition from regions in the world such as India and China in the U.S. and
Western Europe. The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 marked a shift in economic processes,
increasing global capitalism and, thus, increasing global competition for jobs.441 George H.W.
Bush, Bill Clinton, George Bush, and Barack Obama each, to some extent, framed this global
situation as an opportunity for U.S. citizens and the U.S. as a nation to gain more influence and
prosperity. Trump’s rhetoric, on the other hand, tapped into the populist resistance to
participation in “the global.” That is, Trump rejected the global imaginary constructed by the
presidents before him. Instead, he relied on a national imaginary exhibited in his slogan “Make
America Great Again.”
The concept of the global imaginary, and knowledge of the four previous presidents’ use
of the global imaginary, helps contextualize and make sense of Trump’s rhetoric. Trump, instead
of positioning himself as a global leader and representative, who wants to strengthen relations
between transnational audiences, rejected that rhetorical frame altogether, appealing to a
different audience base. Trump acknowledges globalization and positions himself against it,
tapping into populist, nationalist discourse. Analyzing Trump’s rhetoric through the lens of the
global imaginary reveals a potential shift in presidential rhetoric and the role of the contemporary
president, as Trump’s anti-globalization discourse is one reason that he has supporters at home
and abroad. Though certainly not the only reason for his presidential victory, and perhaps not
even the main reason, Trump’s stance against globalization provides one explanation for his
popularity.
This dissertation provides insight into the contemporary role of the president. This role, I
show, includes a global dimension. Post-Cold War presidents, until Trump, constructed a global
441
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imaginary, which is revealed in their discourses with transnational audiences. They used this
global imaginary to figure themselves as global leaders and representatives. Each drew upon the
trope of “democracy” to engage with their audiences, though they did so in different ways. By
the time Obama was in office, the president no longer needed to make a case for the
universalization of democracy—that work had already been done for him. Instead, he performed
his role as democratic leader. The global imaginary works to justify presidential acts. As populist
discourses arise around the world, as more physical walls are constructed, and as the immigration
crisis increases, it is also apparent that the global imaginary is limited.442
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